A TREATISE ON VIRTUE AND HAPPINESS.

BY

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M. D. AND F. R. S.

A NEW EDITION,
CORRECTED and very much IMPROVED
BY THE
AUTHOR.

——————Rectius hoc eſt:
Hoc faciens vivam melius; ſic dulcis amicis
Occurram. HOR.

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PREFACE.

THE ſubſtance of what is contained in this book, was publiſhed ſome years ago, and the favourable reception it met with, from ſome perſons whoſe judgment ought to be valued, has occaſioned its being offered to the public a little more at large; and as it now exceeds the bounds of a LETTER, the title is altered to that of a TREATISE.

It contains only a few obſervations on HUMAN NATURE, with ſome obvious reaſonings thereupon. Whether the obſervations are true, and the reaſonings juſt, muſt be left to the judgment of every candid and impartial reader: it appeals only to COMMON SENSE; and as it is copied from nature, and from the greateſt maſters, it pretends to no more than to ſerve as a key or introduction to what has been written by the moſt celebrated authors on this ſubject.

The matter itſelf is certainly of ſome importance; and whoever will beſtow a little pains and attention upon it, will find that his labour is not loſt:

Aeque pauperibus prodeſt, locupletibus æque;
Aeque neglectum pueris ſenibuſque nocebit. HOR.

There are none but who would deſire to paſs through the world as eaſily as they can, and to give themſelves and others as little trouble as is poſſible: and how we may learn to do this, and alſo obtain the greateſt and moſt laſting pleaſure, is the SUBJECT of the following inquiry. It has not, or at leaſt would not have, the air of a formal leſſon of inſtruction; but only conſiders how every man may be a proficient of HIMSELF, if he is willing to be at the pains.

But, as we own, that the method propoſed is attended with ſome preſent trouble, and requires ſome degree of SELF-DENIAL; it is not to be expected that it

will pleaſe: yet, ſurely, it were to be wiſhed, that every man, inſtead of amuſing himſelf with matters foreign to his purpoſe, would employ a little thought and care to underſtand himſelf; and uſe ſo much of that HOME PRACTICE which is here recommended, would be ſufficient to regulate his paſſions, and direct his aim to the higheſt good; ſtriving to make himſelf honeſt, rather than ſet his heart wholly upon being rich, or engage in any other vain purſuit.

This is all that is contended for; and this, it is ſhewn, would be much for the advantage of every individual, as well as that of the public: for if it could be accompliſhed, (as it appears to be no impoſſibility) it would have a happy influence in general. There would then be no cauſe to complain of bribery and corruption, nor of faction and ſedition; but it would reform all abuſes, and work a wonderful change in all orders and degrees of men.

But not to dwell upon a thought ſo viſionary and romantic: though we are not to expect that all men ſhould be abſolutely good and virtuous, yet they might perhaps approach nearer to it, if they could be convinced that it is their INTEREST, and not only ſo, but their higheſt PRIVILEGE, that to be virtuous, is the only way to be happy and free; whereas the contrary courſe leads to certain miſery and ſlavery. And it will avail but little to employ ſo much artifice and addreſs to obtain things of ſmall value, while the chief enjoyments are neglected: nor can we with any tolerable grace, boaſt of our excellent conſtitution, and that we enjoy civil liberty in ſo great perfection, if at the ſame time we are really ENSLAVED in a moral ſenſe, and can ſubmit to undergo a ſervitude more wretched and ignominious than is endured under the moſt abſolute rulers.

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PART I.

SECT. I.

Of human Affection and Motion in general.

WHEN we would inquire into the ſecret ſprings and cauſes of human action, we have no other way to proceed but by obſervation and experience; and by reflecting on what paſſes within ourſelves, we know that we not only perceive thoſe ideas which are in our minds, ſo as to diſcern the various appearances, and diſtinguiſh the ſeveral qualities and relations of things, but, which to us is of the greateſt importance, we are alſo variouſly affected by them, as they give us joy and ſatisfaction, pleaſure and delight, and thereby promote our happineſs; or elſe occaſion grief and diſturbance, uneaſineſs and pain, and ſo far contribute to our miſery.

To compare ideas one with another, and perceive their agreement or diſagreement, and there-

by to diſcover truth, and improve in knowledge, is the province of the underſtanding: but the power to feel pleaſure and pain is ſuppoſed to be another faculty of the mind, and in common language is called by the name of ſenſe. This is what all animals are poſſeſſed of in ſome degree, as it diſtinguiſhes the animal from the vegetable kingdom; for though ſome plants are called ſenſitive, becauſe they have been imagined to have ſome degree of ſelf-motion, yet that is not truly ſpontaneous, but purely owing to the mechaniſm of their parts.

Man in particular is ſuſceptible of a vaſt variety of pleaſures and pains, almoſt every impreſſion of objects from without, and every thought and reflection of the mind within, being capable of producing ſome degree of delight or diſturbance. And the ſeveral modes of grief and joy, excited in us by theſe objects acting upon our ſenſes, are called affections or paſſions.

Pleaſure is called good, and pain evil; but theſe terms are commonly applied to objects: for whatever is apt to raiſe or excite pleaſure in us, is in itſelf, and immediately good, as that which may procure us objects of pleaſure, is called mediately good. On the contrary, we name that evil, which gives us pain and diſturbance; and that is mediately or conſequentially evil, which will procure us any evil, or deprive us of any good.

Though numberleſs images of things, with all their different relations and proportions, were perceived by the mind, yet if they were not at-

tended with delight, or uneaſineſs, they would ſcarce have any effect upon us, but rather paſs away like a dream; they would leave no more impreſſion than ſhadows which fly over the fields; but all ideas received into our minds from the various objects which have any influence upon us, by ſtriking upon ſome of our ſenſes, or powers of affection, give us either pleaſure or pain; for whatever it is that produces neither of theſe, is not in itſelf either good or evil, but perfectly indifferent, and of no moment or concern.

We are not inſenſible to the action of objects which ſurround us, neither can we be unconcerned ſpectators of their ideas and repreſentations: but as the ſenſations of pleaſure and pain are annexed to the impreſſions of objects when preſent; ſo alſo when they are abſent, their images and repreſentations, as they paſs before our view, are attended with an idea, or appearance, a fancy, or opinion of good or evil, ariſing from the remembrance of what effect they have had, or the imagination of what they will have upon us, by producing in us either pleaſure or pain.

When the ideas of abſent objects are brought into our view, we are apt to conſider them with relation to ourſelves, and what operation they will have upon us, when preſent. If we know from experience that any thing has given us joy and delight, the ſpecies, or appearance of good, will attend the idea of that object, when it is abſent; and it will be the ſame, if from any cauſe we are perſuaded, or if we fancy, or imagine it

will give us pleaſure, mediately, or immediately; whereas, on the contrary, if we remember that any thing has given us pain and diſturbance, or if we are poſſeſſed with an opinion, that it will either mediately, or immediately contribute to our miſery, the appearance of evil will be united with that object.

Without entering into a nice diſquiſition concerning the powers and operations of the human mind, we know by experience, that we are not only capable of receiving a ſenſation, but alſo ſome ſort of an idea or conception of that ſenſation may be retained in the memory, when the object is not preſent to the ſenſe; and as objects by acting upon our ſenſes do excite pleaſing or diſagreable perceptions, ſo the ideas of theſe ſenſations, and alſo every fancy or opinion of good and evil, by ſtriking upon the imagination, do alſo affect us with pleaſure and pain; but then the affections produced by theſe reflected appearances, like inverted images, are of the oppoſite kind.

For whatever cauſes either grief or joy, when preſent, has, when abſent, a quite contrary effect. Thus preſent evil affects us with pain; but the remembrance of it, when removed, affords us pleaſure: alſo every repreſentation of calamity, from which we are ſecure, yields a ſecret delight. And as preſent good gives us joy and delight, ſo the loſs, the want or abſence of good, cauſes grief and uneaſineſs, whenever its idea is preſented to the mind: we alſo feel joy and ſatiſ-

faction from the appearance of approaching good, or departing evil, which is called hope, as the diſturbance we receive from the view of departing good, or approaching evil, is called fear: for we do not only regard what we are at this preſent moment, but are apt to ſuppoſe we ſhall be exiſting hereafter, and conſequently are concerned for our future ſtate, as well as the preſent.

The proſpect of being happy in the time to come, gives us preſent delight, as the view of any future miſery neceſſarily occaſions immediate diſturbance.

Thus there are two different conditions, or modifications of affection, which we are conſcious that we feel alternately; one is that of joy and delight, which we induſtriouſly ſeek after, judge it to be our right ſtate, and when obtained, we endeavour to preſerve it by all the means within our power; and the other is a ſtate of uneaſineſs and pain, which we take to be our wrong ſtate, and conſequently fly from it, ſo far as we are able: One determines us to continue as we are, and the other puts us upon altering our preſent poſture, and incites us to better our condition by a change.

When a man is free from all uneaſineſs, and has no perception of any thing but what is pleaſing and agreeable, he is then perfectly content with his preſent ſtate, and has no inclination nor endeavour but to continue it; but when theſe objects of good, or evil, begin to act upon us, ſo as to affect us with uneaſineſs, it is then we

are put into action, being neceſſarily determined to ſhun and eſcape, ſo far as we are able, every painful and uneaſy ſenſation, as well as to retain or continue that which is pleaſing and delightful.

Theſe different affections of pleaſure and pain, which we receive from objects applied to our ſenſes, or from the repreſentations of things in the mind, are properly called paſſions; yet they are at the ſame time motives or principles of action, as they determine the mind to exert its powers, either to continue its preſent ſtate, or elſe to change its ſituation.

Though this exertion of its powers and faculties is the proper action of the mind, yet theſe affections are the motives and inducements to it, and without ſuch affection there could be no motion; but if ever it happens, from any cauſe, that a man is rendered wholly inſenſible, ſo as to feel neither pleaſure or pain, he is then entirely inactive, and without motion, as much as any inanimate body whatſoever.

So far as we can learn from experience and obſervation, without being affected we are never moved: ſenſe is antecedent to motion; and though there may be ſenſe without motion, as when the organs are not at our command, yet without ſenſe there can be no motion, at leaſt none that is voluntary, or which can properly be called our own.

But we are very certain that we are endowed both with ſenſe, and a power of ſelf-motion;

the firſt informs us of onr right and wrong ſtate, as the latter enables us to purſue the one, and to avoid the other.

All preſent or approaching evil excites averſion, which implies not only the affection of pain and diſturbance, but an endeavour to fly from, and avoid it: as abſent or departing good occaſions deſire, which implies not only grief and uneaſineſs in the want of it, but an inclination to obtain and preſerve it.

Deſire, or averſion, is the *vis impreſſa*, or the moving force, in all voluntary agents; the one being an impulſe, whereby we are driven away from whatever we feel or imagine to be evil, as the other is an attraction, whereby we are drawn towards that which we take to be good: yet theſe may be reduced to one and the ſame, by a different view of their objects; if we conſider the abſence of good as an evil, and the removal of evil as a good, they may be made convertible terms. Thus deſire of good may be termed averſion to the want of it; and averſion to evil may be called a deſire of its removal.

This force of attraction, or repulſion, proceeds from the ſenſation of good or evil which is preſent, or from the appearance of it when abſent; for every idea of abſent pleaſure, which we want, and are not poſſeſſed of, is a negative pleaſure, or, in other words, it is a real pain; and the greater the appearance or opinion of the pleaſure, the greater will be our uneaſineſs in the want of it, and our deſire to obtain it. And as averſion

to preſent evil, is equal to the ſenſe of pain that we feel; ſo fear, or averſion to future evil, that is likely to befal us, will be proportionable to our idea of the miſery which we imagine it will bring upon us.

Hence we may perceive, that we are not only influenced by objects which are preſent, and applied to the ſenſe; but alſo that the fancy, and opinion of them, when abſent, or the bare imagination of what has poſſibly no real exiſtence, may affect us in the moſt ſenſible manner: and many of our paſſions are actually excited by theſe ideas and repreſentations of things in the mind, when our outward ſenſes are no ways employed; and it may perhaps be found, that ſome of the main ſprings of motion, the moſt exquiſite of our joys and griefs, our hopes and fears, do proceed from this original, and that affection does very much depend npon opinion.

Every deſire and averſion is attended with uneaſineſs, which ſerves as an impulſe to put us into motion, and without which we ſhould ſcarce move at all, but rather remain in perpetual inaction. When we are in a ſtate of indifference, the leaſt uneaſineſs will put us into action; and when we enjoy ſome great degree of pleaſure, yet that may not ſo wholly poſſeſs our thoughts, but it may be ſometimes interrupted for a few moments, by appearances of abſent things, which will be intruding: yet, before we can be moved out of our preſent ſituation, it is neceſſary that the force ſhould be ſufficient to overcome the re-

ſiſtance, or that the deſire of ſome abſent good, or fear of ſome approaching evil, ſhould prevail over the ſatisfaction of our preſent condition.

Though the ſatisfaction of our preſent condition be not very great, and the deſire of ſome abſent good be very ſtrong; yet, other ideas coming athwart may excite oppoſite and contrary affections; and if the deſire is balanced by ſome averſion to the means of obtaining it, or fear of ſome evil that may follow, we ſhall not be put into motion, but be determined to forbear the purſuit of that good; nay, though our preſent eſtate be exceedingly painful and uneaſy, yet if our averſion to the means of freeing ourſelves from it be greater than our averſion to the preſent evil, we ſhall be determined to endure it.

In all caſes where oppoſite affections ſhall at the ſame time urge us to do, and to forbear any action, if equal, they deſtroy one another, and we remain in the ſame eſtate as before, otherwiſe the moſt powerful will determine us to change or continue it: yet theſe contrary incitements will not fail to occaſion ſome ſtruggle; we ſhall be driven now this way, and now that, uncertain what to reſolve upon; and which way ſoever our choice may be fixed, it will at firſt be with ſome reluctance, and not without a mixture of regret.

But notwithſtanding, we commonly find, that where various inclinations and affections do ſtrive to move us different ways, or excite us to different or contrary actions, the ſtrongeſt will prevail, and the force or eagerneſs with which we purſue

any good, or fly from any evil, will in ſome meaſure, be proportionable to the prevailing deſire or averſion wherewith we are poſſeſſed; for though different appearances may alternately preſent themſelves, ſo as to cauſe a momentary conflict, and keep the mind for a while in ſuſpence, even ſo far as to create ſo much trouble and diſtraction as may ſometimes occaſion the moſt exquiſite diſtreſs; yet moſt commonly the diſpute is ſoon decided, and the principal uneaſineſs that is felt, ſilences, after a ſhort time, and ſuppreſſes every other paſſion.

From all which it will moſt plainly appear, that though the actions of mankind are intricate and various, and it may ſometimes be difficult to trace out all the particular motives that influence us; yet thus much in general we are moſt certain of, that how ſurprizing ſoever theſe actions may appear, their original is moſt ſimple and uniform; it is only ſome uneaſineſs ariſing in the mind, from the action of preſent evil, or from the repreſentation of abſent good, or approaching evil; this is the ſecret ſpring which puts all into motion, rouzes men from indolence and inactivity, and gives riſe to the moſt renowned exploits, as well as to all others that are leſs regarded. The common labourer would not toil for his daily bread, if he was not prompted by hunger, or the fear of want; neither would the lover purſue his miſtreſs with ſo much ardour, if the paſſion which glows within his breaſt would let him be at eaſe. Decius would not have devoted himſelf to

deſtruction, if he had not been ſtimulated by a generous love to his country; he could not be eaſy in all events; the public happineſs was what he earneſtly wiſhed for, and the ruin of his country was an evil which he dreaded more than death.

Nor would Alexander have taken ſo much pains to conquer the world, if he had not been animated by another, no leſs powerful, paſſion, which was the love of fame: honour and applauſe affected him with inexpreſſible delight, and this he thought was to be obtained by conqueſt. It was glory which the young hero moſt ardently deſired; nor would he have purſued it through ſo much toil and hazard, if he could have been eaſy with it.

But though the appearance of abſent good ſtrikes the mind with a ſudden uneaſineſs, which moves us to ſeek after, and obtain it; yet it is not requiſite that the painful ſenſation ſhould always accompany the idea: for aſſurance of obtaining what we deſire, ſoon removes the uneaſineſs, and converts it into pleaſure, though the motion at the ſame time may ſtill perſevere: or if there is only a probability of gaining what we have in view, that inſpires us with hope, which is a moſt pleaſing affection, and takes off very much from the uneaſineſs of deſire: but if we apprehend a greater probability of being diſappointed in what we aim at, this fills us with anxious fears, and very much increaſes our diſturbance.

In like manner all preſent evil affects us with pain, and every view of approaching evil neceſſarily gives us uneaſineſs, which moves us to fly from and avoid it; yet both the ſuffering, and apprehenſion may be alleviated by a joyful hope that we may eſcape it, or be ſhortly delivered from it.

But if the good is judged to be wholly unattainable, or loſt ſo as not to be retrieved, or the evil is altogether unavoidable, without any poſſibility of being delivered from it, this brings us to abſolute deſpair; which puts an end to all our endeavours, as it extinguiſhes the leaſt glimpſe of expectation, affording nothing but continual grief and ſorrow while the idea remains in the mind.

When we are in purſuit of any good, or when we fly from any evil which we apprehend to be coming upon us, it is not neceſſary that the idea of pleaſure, or apprehenſion of evil, ſhould be always preſent in the mind; becauſe when we are once put in motion, we ſhall continue in the ſame ſtate, till ſome new impreſſion produce a change; and while the idea is abſent, the uneaſineſs which it occaſions muſt of conſequence ceaſe.

From whence it is evident, that though the impulſe of deſire, or averſion, conſiſts in uneaſineſs; yet this may be greater or leſs, of longer or ſhorter duration, according to the impreſſion that is made, as the idea of good or evil is more or leſs in the mind, or as it is attended more or leſs with hope or fear.

All this is advanced upon a ſuppoſition that

the ſenſe is always the ſame; but it may perhaps be found, that in the ſame perſon, at different ſeaſons, this power of affection will vary, and in different perſons, the degrees of ſenſibility will be different: they whoſe organs are of a more delicate texture, who have a great quickneſs of thought, and a ready underſtanding, have generally a more lively and exquiſite ſenſe of pleaſure and pain: they are ſooner made uneaſy, and conſequently more readily put into motion than others; but then their motion is more apt to be controlled by oppoſite impreſſions; and perſons of that temperament, are moſt ſubject to levity, and prone to be fickle and unſteady; while others, more ſlow and heavy, do not ſo quickly yield to every impulſe; they are not ſo readily put into action, but then they have more firmneſs and conſtancy, and their motion is more perſevering, not ſo eaſily ſtopped or diverted into another courſe. Whatever it may proceed from, it is plain to obſervation that ſome perſons are in all their motions regular and ſteady, ſo far as prudence ſhall require it, in order to obtain the deſired end; others are wavering and uncertain; whilſt many are apt to run into the contrary extreme, to be unreaſonably obſtinate and inflexible, and when they have taken a reſolution will adhere to it with invincible rigour. It may alſo depend upon ſome difference in the conſtitution, that ſome are, in all their actions, gentle, and deliberate; while others are fiery and impetuous. Some are always in high courage, and exceeding

confident of ſucceſs; others naturally timorous, and are apt to be diffident and dejected.

Yet that we may be effectually put into motion, and that our endeavours may prove ſucceſsful, it is neceſſary that the application of the agent, and the condition of the patient, ſhould be ſuch, as that the impreſſion may not be too faint, and it is no leſs neceſſary that the idea ſhould not be too much out of our thoughts; and alſo that hope ſhould be intermixed with fear, to make us vigilant and cautious, and to quicken our activity in the purſuit; otherwiſe the deſire will be apt to languiſh, and we ſhall grow remiſs, negligent, and ſecure; or elſe be diſpirited, and throw up all in deſpair; as, on the other hand, when the idea of pleaſure is too great, or too often preſented to our view, the impatience of deſire will be increaſed beyond a juſt degree, and our motion accelerated, ſo as ſometimes to be over-haſty, and by leading us into raſh meaſures, may occaſion diſappointment; and when we fly from any evil which is apprehended, if the frightful idea is always preſent to the fancy, our fear and conſternation will be too much increaſed, which will make our flight too haſty and precipitate, and diſable us from taking the moſt proper methods to avoid it.

SECT. II. *That happineſs is the end of all our actions; with ſome conſiderations concerning happineſs and good.*

AS nature has furniſhed us with theſe powers of affection, and given us ſtrong deſires, which determine us to purſue what has the appearance of good; and alſo powerful averſions, which make us fly from what we feel, or imagine to be evil; and as our aim in every particular action is to eſcape the one and obtain the other, ſo the ſcope and end of all our motions, the general aim of our whole conduct is, or at leaſt ought to be, happineſs. This is what every ſenſible thinking creature who allows himſelf the leaſt reflection will make the object of his wiſh; and ſo far as his powers and faculties will admit, he will order all his actions ſo as to gain this invaluable prize called happineſs; which is commonly ſuppoſed to conſiſt in being delivered from all evil, ſo far as is poſſible, and in obtaining the beſt and greateſt good; or, which is the ſame thing, in eaſe and relief from pain, and in the enjoyment of the greateſt, and moſt laſting pleaſure.

We are by nature ſo conſtituted as to receive many real pleaſures, and pains, both from our external and internal ſenſes; but, beſides theſe, the removal, or leſſening of a pain, operates as a pleaſure; and the loſs, or diminution of a pleaſure, is to be accounted as a pain; as in all com-

putations, the ſubtraction of a negative quantity, is the addition of a poſitive; and the ſubduction of a poſitive, the addition of a negative.

Many pleaſures, when they ceaſe, are ſucceeded by uneaſineſs and pain; as violent pains when removed do for a time, by bare ceſſation, occaſion the higheſt pleaſure.

When we are in poſſeſſion of good, if that be taken from us, and evil is allotted to our ſhare, this cauſes a more bitter ſenſation of miſery, than if we had been in a ſtate of indifference; becauſe it not only gives us pain, but deprives us of the foregoing pleaſure. But when we are oppreſſed with evil, if that be removed, and at the ſame time we receive the addition of a good, this produces a more lively ſenſe of delight, than if we had before been in a ſtate of indolence; becauſe it not only gives us pleaſure, but relieves us from the preceding anguiſh.

From whence it appears, that in order to be happy, it is not neceſſary that we ſhould enjoy only the good, and be wholly exempt from the evil. Happineſs does not conſiſt in the conſtant enjoyment of pleaſure, without ever feeling any pain; but in a due mixture, and alternate ſucceſſion of each: a ſtate of uninterrupted joy, and delight, without any allay of ſorrow, is a perfect chimera; and to expect all the ſweet, without ever taſting of the bitter, would be moſt unreaſonable: neither ought we to deſire it, becauſe without a mixture of the latter, the former would have no reliſh.

Such is the ſtate of human life, that even miſery itſelf ſeems a neceſſary ingredient to our happineſs, ſince many of our pleaſures are only alleviations of pain; and even thoſe which are the moſt real, and natural, are very much enhanced and recommended by ſome antecedent uneaſineſs: inſomuch that if all pain could be taken away, the pleaſures remaining would be but few, and thoſe too ſo very dull and inſipid, as to afford but ſmall enjoyment: and we ſhould then be reduced to a ſtate of perfect indolence, and inactivity.

Pain is the ſecret ſpring which puts all into motion, and if that were away, all action would immediately languiſh, and at length entirely ceaſe: it is alſo a ſeaſoning in life which is abſolutely neceſſary, becauſe without it all our enjoyments would be inſipid, and pleaſure would quickly be no more. The more violent our deſires, or averſions are, the ſwifter, and more eager will our motions be; and when we obtain what we aimed at, the more intenſe will be the ſubſequent delight, which reſults from the removal of a more grievous, and tormenting pain.

But though to get free from uneaſineſs be the firſt ſtep towards being happy, yet that ſeems to be no abſolute gain; it is only retrieving what we had loſt, and all pleaſure of that kind can only balance the miſery that went before: but when, beſides relief from a pain, we obtain the enjoyment of a real pleaſure, this is a double acquiſi-

tion, and adds ſomething to our ſtock of ſolid happineſs.

When both theſe do come united, they very much increaſe the value of any ſatisfaction, and we may obſerve in common life, that whatever is obtained with difficulty and danger, is generally very much prized, while another good of equal moment, which is too eaſily acquired, like a conqueſt gained without reſiſtance, is often ſlighted and undervalued.

But though it ſeems neceſſary that pain ſhould come before pleaſure, to introduce it with greater advantage; yet it is highly requiſite the pain ſhould not be of too long continuance; for miſery of itſelf can never be the object of deſire; on the contrary, we fly from and avoid it, as much as lies in our power; and though we cannot always eſcape it, we ſtrive at leaſt to get rid of it as ſoon as poſſible.

To be at eaſe from pain is always our firſt and moſt neceſſary care; as it is the firſt degree of pleaſure, this will always demand our firſt and principal attention; and, indeed, without this there can be no ſatisfaction, becauſe while we labour under any painful diſorder of body, or any conſiderable diſturbance of mind, we are rendered almoſt incapable of reliſhing the pleaſure of any enjoyment.

After relief from pain, happineſs conſiſts in the enjoyment of real pleaſure; yet it is not the obtaining the firſt ſatisfaction which offers itſelf, that is always ſufficient; but as the pains ſhould

be made as ſhort as poſſible, ſo the pleaſures ſhould be of a laſting, and durable nature, and not only ſo, but the beſt and greateſt we are fitted to enjoy.

For, the various delights human nature is capable of receiving, are not all of equal importance; ſome are of an inferior nature, which we enjoy in common with other animals; others are more exalted, and becoming the dignity of human nature; ſome are faint and languid, others more lively, and tranſporting; ſome tranſient and and momentary, yielding no after-ſatisfaction in reflection and remembrance; while others are permament, and laſting, not only pleaſing in their immediate operation, but in the conſciouſneſs and memory they leave behind them, which may be ſaid to yield a moſt durable ſatisfaction. Yet it muſt be acknowledged that, ſuch is our frame and conſtitution, few pleaſures are laſting in their direct and immediate exerciſe, nor can our ſenſes bear the application of the ſame objects for any long time together, but they muſt be relieved with ſomething new, and repeated after ſome intervals of abſtinence, elſe they grow inſipid, dull and tireſome; ſo that to heighten the enjoyment, there is required not only a mixture of pain, but alſo a variety of pleaſure ſucceeding each other in their proper ſeaſons. Yet it will certainly very much conduce to our happineſs, to enjoy as great a ſhare of the nobler pleaſures, as our condition will admit of, and that the inferior kinds ſhould not encroach upon thoſe of a higher nature.

We muſt not expect to obtain every thing which may have the appearance of good, but muſt be content to forbear the enjoyment of many pleaſures as well as to endure many pains, becauſe though what is apt to produce pleaſure in us be called good, and that which gives us pain, in any degree, be termed evil, yet when we come to eſtimate good and evil, we ſhall find the value lies much in compariſon: for, a leſſer good that deprives us of a greater, is not really, and abſolutely a good, but is rather to be counted an evil: as a leſſer evil which prevents a greater, is to be eſteemed as a good.

Neither can that be juſtly accounted as a good, which, though it yields immediate pleaſure, yet is ſure to be followed by more laſting grief, and ſorrow; as on the contrary, that ought by no means to be eſteemed as an evil, which though it cauſes preſent pain and diſturbance, will in its conſequence procure us greater pleaſure.

There are many objects which will afford us real pleaſure, and ſo far may ſeem to contribute to our happineſs; yet if they hinder us from enjoying greater, or will in conſequence bring upon us greater miſery, it is evident, upon the balance, the loſs will exceed the gain: and conſequently, whatever appearance of good ſuch things may have, they will at laſt be found to be really evil.

And as all worldly enjoyments do contain a mixture of good and evil, there are many things which at preſent may give us pain, and diſtur-

bance, and ſo far may tend to make us miſerable; yet if they may be a means to ſave us from enduring greater pain, or if they will in conſequence procure us greater pleaſure, it is plain that in this caſe we gain more than we loſe; and therefore however ſuch things may at firſt appear to be evil, yet they will prove in the main to be really good. Before we can determine concerning the real value of any thing to our happineſs or miſery, we muſt regard not only the preſent, but are obliged to look forward and conſider the conſequences of things; and if preſent evil will be followed by greater good, we muſt own that the latter will overbalance the former when it comes to be enjoyed; and not only ſo, but the pleaſing expectation may greatly alleviate the preſent ſuffering. Alſo when preſent good will bring upon us greater evil, it will not only be overbalanced thereby, but alſo the apprehenſion may imbitter all preſent ſatisfaction.

The removal of evil, and the acquiſition of good, are two great ſources of happineſs; as the loſs of good, and the preſence of evil, are two bitter fountains of miſery; yet it is not from theſe alone that our delights and diſquiets do take their riſe; but as we are likely to be concerned in what ſhall happen to us hereafter, as well as in our preſent condition, the proſpect of future advantage affords us preſent ſatisfaction, as the view of approaching diſaſter creates immediate diſturbance.

The pleaſure we receive from the proſpect of

future good, may ſometimes be ſo great, as to make us regardleſs of any preſent evil; as the apprehenſion of future evil, whether real or imaginary, may ſometimes occaſion ſo much diſturbance, as to deſtroy all enjoyment of preſent good. Hope is a main ingredient towards happineſs, without which it would be but poorly ſupported; for preſent good could never furniſh out a conſtant ſucceſſion of delight, but would ſoon grow dull, and taſteleſs, and a great part of our lives would be void of all entertainment, if hope of future good did not come in to ſupply the defect: it is this which fills the mind with pleaſing proſpects, gay illuſions, and delightful viſions, which yield anticipating tranſports, and ſuſpend for a time all uneaſineſs ariſing from preſent evil.

On the other hand it muſt be owned, that men are no leſs ingenious to diſturb their preſent ſatisfaction, and the eaſe and tranquillity of their lives, with the fear of approaching evil: it is this which ſometimes gives to things a more frightful appearance than they ought to have, raiſing ſuch diſmal apprehenſions, and imaginary terrors, as do utterly deſtroy all enjoyment of preſent good, and create real and moſt exquiſite miſery.

It will hereafter appear how neceſſary it is, for the ſake of a man's own happineſs, that he ſhould carefully diſtinguiſh betwixt the apparent and the real good: but at preſent, it will be ſufficient to obſerve, with regard to things which are not in our power, that what cannot be obtained, can never reaſonably be accounted as a good, be-

cauſe being placed beyond our reach, it can never contribute to our happineſs; but on the contrary, the deſire which cannot be gratified, will occaſion continual grief, and diſturbance; or if hope ſhould come in to our relief, and we indulge the flattering proſpect, it will prove at laſt no better than a fool's paradiſe, and all the viſionary joy will end in diſappointment; or if it cannot be acquired without a difficult, and tedious chace, the uneaſineſs may be ſo much prolonged, that the capture will be ſcarce worth the toil.

Neither ought we to join too great an opinion of good to what we may poſſibly be poſſeſſed of, but yet is not in our power to retain, and which we may ſoon be deprived of, becauſe in that caſe the enjoyment is precarious, and we ſhall be always in danger of loſing it, and the loſs of good is what occaſions a moſt grievous diſquiet. If wealth and power, fame and fortune, are but uncertain goods which many perſons may poſſibly never obtain, or at leaſt may not be long poſſeſſed of, then the more eagerly they purſue them, the more they will be expoſed to loſs and diſappointment.

As that which can never be obtained is not our good, we ought alſo to withdraw as much as poſſible the opinion of evil from that which muſt be endured, and which it is not in our power to eſcape: it is the condition of human life to labour under many imperfections, and be ſubject to many unavoidable calamities, which when we find that our utmoſt precaution to guard againſt

them, is but vain, we ought to ſubmit to, and patiently receive as part of our portion, without repining, or thinking them to be evil: otherwiſe the dread and apprehenſion will imbitter our lives, while yet the averſion is vain, and unprofitable, becauſe that which it ſo earneſtly ſhuns, will be ſure to overtake us. There is no man who with all his art and care can eſcape the ſtroke of death; and it would therefore be moſt for his eaſe and quiet to think ſlightly of it, and not imagine it to be the greateſt of evils, for indeed in many caſes it is the greateſt good; but when it is repreſented as a hideous form dreſſed up in ſable weeds, and made to wear ſuch a dreadful aſpect, this can only tend to fill the mind with diſmal apprehenſions, ſufficient to ſpoil every enjoyment of life, and eſpecially all manly virtue and generous pleaſure muſt diſappear, and fly before this king of terrors.

Upon the whole it is apparent, that whoever entertains too high and florid ideas of happineſs, will find himſelf much miſtaken; for many of our pleaſures, as has been already mentioned, are only alleviations of pain, or at leaſt are very much heightened by a due mixture of it; and beſides, it muſt alſo be remembered, that a patient endurance of ſome degree of evil is highly requiſite, becauſe in our preſent circumſtances ſome degree of evil is abſolutely neceſſary and unavoidable.

A ſtate of uninterrupted felicity, without any mixtnre of diſturbance, is not to be expected: while we are ſurrounded by ſo many objects

which muſt be avoided, or elſe they may ſoon prove deſtructive to our weak and tender frame, and while others are ſo neceſſary to be ſought after, as conducing to our welfare, and ſupport, it is not for us to be indolent and unconcerned. If we felt no pain from preſent evil, or could view approaching danger without any diſturbance, we could not long preſerve our beings, but ſhould be every moment expoſed to inevitable deſtruction, neither could we provide what is neceſſary for our well-being, if abſent good gave us no uneaſineſs.

The condition of human nature does abſolutely require, that men ſhould be ſuſceptible of many pains, and diſquiets, even for their own preſervation, during the ſhort time they are appointed to continue here; and as we are at beſt but weak and imperfect creatures, and not deſigned to be of any long duration, we are expoſed to many diſaſters, which with our utmoſt endeavours we cannot always eſcape, are ſubject to diſeaſes, and the far greateſt part of thoſe who are born, are ſnatched away by untimely death.

So that, if we take a ſurvey of human happineſs in its greateſt elevation, and view it in the faireſt light, we ſhall find, it will admit of many abatements; every man muſt receive evil, as well as good; and his ſweeteſt enjoyments will be daſhed with the bitterneſs of ſome trouble, and diſtreſs.

If we could ſuppoſe a perſon poſſeſſed of every thing his heart could deſire, to render him com-

pleatly happy; yet, as a man, he muſt be imperfect, he muſt feel the natural uneaſineſſes of hunger and thirſt, or elſe he will have little pleaſure in eating and drinking. The inclemency of the ſeaſons will often incommode him, and he muſt endure labour and wearineſs, elſe his reſt will ſcarce be ſweet and refreſhing: he will ſometimes want what cannot eaſily be obtained, and muſt conſequently ſuffer under the uneaſineſs of deſire, elſe his enjoyments would grow dull for want of difficulty; and he muſt frequently deny himſelf ſuch pleaſures as he might enjoy, leſt they prove injurious through exceſs: many evils he muſt endure that are not to be avoided; croſſes and diſappointments, loſſes and misfortunes of one kind or other, he muſt often meet with, while he lives in this world, ariſing from the uncertainty of all human affairs, or from the malice of his enemies, or ingratitude of his friends, which will not fail to adminiſter grief, and vexation. If he lives to old age, he muſt labour under infirmity, and diſeaſe; and to cloſe all, at laſt he muſt die, and his material part return to duſt, of which all things are originally compoſed.

Yet not withſtanding all theſe untoward articles, the good is thought ſufficient to outweigh the evil; and we make no ſcruple to pronounce that man happy, who enjoys the greateſt pleaſure that his particular genius, and capacity, and his rank and ſtation in the world will admit of, intermixed with no more pain than is abſolutely neceſſary; for ſome he muſt be content to en-

dure, becauſe it will give a greater reliſh to his pleaſures; it will often in its conſequence procure him greater advantage, and in his preſent circumſtances, it is both requiſite and unavoidable.

This indeed is the higheſt felicity we can poſſibly aſpire after, in this life, and it is more than every one can attain; for upon a ſtrict inquiry, it will be found that the greateſt part of mankind are to be accounted in ſome reſpects miſerable, as they endure a greater ſhare of trouble and anxiety than is neceſſary in their preſent condition; or at leaſt are not ſo happy as they might be, inaſmuch as they take up with inferior ſatisfactions, and by that means fail of obtaining the higheſt, and beſt they are capable of receiving.

There is no man but who, at ſome certain ſeaſons, is free from all uneaſineſs, and enjoys ſo much ſatisfaction, as makes him content with his preſent condition, without any deſire of change; yet that cannot always continue, joy and grief will affect his mind interchangeably, and if his pleaſures are mean and low, or but of ſhort duration, and his uneaſy moments more than they need to be, ſo as to fill up a great part of his life, we always judge him to be ſo far unhappy. If we carefully reflect upon our own condition, or look round about us into the lives of others, we ſhall find that this will hold true, more or leſs, of all perſons, and it is owing in part to evil accidents and misfortunes from without, which we cannot prevent; but it alſo proceeds in ſome mea-

ſure from want of wiſdom within, to guide and direct our motion to the beſt advantage.

SECT. III. *How we may err and deviate from our true happineſs.*

FOR when we do not ſhun and avoid that which is really evil, or when we do not purſue our beſt and chiefeſt good; as alſo when we fly from what is not neceſſarily, and abſolutely evil, or when we purſue that which upon the whole is not really our good: theſe muſt be manifeſt errors in our conduct, as they do not lead us towards happineſs, which is the ultimate end of all our actions, and the centre to which all our motions ought to tend.

In all theſe caſes we ſhall either be indolent, and unactive when we ought to be in motion, or we ſhall be reſtleſs and eager for change, when we ought to have remained quite in our preſent condition, or elſe our motion will be wrong directed, and we ſhall aim at improper objects, the conſequence of which will be, that we ſhall ſuffer under misfortunes we might have avoided, ſhall run into troubles which would not otherwiſe have come upon us, or by aiming wrong ſhall miſs the mark, and fail of obtaining the greateſt pleaſure we are capable of enjoying.

Yet we muſt unavoidably be ſubject to ſuch errors, becauſe our motion is guided by affection, and affection is influenced by opinion; and we

know, from too certain experience, that opinions are frequently wrong. Our deſires and averſions do very much depend on the appearances which ſtrike upon the fancy; and it may often happen, from many cauſes, that the apparent good or evil may be different from the real.

Good and evil, when preſent, may be eſtimated according as they are felt; and here we may be leſs ſubject to miſtake, though even this will admit of ſome variation. Falſe opinion, confirmed by wrong practice, may by degrees vitiate our taſte, and diſpoſe us to take delight in things that are not naturally adapted to give us pleaſure; and may alſo make us apt to be offended with many others, which might be endured without any neceſſary abhorrence, which will not fail to lead us aſtray.

But when theſe objects are abſent and at a diſtance, we are much more liable to be impoſed upon by falſe repreſentations. In many caſes that which is really evil may not appear ſo to us, nor move us to fly from and avoid it; as what is really good, may not have united with it an idea of pleaſure, ſo as to make us purſue it; nay, it may ſometimes happen that good ſhall have an appearance of evil, and evil ſhall be repreſented as good, which will make us deſire that which ought to be our averſion, and fly from that which we ought to have purſued.

The ideas of ſuch ſenſations of pleaſure and pain, as we receive from objects applied to our outward ſenſes, we commonly retain pretty juſt-

ly; and when the objects are presented to our thoughts, these appearances seldom fail to accompany them. The child who has been burned by the flame, will retain an idea of the pain, so as to make him dread the approach of it afterwards; and he who has experienced the taste of some delicious fruit, whenever he sees or thinks of it afterwards, the idea of pleasure will recur, so as to make him desire it: but in many cases, these appearances do not depend on what we have felt and experienced, but on ideas in the mind, which are often fantastical and groundless, arising from false representations of things from without, or else formed by the imagination without any real foundation in nature.

We are endowed with such variety of powers of affection, and capable of receiving so many ideas and representations of things, that opinion can conjure up innumerable phantoms and apparitions of good and evil, and unite them with objects to which they do not justly appertain; so that man, with all his boasted powers and faculties, is in his notions the most whimsical, and in his pursuits the most extravagant of any creature whatsoever.

Children are pleased with rattles and gewgaws, and when we grow up to years of manhood, we are apt to amuse ourselves with many things which are of no greater importance. The miser thinks he shall be compleatly happy if he can but fill his bags with shining metal; and therefore employs all his care to get riches without

meaſure or end, by right means or by wrong. The warrior deſires no more than that victory ſhould crown him with a wreath of laurel; and while he eagerly courts military glory, regards not the juſtice of his cauſe, nor feels any regret for all that bloodſhed, ravage and deſolation which he occaſions. The religious recluſe hopes to merit heaven by being good for nothing upon earth, renounces this world for the ſake of that which is to come, and ſpends his time in prayer and meditation; whilſt the youth who hearkens to ambition engages warmly in affairs of this life, and has his fancy ſtruck with ribands, titles, badges of honour, and marks of power and grandeur.

We are liable many ways to be betrayed into wrong notions, and falſe opinions, of what relates to our happineſs or miſery. In our tender years, before we are capable of forming a judgment of our own, we are influenced by the opinion and example of others: while we are not able to diſcern the real nature of things, we muſt of neceſſity take them upon truſt, according as they are repreſented by thoſe whoſe wiſdom we confide in. This is indeed moſt reaſonable and fitting, and yet this way are men often led into wrong judgments, and the opinions they imbibe ſo early, they commonly retain in their riper years.

How eaſily men learn to aſſociate the ideas of good, and evil, to things of which they have no juſt knowlege, merely becauſe they ſee others do it; and how ready they are to do violence to

their own ſenſe, and reaſon, rather than be ſingular, and forfeit the good opinion of thoſe they converſe with, is very eaſy to obſerve.

Moſt men are apt to aſſent to the truth of many propoſitions, not from any evidence they perceive, but merely becauſe they are the received opinions, they comply with them, as others have done before them, becauſe they are faſhionable; but when they have been long accuſtomed to believe them, they then become eſtabliſhed axioms, which muſt not be examined, nor ſo much as called in queſtion.

Thus we imbibe very early principles which inſenſibly gain an influence over our conduct, and take up opinions of good and evil, purely by imitation, without much inquiry into the truth of them; and theſe prejudices and prepoſſeſſions, when they come to be rivetted by cuſtom, and ſtrengthened by habitual practice, are ever after very firmly adhered to, inſomuch as we may almoſt venture to affirm, that the chief diſtinctions that are to be met with amongſt men, both with reſpect to ſentiment and manners, allowing for ſome ſmall difference in the natural temper, are moſtly owing to education, faſhion, and prepoſſeſſion.

Hence proceeds that great variety of opinions, reliſhes, and meaſures of life, in different nations; and in the ſame nation amongſt thoſe who have been accuſtomed to a different way of living. Thoſe who firſt ſailed to the Weſt Indies, did there diſcover a people in their manners and

cuſtoms, quite different from the Europeans; yet theſe were rational creatures, and perhaps had no leſs virtue and real happineſs than their unjuſt invaders: they knew not how to value gold; and though the Spaniards might deſpiſe the ſimplicity of the naked Indians, yet theſe with more juſtice deteſted the cruelty, and inſatiable avarice of the Spaniards.

The modes of faith and religious worſhip, which are held ſo ſacred at Rome, do not prevail at Geneva; and thoſe maxims of government, which cuſtom has eſtabliſhed in France, and Spain, will not be endured in England, and Holland. He who has lived at court, has a different taſte from another who has been bred up in the country; and the frugal induſtrious citizen varies in his notion of happineſs, from the gallant ſoldier, who has been trained up in a camp.

So true it is, that men are apt to receive a tincture from thoſe they converſe with; and there is ſomething ſingular to be obſerved in people of the ſame nation, party, or profeſſion, with regard to their opinions and reliſhes, of what relates to the public good, and alſo to the happineſs of private life.

Which way ſoever we come to entertain an opinion, or begin any practice, yet theſe never fail of being ſtrengthened, and improved, by uſe and cuſtom; and when we have been long accuſtomed to aſſent to propoſitions, which perhaps we never carefully examined, but whoſe truth we are frequently aſſured of, by thoſe who are

wiſer than ourſelves, we at length moſt firmly believe them, become exceeding zealous to propagate the truth, and are apt to be offended with all who are not of the ſame opinion.

And if, in compliance with the faſhion, or through a deſire to pleaſe thoſe we live amongſt, or from any other motive whatſoever, we chuſe to do what at firſt we may poſſibly have no great reliſh for; yet there is that force in cuſtom, which is a ſecond nature, that by long practice, we are inſenſibly drawn in to like it, and to chuſe it for its own ſake, as a thing that is good in itſelf.

It is plain to obſervation, that many of thoſe pleaſures which men are ſo fond of, are not founded upon reaſon, nor do they yield any real and natural entertainment; but are only amuſements begun by imitation, and confirmed by habit, till at length we grow uneaſy in the want of them; and conſequently, hanker after and deſire them, when the firſt inducement we had to chuſe them does no longer ſubſiſt.

So great a force there is in long uſe and practice to vitiate our taſte, and cauſe us to take a fantaſtical delight in things of an inferior nature, which are not naturally fitted to afford us the moſt exalted pleaſure!

But where education and evil cuſtom have no ſuch influence, we are often betrayed into wrong judgments, from the narrow capacity of our minds, which will not allow us to ſee all the relations, and conſequences of things at once, or

at leaſt from haſte, or negligence, in taking up with ſhort and partial views.

Good and evil is often of a complicating nature; and that which yields immediate ſatisfaction, may in conſequence prove highly prejudicial; as what gives us preſent diſturbance, may yet hereafter procure us much greater advantage. There is ſcarce any thing in nature pure and unmixed, but may be good in ſome reſpects, and evil in others; and it is poſſible the idea of pleaſure, which any object will afford, may be diſplayed to the utmoſt advantage, while, at the ſame time, the pain that muſt follow after, or the greater good it will deprive us of, may be hid from our eyes, or at leaſt may not be viewed in ſo fair a light; and alſo in other caſes, the frightful idea of pain or hardſhip, which muſt be undergone, may be placed full in our view, while the greater good which it will procure, or the greater evil which it will prevent, ſhall be ſhaded and obſcured, ſo as ſcarcely to be perceived: in all which inſtances, it is plain the appearances will be inadequate, falſe, and deceitful; and if they muſt paſs uncorrected, will moſt certainly lead us aſtray in our purſuit after happineſs.

It is owing to the imperfection of the underſtanding that we cannot ſee many things at once with equal clearneſs, nor in ſo juſt a light; but when we come to compare objects of good and evil, in order to form a judgment of their real value, our views are often partial and narrow, confined within a ſmall extent. We have at beſt

but an imperfect knowlege of things, and though what is neceſſary to be known is placed within the reach of our diſcovery, yet inſtead of taking an impartial ſurvey of our whole concerns, we are moſtly taken up with what chance preſents to us, and which falls within the compaſs of our ſmall experience. We may often through ignorance make a wrong choice, while we ſuffer our attention to be fixed upon matters of ſmall moment, being at the ſame time regardleſs of others much more important.

This will be much more likely to happen, when impreſſions are ſtrong and paſſion gains the aſcendant; for to ſo ſmall a compaſs may our ſight be contracted, that when the affections are intenſe, one ſingle object may take up the whole extent of our view, ſo as to make us careleſs of every thing elſe.

Thus a perſon who is fired with reſentment, can think of nothing but revenge; it is the only good he has in proſpect, to compaſs which he will ſacrifice every thing, and blinded by his rage, he ſees not the fatal miſchiefs that will enſue. Alſo the paſſion of love, though its motions are leſs impetuous, yet its influence is no leſs prevailing when the charming object takes up all our thoughts, and employs all the faculties of the mind, ſo as to exclude every thing elſe, and render us forgetful of every other good.

But though we were free from ſuch violent emotions, yet it is poſſible the ſincere love of truth may not in all perſons be ſo prevalent as to

make them lay aſide all prejudice and partiality, all pride and narrow ſelf-intereſt, all overweening fondneſs for their preconceived opinions; and to ſhake off all ſloth and lazineſs, ſo as to ſearch after it with perfect freedom and unwearied diligence, without which it is not to be found.

It is alſo no ſmall misfortune that we do not always bend our endeavours, in the firſt place, to underſtand ourſelves, and what relates to ourſelves, though the inquiry would be moſt uſeful, and no leſs entertaining: but the ſubject it ſeems is too low and common, and moſt men delight more in high and difficult ſpeculations, and love to amuſe themſelves in ſearching into things which they can never underſtand, rather than employ their thoughts about that which is within the reach of their capacity. Pride will not ſuffer us to remain ignorant of any thing, and what we cannot learn by obſervation we can abundantly make up in fiction, which is an employment more eaſy and agreeable, than a painful ſearch after truth.

But whatever it is which hinders a fair and impartial inquiry into that which is our main concern, and infuſes into our minds falſe notions of good and evil, under what pretence ſoever it may be advanced, can have no other influence than to lead us into a wrong courſe; for while opinions are wrong, our affections can never be right, nor our motion directed to the beſt advantage.

The firſt and moſt eſſential requiſite towards

right conduct, is to be rightly informed about what relates to our happineſs and miſery; yet though we ſhould ſuppoſe that this might upon all occaſions be obtained, it would not always be ſufficient to ſecure us from errors, nor do we find that men always act according to their knowledge; for though the judgment may be convinced, upon full proof, of the importance of any good, yet this will not at all times govern our actions; it is only cool and deliberate reaſoning, and the ideas it is employed about may be too general and abſtracted to ſtrike upon the imagination, and thereby raiſe deſire; and as our motion depends upon affection, if a leſſer good has united with it a more lively and diſtinct idea of pleaſure to affect us with uneaſineſs in the want of it, the inclination will infallibly turn that way.

As our motion is governed by affection, ſo is affection very much influenced by opinion; but here we would be underſtood to mean ſomewhat more than a bare conviction of reaſon, becauſe it implies an idea or appearance of good or evil to ſtrike upon the fancy, elſe it can ſcarce affect us with uneaſineſs, or excite either deſire or averſion.

And how unaccountable ſoever it may ſeem, yet theſe do not always go together in equal proportion, but a leſſer good or evil, even that which in our cooler hours is owned and acknowledged to be ſuch, ſhall ſometimes bring along with it an idea of pleaſure or pain more lively and affecting

than another, which our deliberate judgment confeſſes to be greater.

The latter may poſſibly not be ſufficiently known and experienced, ſo as to raiſe in our minds a juſt repreſentation of it, or elſe it may be caſt at a diſtance, and thereby its appearance diminiſhed and rendered more confuſed, whilſt the former may be placed in a ſtrong light, and its idea may be vivid and diſtinct.

Thoſe objects of pleaſure or pain which are placed near, and frequently act upon our ſenſes, will upon a double account have a greater effect, both as the ideas which they excite are more lively, and diſtinct; and eſpecially as they are more in the mind, and oftener brought into our thoughts; for the force of deſire or averſion excited in us by an idea or ſenſation of pleaſure or pain, is in a proportion compounded of the greatneſs of the impreſſion, and its duration or the time of its continuance in the mind.

Though theſe do mutually tend to ſtrengthen and ſupport each other; for the greater the appearance, the more it will force its way into the mind, and recur ſo much the oftner to our thoughts; and the more any idea is brought into our view and contemplation, the more lively and diſtinct it will grow, and its impreſſion on the fancy will be ſo much the ſtronger.

It may often happen from our different ſituation, and the poſition of objects, that things of leſſer moment may be brought near, and frequently preſented to our ſenſes, ſo as at ſome certain

ſeaſons, to be almoſt continually in our thoughts; while other objects of the ſame kind, of much greater importance, may be caſt at a diſtance, and ſeldom thought of, or regarded; the neceſſary conſequence of which will be, that the former will have a greater appearance of good or evil united with them, and affect us more powerfully than the latter.

Though they may be of the greateſt moment, known and perceived to be ſuch, whenever they are taken into conſideration; yet while they are out of our thoughts, they can have no effect; or if they are but rarely brought into ſight, their influence will be but weak, eaſily overcome by other appearances which are almoſt conſtantly in our view.

All this may in ſome meaſure account for the wonderful power of cuſtom, and that great difficulty, which all men find within themſelves, to forbear ſuch enjoyments, however mean, and unworthy, trifling and fantaſtical, they may be, which yet habitual practice has rendered in ſome ſort neceſſary; and it alſo gives a ſolution to that difficulty, why the greateſt good or evil, even that which is apparently ſuch, and in our cooler hours, known and confeſſed to be ſo, does not always determine the will, nor the deſire of the one, or the apprehenſion of the other, when abſent, is at all times ſufficient to overcome the ſatisfaction of ſome inferior preſent enjoyment: and a leſſer evil which is preſent, and conſtantly felt, ſhall by its continual action prevail over all op-

poſite impreſſions, from the greateſt abſent good, or future evil, whoſe ideas are but ſeldom brought into our view: and laſtly, it may ſhew the reaſon why the ſenſual appetities, which beſides the ideas of abſent pleaſure, are alſo attended with a preſent uneaſy ſenſation of body, will ſometimes, by their conſtant ſollicitation, have a greater influence than objects of the laſt importance, which are not always kept in the mind.

We find, that in fact men are often affected with matters of ſmall moment, to the neglect of others that are of much greater concern; nay, they often prefer trifling and momentary pleaſures to the joys of heaven, and ſome inconſiderable evils which are preſent or approaching near, are more influencing than the pains of hell.

So frail is our nature, and ſo fallible our judgment, that we ſhall often be in danger of running into errors; and whether we are led by education and faſhion, or drawn aſide by bad example and evil cuſtom, biaſſed by prejudice, or blinded by paſſion; or whether we are deceived by the ſhortneſs of our views and the undue poſition of objects, we muſt unavoidably, upon many occaſions, receive falſe repreſentations of good and evil; our conſequent affections will be diſproportionate and irregular; and we ſhall frequently make that the object of our deſire, which upon the whole is not our good, and that our averſion, which is not truly and abſolutely evil.

If we have no certain aim to direct our courſe, nor any rule whereby to form our judgment,

but every thing muſt paſs for good or evil, which fancy repreſents to be ſuch; and ſome ideas muſt be ſuffered wholly to poſſeſs our thoughts, ſo as to exclude all others, we ſhall be led aſtray from our chief end, and wander far from our true felicity; and what adds to the abſurdity, our motion will frequently alter its direction, and our conduct will be apt to vary.

Though men are generally very ſtedfaſt in thoſe opinions which were taught them in their youth, eſpecially about matters of nice ſpeculation, and many are to be found who will be obſtinate in their errors, and ſteady in wrong purſuits, yet in the common affairs of life this will not always happen.

We ſhall, upon many occaſions, diſcover our miſtakes, before they are confirmed by habitual practice, as we ſhall find by experience that many things are not what they appeared to be at firſt view, or as our company changes, and things are repreſented to us in a different light, or as objects do change their poſition, and ſome are accidentally brought near or removed far from us; all theſe will cauſe appearances to vary, and our affections will alter, ſo that our purſuits will rarely be uniform and ſteady.

And if all ideas which preſent themſelves muſt be admitted without examination, thoſe that ſucceed and take poſſeſſion of the mind, in their turn, may be as far from truth, as thoſe that went before. From whence it will neceſſarily follow, that opinions will ſtill be ſhifting, and

our paſſions always veering; we ſhall often ſlight that which was once moſt highly prized, and ſometimes come to admire what was before deſpiſed and undervalued, nay ſo far may we be deceived, as fondly to imagine that to be our good this day which to-morrow we find to be evil, make that our averſion which was once the object of our deſire, and purſue that at one time which we moſt earneſtly fly from at another.

And that which contributes ſtill more to render our motion unſteady, is the inconſtancy of our temper; for though objects may remain the ſame, yet if our humour is changed, they will not affect us in the ſame manner, when preſent; and when abſent, their images and repreſentations will have a quite different effect from what they had before.

We often find, that what pleaſes us at one time, will, in another diſpoſition of mind, prove grating and diſguſtful; and that which ſometimes gives us diſturbance, ſhall, at other times, be received calmly and contentedly. It is eaſy to obſerve, how men are apt at ſome certain ſeaſons, to be elated more than is fitting; as at others, they will be unreaſonably dejected; ſometimes viewing things only on the bright ſide, eaſy and delighted with the preſent, and filled with pleaſing hopes of the future; while at other hours, the mind is in no condition to reliſh pleaſure, but is prone to be diſturbed with every trifle; viewing all things on the dark ſide, thinking the worſt

of our preſent ſtate, and entertaining diſmal apprehenſions of what is to come.

Our paſſions depend not only upon the action of objects, and their repreſentations from without, but alſo upon the temper and diſpoſition of the mind within; if either of theſe be altered, our affections will vary; yet theſe ſeem to have a great influence upon each other; for any ſtrong impreſſion from without, producing either pleaſure or diſturbance, eſpecially if they be of long duration, will cauſe an alteration in a man's humour: as on the contrary, if from any other cauſe his temper is changed, he will be differently affected with outward impreſſions, and it will occaſion appearances to vary, and make him ſee things in a quite different light.

After ſtrong ſenſations of pleaſure and delight, we do not only rejoice at the firſt occaſion, but every thing that preſents itſelf is agreeable; and what at another time would have created great diſturbance, makes little impreſſion, but is taken patiently: whereas, on the contrary, after any conſiderable diſturbance, the mind is often ruffled and diſcompoſed, requiring ſome time before it can ſettle; and during that uneaſy ſtate, till the ill-humour wears off, and the man recovers his temper, he will not only grieve at that which firſt gave him vexation, but will be leſs diſpoſed to be pleaſed with any good, and more inclined to be uneaſy with every little trouble, which at another time would paſs unregarded.

It is eaſy to obſerve how much more apt ſome

perſons are than others, to be diſordered, and put out of temper. Some have naturally that happy conſtitution, which gives them a certain chearfulneſs and gaiety of ſpirit, that accompanies them in all circumſtances of life, and diſpoſes them to view things in a pleaſing light; to be eaſy and contented with the preſent, and to entertain the beſt hopes of what is to come: while others are inclined to be ſad and melancholy, to be more diſturbed than is neceſſary with preſent evil, and to entertain needleſs fears of the future. There are alſo many other ſingularities in the original caſt of mens minds, which do cauſe that great diverſity in the humours of mankind; and the ſame perſon, at different ſeaſons, will differ very much from himſelf, and his humour will inſenſibly change from pleaſant and gay, to ſad and ſerious; one day elevated, and in high courage, and the next perhaps timorous and dejected; ſometimes kind and good-natured, and at other times captious and reſenting.

Not only ill accidents, which give us diſturbance, but alſo an ill ſtate of health, and even a clouded ſky, with many other cauſes, will affect the mind, ſo as to produce an alteration in the temper; and ſome diſorders of the body, which do particularly affect the brain and the nerves, thoſe curious organs of thought and ſenſe, will diſturb the imagination, ſo as to cauſe ſtrange and unaccountable terrors to ariſe; the ſlighteſt repreſentations from without, will conjure up the moſt frightful ſpectres within, and fill the mind

with imaginary dangers, which yet will occaſion real and moſt exquiſite miſery.

Happy it is for thoſe, who are poſſeſſed of that conſtancy, and firmneſs of ſpirit, as not to be eaſily thrown off from that juſt equality of temper, ſo neceſſary to our happineſs; for every deviation from this, into either extreme, either too jovial and gay, or too ſerious and ſplenetic, too much elevated or too much dejected, but eſpecially the latter of theſe, will lead us into errors; it will give us falſe reliſhes of things, and make us ſee all objects in a falſe light, and unite falſe ideas of good or evil with whatever comes before us.

It is not only when theſe ideas of good and evil are united through miſtake to wrong objects, that we are led aſide, and fail of being ſo happy as we might be, but alſo when they are out of proportion, greater or leſs than they ought to be. We find by experience that both theſe do often happen, and are occaſioned partly by falſe repreſentations of things from without, and partly from ſome fault in our inward temper, ſome inflexion or variation in our humour: theſe are the cauſes that appearances are not always ſtrictly juſt and agreeable to truth, but are frequently dreſſed up in falſe colours, whereby ſome things are rendered more alluring than they ought to be, as others will appear more diſmal; the conſequence of which muſt neceſſarily be, that we ſhall not only be ſometimes drawn to purſue a leſſer good, in the neglect of others more valuable, and fly

from a ſlight evil, while we take no care to avoid ſuch as are greater; but our affections will alſo be exceſſive and immoderate, our deſires too eager, craving and impatient, and our averſions and fears too violent, creating more diſturbance than is requiſite, and by this means the apprehenſion may far exceed the ſuffering when the evil comes upon us, and the expectation may not be anſwered by the enjoyment, provided the good be obtained.

And thus it appears, that if fancy and humour muſt be allowed to govern without control, we ſhall often be led aſtray from our true happineſs, and not only fail of obtaining the greateſt pleaſure we are capable of receiving, but may alſo become ſelf-tormenters, and create to ourſelves a greater ſhare of miſery than is neceſſary in our preſent condition.

Preſent evil may by this means become more grievous and intolerable than it needs to be, and many things may be made the occaſion of much trouble and vexation, which might have been endured without any neceſſary diſturbance: alſo by viewing things in too gloomy and diſmal a light, we may baniſh hope from our breaſts, which is the only comfort of the miſerable, and abandon ourſelves to deſpair, while there is a fair proſpect of relief.

Good, which is loſt ſo as not to be retrieved, may be retained in the memory, and preſented to the imagination until it makes ſo laſting an impreſſion, that our ſorrow ſhall ſcarce know

any end: and abſent good, ſuppoſed to be attainable, may by its appearance to the fancy raiſe deſire, which ſhall be too eager and impatient, cauſing much greater uneaſineſs than is requiſite to put us into motion, greater perhaps than can be recompenſed by the ſhort lived pleaſure which reſults from the removal of a laſting torment, or by the enjoyment of the good, provided it ſhall be obtained; but when our motion is ſo very haſty, we are leſs likely to meet with ſucceſs, than when it is more eaſy and deliberate.

If we accuſtom ourſelves to yield to every foremoſt opinion of good, fancy will ſoon gain the aſcendant, and we may probably neglect the moſt important enjoyments of life, and amuſe ourſelves with ſhining toys and glittering trifles, which though we eagerly follow, we ſhall perhaps never obtain, or if we do, ſhall find they are not really our good; nor will they yield that ſatisfaction we imagined: and thus, inſtead of being repaid for all our pains and anxiety in the purſuit, we ſhall gain nothing in the concluſion but vexation and diſappointment.

This will be miſery ſufficient; but yet it is ſtill fruitful of more, as it introduces continual fretfulneſs and ill humour, and ſpoils the reliſh of thoſe good things, which are in our power, and which might be ſufficient to make us happy, if we could enjoy them with contentment.

Hence the greateſt troubles and diſtreſſes of life are commonly aſcribed to reſtleſs and ungoverned deſire, which makes us uneaſy and diſſatiſ-

fied with our preſent condition, always roving after ſome imagined good which we want; but the fear of future evil will alſo contribute its ſhare to render us more unhappy than is neceſſary.

For though a prudent caution is requiſite to make us ſhun approaching danger, yet if every firſt appearance or imagination of evil muſt be admitted, our fears may become moſt anxious and tormenting, driving us with greater terror than is fitting, from things that we ought rather reſolutely to meet, or at leaſt which we ſhall be leſs likely to eſcape by ſo precipitate a flight.

When the mind is clouded and over-caſt with melancholy, our ideas may be more black and diſmal, than they ought to be, raiſing needleſs fears, and dreadful apprehenſions of evils, which may perhaps never befal us, or (what is equally fruitleſs) which we muſt of neceſſity undergo, and cannot poſſibly eſcape. This may produce perpetual diſturbance, ſo far as to make life miſerable, though attended with all other circumſtances which in appearance render it happy: for theſe diſmal ſpectres will be continually preſenting themſelves, and haunt us in our ſecureſt hours, ſo as to deſtroy all delight, and poiſon every pleaſure.

Thus it is not only when we purſue what is not our good, and fly from that which is not evil, that we run into errors; but alſo when our affections are immoderate and unreſtrained, when our deſires are too impatient, and our averſions

too violent, our hopes too ſanguine, or our apprehenſions too diſmal; all theſe are inconſiſtent with our happineſs, and productive of nothing but trouble and diſquiet.

Hope is indeed a moſt enlivening cordial, it not only ſupports us in this life, but even extends itſelf beyond the grave; and why ſhould we not indulge the pleaſing expectation, ſince, if we ſuppoſe the worſt, and that what we imagine ſhould not happen, yet we ſhall never feel the pain of diſappointment, nor even ſo much as dream of it? But in the common affairs of life, when hope is unreaſonable and ill-grounded, it will be moſt likely to end in grief and vexation.

And thus at laſt it will be found, that our greateſt diſtreſſes may be owing to the extravagance of our humours and opinions, when unexamined fancy is allowed to govern; and what aggravates the misfortune is, that as theſe opinions are not founded upon truth, they will be always variable; and the frequent turns and changes in our motion, often tracing back the falſe ſteps we had taken, and flying from that which we once eagerly purſued, will give us a mortifying view of our own weakneſs and folly; the conſciouſneſs of having acted ſo contrary to our intereſt, will occaſion uneaſineſs; and every reflection we make on our own conduct, will be attended with repentance and diſſatisfaction.

SECT. IV. *How theſe errors are to be prevented.*

TO prevent ſuch deluſion, God has endowed us with reaſon, to be our guide and director; which for the ſake of our own intereſt and advantage, we are obliged to conſult on all occaſions, and not to be over haſty in obeying every preſſing deſire, or averſion; but ſometimes to put a ſtop to our motion, until by a little conſideration it may be ordered and directed for the beſt, ſo as to be moſt conducing to happineſs, which we ought to propoſe, as the ultimate end of all our actions.

If, amidſt the great variety of pleaſures and pains, which we are capable of receiving, we yield to the firſt motions of ſenſe, and are carried away by every foremoſt inclination, we ſhall be frequently miſled from our true felicity, and as often create to ourſelves grief and repentance.

But we are not neceſſarily determined by every preſent ſenſation, or firſt appearance of good and evil, becauſe we have it in our power to bring into our view that which is abſent, as well as that which is preſent; that which is paſt as well as that which is to come; that which is diſtant and remote, as well as that which is near; and by comparing theſe together, to draw concluſions concerning the true value and importance of every thing that relates to our happineſs and miſery.

We cannot always avoid miſtakes, even when we uſe our utmoſt care; but the author of our beings has given us thoſe powers and faculties to judge of what relates to ourſelves, which will lead us ſo much the nearer to our happineſs, as we carefully and diligently employ them. He who does this, has done all he can do, and will be acquitted before God and man; but whoever fails to improve theſe natural talents, is ſo far wanting in his duty, and when miſery overtakes him, will have no juſt reaſon to complain of his hard lot, becauſe the blame will reſt principally on his own negligence and folly.

We ought therefore to make it our main buſineſs and principal concern, ſometimes to take a review of our paſt actions, and if we find any thing amiſs, to ſearch the ſource and original of all our errors, and to regulate our opinions, on which our motions do depend.

It is eaſy to obſerve how induſtriouſly men will employ their utmoſt abilities, and exert all their talents, to obtain what they are in purſuit of, and take to be their chiefeſt good: their ſchemes are well concerted, and right meaſures taken to put them in execution; but the ends which they propoſe are frequently wrong, being governed by perverſe fancies, and falſe reliſhes of life and manners. Should we not therefore, ſometimes at leaſt, beſtow a little pains to diſcover what we ought to aim at, and what things are moſt worthy to be purſued, leſt, through a fooliſh admiration or miſtaken opinion, we ſhould

engage in a long laborious chace, and all the while make that the object of our desire, which is not worth our care?

It is this which demands our first and most constant attention; and here is laid the foundation of an art superior to all others of human practice and invention, the most useful as well as most excellent part of knowledge, being to know ourselves, and what relates to ourselves, and not to rest in bare speculation, but by working upon our own minds, to rectify our sentiments, and relishes of things, by which all our affections, and consequent actions are governed. This is no vain philosophy, but true wisdom, to gain which will far exceed all other acquisitions, and be more advantageous than to get riches, because these can only furnish us with outward things; but that will set all matters right within; it will teach us to regulate our passions, and to direct all our actions to their true scope and end.

And though this is a science which for its dignity and utility far excels all others, yet its precepts are plain and simple, such as every one may learn if he will but heartily set about it: it requires no long deductions, nor intricate conclusions; nor is it built upon airy speculations; every man's own sense and experience will readily inform him, in most cases, if he will but consult it, and freely make use of his reason in an affair of so great concern; being at the same time always ready to receive information, and with all due

modeſty and ſubmiſſion, to hearken to the advice of ſuch as are wiſer and better than himſelf.

It is very requiſite that all the arts of perſuaſion ſhould be made uſe of, and the greateſt force of eloquence employed at ſtated times and ſeaſons, to reclaim men from their evil courſes, and keep them in their duty, to repreſent every thing in a juſt light, and ſhew what is truly eligible, and what ought to be avoided.

It is not ſo eaſy a work to reform the errors of our conduct, that a man can always perform it of himſelf, without the kind aſſiſtance of ſuch as are able to adviſe and direct him: yet the beſt inſtruction will avail but little, unleſs he will reſolve to do his part, to employ a little care and attention, and uſe all the neceſſary caution, which the miſtakes we ſo often commit through inadvertency ſhould excite us to. The conſciouſneſs of this ſhould induce us, if poſſible, to reſtrain all impetuous motions, and control every forward inclination, until the ideas of pleaſure and apprehenſions of evil, which offer themſelves to our view, are thoroughly examined and corrected.

As we cannot avoid reflecting upon our conduct, experience will convince us, that we are often impoſed upon and deceived, when we are too eaſily moved by the firſt appearance, and ſtriking fancy of good and evil: the more frequently and impartially any perſon reviews his own actions, the more lively impreſſion of this truth will remain upon his mind, ſo as to excite

a conſtant ſuſpicion of judging amiſs, and introduce an habitual care and caution in all his proceedings: it will make him watchful to reſtrain the ſallies of too haſty paſſions, and will always bring to his remembrance, that every idea which preſents itſelf ſhould be obliged to wait a while, and be carefully examined before it is allowed to paſs.

Whenever we are ſtruck with the appearance of any good, ſo as to raiſe in us a deſire to obtain it, the fear of being drawn aſide from our right aim, ſhould induce us to ſuſpend our motion, and ſtop the proſecution of that particular deſire, until we have employed at leaſt a few tranſient thoughts in examining, whether that which has the opinion of good united with it, be really and neceſſarily ſo; or whether we may not be without it, and yet be eaſy and contented: and laſtly, whether the obtaining that good may not deprive us of a greater good, or bring upon us a greater evil, and therefore ought to be forborn.

And, in like manner, when the appearance of evil excites our averſion, we ought not to obey the impulſe, till we have conſidered whether what we take to be evil, and would fly from as ſuch, may not be ſuſtained without any neceſſary averſion or abhorrence; or whether it may not be a means to procure us a greater good, or prevent a greater evil, and therefore ought to be endured.

It may alſo deſerve a ſhort inquiry, whether we ſhall be able to eſcape that which is the cauſe

of our averſion and diſturbance; and alſo, whether it will be in our power to obtain that which we make the object of our deſire; or, if it ſhould be obtained, whether we can be aſſured of keeping it in our own poſſeſſion, without any danger of its being loſt, or taken from us.

When we come to arraign and queſtion our opinion, and bring them to a fair examination, it will frequently happen, that what has united with it an appearance of good, will be found upon the whole to be really evil; and that which we might imagine to be evil, will prove in the main to be quite the reverſe.

It is to us of the laſt importance to be able to form a right judgment about every thing which brings along with it a ſhew of good or evil, and therefore we ought ſurely to avoid being engaged in uſeleſs ſpeculations, and curious reſearches into things which we can never underſtand, that ſo we may with leſs hindrance proceed in ſearching into that which is our main concernment, and in taking a deliberate review of what has any relation to ourſelves.

It is highly requiſite that there ſhould be a careful ſcrutiny into our fancies and opinions, which ought to be carried on with the utmoſt freedom and impartiality, being governed only by the ſincere love of truth; and then it will ſcarce fail of being brought to a happy iſſue.

If education and common opinion have betrayed us into wrong notions of what relates to our happineſs and miſery; or if we are led into miſ-

takes by ſhort and partial views, or by the undue poſition of objects; if we have been biaſſed by prejudice, or blinded by paſſion; all theſe may in ſome meaſure be rectified by a fair inquiry, and by a free and impartial uſe of underſtanding, being always willing to lend a patient ear to inſtruction.

There is nothing a man will ſo earneſtly wiſh for, as to be doing with the utmoſt and moſt unwearied diligence that which is his principle buſineſs, to learn what is truly profitable and good, tending to his beſt intereſt and advantage, and alſo what is hurtful and injurious, tending to his greateſt detriment.

In a matter of ſo great concern, he will not always reſt ſatisfied with the received opinions, nor be led by example, and the prevailing faſhion; he will ſtrive to lay aſide all prejudice and partiality, not ſuffering his views to be confined to a narrow compaſs, but will ſummon all the powers of reaſon to break the enchantment, that ſo he may think in a more free and extenſive manner; and ſo far as his capacity will allow, take a general ſurvey of every thing which may either promote or hinder his true felicity.

By this means he will not haſtily take up with every apparent good, but will ſoon diſcover what is really ſuch, and thus he will advance conſiderably towards happineſs, who can truly diſtinguiſh betwixt good and evil; and it might be ſuppoſed that he would then feel no hindrance in following what his beſt judgment dictates to be right;

but experience will convince him, that his work is but half accompliſhed, becauſe he will find himſelf embarraſſed with many oppoſite inclinations, which will thwart thoſe motions his impartial reaſon may ſuggeſt.

Though reaſon be convinced, yet the fancy may be otherwiſe engaged; evil habits may have been contracted; the taſte may be vitiated, and by a long indulgence, ſome ideas may have gained ſo great an aſcendant, as not eaſily to be reduced to obedience; and though in our ſedate and cooler hours, we can clearly diſcern what is truly good and evil, and reſolve to regulate our conduct accordingly; yet the main buſineſs will be to keep our opinions ſteady and invariable; leſt at other ſeaſons the nearer approach of objects ſhould cauſe a change in our reſolutions, and raiſe appearances to ſtrike upon the fancy in ſo powerful a manner, as to carry us with irreſiſtible force into meaſures directly oppoſite to what our moſt deliberate judgment did approve.

It will be the principal care of ſuch as educate youth, to form their minds to wiſdom, by infuſing right opinions of good and evil, cheriſhing the good affections, ſo as by frequent uſe to render them habitual; and ſuppreſſing all wrong inclinations, by forbearance and reſtraint. They will carefully watch each growing tendency, and ſuffer no ill habits to be contracted, nor any affections to be indulged, in oppoſition to reaſon; but will induſtriouſly withdraw the fancy and opinion both of good and evil from that to which

it does not properly appertain, and always direct it with the ſtrongeſt encouragement to that with which it naturally agrees. But all are not ſo happy as to enter the firſt ſtage of life with ſuch advantage: it may with too much truth be affirmed, that in many places, the profeſſed teachers of mankind do inſtil falſe notions, and thereby encourage wrong affections; or elſe bad example, and the prevailing faſhion do lead men aſtray, and cuſtom will introduce a falſe reliſh, ſo that whoever comes to years of diſcretion, and a capacity of reaſon and reflection, will ſcarce want occaſion to make uſe of it; he will find many things amiſs within, which will cut out for him ſome employment.

Therefore whoever is deſirous of obtaining the greateſt good he is capable of enjoying, he muſt ſtrive to rectify, as far as he is able, his opinions, and recal his ſentiments from the power of faſhion, to that of reaſon; and if evil cuſtom has prevailed, he ſhould, in obedience to the dictates of his underſtanding, ſtrive by contrary practice to reform his taſte, and by degrees to wean his fancy from inferior enjoyments, which are not truly his good, that ſo he may apply it with greater ſucceſs to ſuch as are of a higher nature, and will yield the greateſt and moſt laſting pleaſure.

The firſt part of wiſdom is to be free from folly; and the principal care in conducting our motion, is to avoid error, and forbear purſuing that which is not good, and flying from that

which is not really evil. If a man can but once gain that command over himſelf as to be free from every falſe bias, and diſengaged from every wrong inclination, he will then, and not before, be free and diſencumbered in the purſuit of what reaſon dictates to be moſt conducing to his happineſs, and will find it a more eaſy taſk to ſhun and avoid what would tend to make him miſerable.

It appears but too plain, that objects of the loweſt rank will ſometimes to a depraved fancy and a vitiated taſte, afford greater delight than others, which we cannot but acknowledge to be of a much higher and nobler kind; and as they pleaſe us more when preſent, their repreſentations when abſent will be attended with a more lively idea of pleaſure, and the deſire ſhall be ſo much the ſtronger, as this is commonly brought on by long uſe and cuſtom, and ſcarce to be remedied by any other method.

Thus he, who by long indulgence is wholly devoted to the pleaſures of ſenſe, has perhaps but little reliſh for higher enjoyments, and is utterly diſabled from purſuing them: but the moſt thoughtleſs and undeſigning rake cannot avoid at ſome certain ſeaſons being made ſenſible of his errors; and if he can be once brought to ſerious reflection, the voice of reaſon will be ſounding in his ears, Scorn theſe unmanly delights, which are at beſt but mean and unworthy, and are too dearly purchaſed by more laſting grief and ſorrow. Juſt attention will ſet before his eyes a lively i-

mage of thoſe evils he brings upon himſelf, and of thoſe ſublimer joys he ſacrifices for the ſake of the loweſt ſatisfactions. This it is poſſible may be ſo deeply impreſſed upon his mind, as to efface all oppoſite appearances, and make that his averſion, as the cauſe of ſo much miſery, which he once delighted in as his greateſt good. And thus it is certain, if he can once conquer his vitious habits, and is no longer diverted and drawn aſide by irregular attractions, he will find leſs hindrance in purſuing ſteadily that courſe which his moſt deliberate choice ſhould approve.

Though our aim ſhould be directed to the higheſt felicity, yet we ſhall ſcarce be able to make any progreſs towards it, until we ceaſe from purſuing what is not our good, but ſhall be like the benighted traveller, who is drawn far out of his way, by following ſome falſe blaze, or wandering meteor; therefore after we have by a free uſe of underſtanding, learnt what is truly good and evil, our next care ſhould be to work upon the imagination, and by habitual practice to reform our taſte, and bring all thoſe lively and affecting ideas which ſtrike upon the fancy, to be rational and juſt, no ways varying from the ſentiments we entertained in our ſedateſt hours.

By this means we may in ſome meaſure, amend our faults, and corect our errors, which we affirm is not impoſſible to be affected; for it is not only when a man is too much addicted to the pleaſures of ſenſe, but if he is fired with ambition, or if he is proud, and covetous, envious,

or ſuperſtitious, or whatever other irregular paſſion may lead him aſtray, there is a certain method to be obſerved whereby he may hope to retrieve his wanderings, and find the way again.

We do not preſume to give advice or inſtruction, but only to conſider how every man may adviſe himſelf, if he thinks it worth his time, and is willing to be at the pains; neither will it be found quite ſo ridiculous as at firſt ſight it may appear, to ſuppoſe a man may divide himſelf into two diſtinct parties, and be at once both teacher and follower; for we know we are not only endowed with ſenſe, or a power to feel pleaſure and pain, which ſerves to put us into motion, but we have alſo a power of comparing, reaſoning, and judging; that this latter was given us to reſtrain, and govern the former, and therefore may juſtly claim the ſupreme direction.

It is certainly every man's chief intereſt to exert this generous faculty, and raiſe within himſelf a counſeller and adviſer, who will not only ſave him from going aſtray, but will be ſure to bring him forward in the right way towards happineſs. He will not only point out to us the errors of our conduct, but will ſhew us how they are to be corrected and reformed; and if the ſole power is lodged in his hands, all our affairs will be rightly managed, and our motion guided to the beſt advantage.

Whoever will freely and impartially employ his reaſon, may diſcover what is really his good: and though the appearance ſhould be too faint to

raiſe deſire, yet keeping the object much in our view and contemplation, may excite a lively idea of pleaſure to ſtrike upon the imagination, and make us uneaſy in the want of it, repeated uſe and practice will encreaſe our reliſh, until at laſt we come to like and admire, what at firſt was viewed with great indifference.

But as our greateſt hindrance proceeds from wrong inclinations which riſe up in oppoſition to reaſon, and carry us into contrary purſuits, we ſhall often be obliged to work by the weaning rather than the engaging paſſions; and when we are once fully convinced, that what we took to be good is upon the whole really evil, we ſhould turn away our eyes from the dangerous ideas of pleaſure which it may yield, and keep at a diſtance from the tempting object; for in ſome caſes there is no ſafety but in a ſpeedy flight.

We may then, for our further ſecurity, fix our attention on the greater miſchiefs that will follow, ſo as to deſtroy the appearance of good, and thereby remove the deſire, or rather make it our averſion, until by diſuſe and contrary cuſtom, all inclination towards it may be worn off.

On the other hand, when the appearance of evil comes along with that to which it does not juſtly appertain, if reaſon is convinced, that in the main it is really good, we ought not to fly from it with precipitation, but rather ſtrive to approach nearer to it by degrees, and inure ourſelves to bear it; by which means the hideous phantom will vaniſh, and by bringing into view

the greater advantage it will procure, it may no longer be our averſion, but rather become the object of deſire.

That every fancy and appearance of good or evil ſhould be made conformable to reaſon, and that our affections ſhould be governed accordingly, is a thing of all others, the moſt to be deſired; but it muſt be acknowledged that it is not ſo eaſy an attainment, but that it will coſt ſome pains, and the firſt ſteps towards it muſt be in anguiſh and regret. It will require ſomewhat of ſelf-denial, to be able to ſtop or ſuſpend our motion, and control every forward inclination, until reaſon can have time to examine appearances; and if upon a fair inquiry, what we aim at, is not found to be our good, we muſt wholly refrain the purſuit. All this cannot be done without ſome violence to the ſenſitive part of our nature; as we ſhall be obliged to ſuſtain the uneaſineſs of many deſires and averſions; which muſt not be gratified; and much muſt be ſuffered both from the preſence of evil, which muſt be endured, and alſo from the abſence of good, which muſt be forborn.

Yet who would not ſtrive to learn theſe leſſons of forbearance and endurance, ſince the advantages accruing are ſo apparent, as that by the expence of a ſmall venture, we ſhall be ſure to gain a prize of ineſtimable value, and by forbearing ſome inferior gratification, or perhaps enduring ſome pain and hardſhip for the preſent, we

ſhall obtain the greateſt and moſt exalted pleaſure.

Happineſs itſelf muſt not be purſued too eagerly, leſt by too haſty meaſures we meet with diſappointment; nor muſt we be always averſe to ſuffer a little pain, becauſe he who is ſo very impatient as not to bear the leaſt uneaſineſs, can never order his affections and govern his motions as he ought; nor can he have any ſteadineſs or ſtrength of mind; but will be driven aſide by the ſmalleſt impulſe, and made the ſport of every weak and childiſh paſſion: but whoever is rightly apprized that there is no ſuch thing as pure and unmixed felicity, and is therefore willing to undergo ſome trouble, and chuſes to take the pains which is neceſſary to reſtrain and moderate his affections, and inure himſelf to the practice of ſelf-denial, will be amply rewarded for all his ſufferings, by the great advantages that will enſue.

For there is nothing excellent and worthy which he may not attain by ſuch a regimen; whereas the contrary method of yielding to every impulſe, and giving way to every prepoſſeſſing fancy, will carry us far from our true felicity, and in a ſhort time, bring upon us the greateſt miſery and diſtreſs.

It is but being content to bear ſome preſent evil, and alſo to ſuffer under the want of good, until by letting reaſon have fair play, all falſe repreſentations may be removed, and then we ſhall ſcarce fail of obtaining the greateſt happineſs, and

ſhall be delivered from numberleſs diſquiets, which we ſhall otherwiſe bring upon ourſelves.

To be able to forbear what has united with it an idea of pleaſure, but in the main is not our good, and to endure what is not really evil, though it may give us ſome preſent uneaſineſs, is one of thoſe great ends that are to be obtained by a free uſe of reaſon, and by the correction of our fancies and opinions; but when by this or any other means, the practice is become in any degree habitual, it will in its turn contribute very much to fix the empire of reaſon, and render it a more eaſy taſk to rectify all falſe appearances, and bring every paſſion into ſubjection.

This general habit of ſelf-denial, call it temperance, moderation, patience, government, or ſelf-command, for it ſeems to include all theſe, has by the greateſt maſters, in all ages, been eſteemed the main principle of wiſdom; and is what every one ſhould ſtrive to obtain as the greateſt treaſure, far exceeding all outward acquiſitions, which are often precarious and uncertain, and as often the occaſions of grief and vexation; but this will afford perpetual tranquillity, as it is in every one's power by this method to lay within himſelf the ſure and laſting foundations of happineſs, peace and contentment.

Though it may appear ſomewhat hard, and like a force upon nature, voluntarily to endure pain, which we all naturally ſtrive to avoid, as much as we are able, yet reaſon and reflection will inform us, that to bear a leſſer evil, in order to avoid a

greater, and to forbear a leſſer good to obtain another more valuable, is no way inconſiſtent with our true intereſt; and that according to the preſent diſpoſition of affairs, the greateſt good is not to be acquired, nor can we eſcape the greateſt evils upon any other terms.

Which conſideration, if it be kept in mind, may unite ſo great an appearance of advantage with this method of ſelf-denial, as quite to over-balance all the hardſhips which muſt be undergone; and though the inclinations muſt be often curbed and reſtrained, and the affections frequently controlled, by bringing oppoſite appearances into play, which will occaſion a conflict that at firſt may be a little irkſome, or even painful; yet repeated uſe and practice will render it more eaſy, and upon every ſtep we take in this great work, the mind will review with pleaſure the conqueſt it has made, and rejoice to feel its own advancement and recovery.

Though we ſhould advance but ſlowly, and perhaps be far from arriving at perfection, yet it will be ſome ſatisfaction to have made a ſmall progreſs, and the leaſt approach towards it will be found no inconſiderable an attainment.

Happy it is for thoſe who from their tender years, while the inclination was yet flexible and yielding, have been trained up in the uſe of ſelf-denial, and frequently obliged to endure what they were averſe to, and to forego what was the object of their deſire, to refrain from pleaſure, and to undergo ſome labour and hardſhip; for

this will ever after contribute very much to the health and ſtrength both of their bodies and minds: and they who have effectually acquired this habit, will not be hurried away by their unruly paſſions, but having the reins in their own hands, will find no difficulty to ſtop in their full career, and divert their motion into another courſe, as reaſon ſhall direct.

But after a long courſe of indulgence, when perſons have had their own wills, and their inclinations have rarely been croſſed, the ideas and fancies of good and evil, having been ſo long accuſtomed to command, will grow too imperious to admit of any reſtraint; for if we give way to any ſingle appearance upon its own authority, without bringing it to the teſt of reaſon, it will be ſure to gain ſtrength by indulgence, and we ſhall be leſs able to reſiſt it afterwards; and as it is ſcarce poſſible to obey one wrong inclination without being enſlaved to the reſt, this will gradually lead on to a general looſeneſs and diſorder, where every foremoſt fancy gains abſolute dominion, and it will be no longer in our power to ſtop our motion, and govern it according as reaſon ſhall direct, but we ſhall be carried away by the unreſiſting force of every lawleſs paſſion.

Yet even in this deplorable condition ought no man to deſpair of ſeeing an alteration for the better; though the advantages of a good education are wholly wanting, and not only many particular wrong affections have been ſtrengthened by cuſtom, but a habit of univerſal diſſoluteneſs

has been introduced, yet ſtill there is a poſſibility of amendment.

Though we have not been accuſtomed to practiſe ſelf-denial out of choice, yet we muſt ſometimes do it out of neceſſity; as we cannot always have our wills, but muſt often meet with diſappointment: and thus a ſeries of croſs accidents and misfortunes may teach us thoſe leſſons of moderation which we had not learnt before: or if by the kind admonitions of his friends, or the force of his own genius and good ſenſe, or from any cauſe whatever, a man is brought to a ſerious reflection, and has preſented to his view a lively picture of the miſery which reſults from the tyranny of indulged paſſion, this may raiſe in him a ſtrong deſire to take the government upon himſelf, and to endeavour to reduce his affections to ſome order and ſubjection.

Though the taſk may ſeem difficult at firſt, and appearances may be ſtubborn and rebellious, yet whatever trouble it may coſt, they muſt be encountered and reduced to obedience, otherwiſe they will grow more abſolute, and the government will of courſe be theirs; and it will be ſome encouragement to proceed in this work when we find that though theſe aſſuming fancies are moſt inſolent and domineering, where they gain the aſcendant, yet they are of ſo mean and ſervile a nature, that whenever they are oppoſed with vigour and reſolution, they will be brought to ſubmit; and thoſe turbulent paſſions may at laſt

be taught to know their proper part, which is not to govern, but obey.

As we know by woful experience, that the more we give way to any wrong inclination, the more will the opinion of the falſe good be augmented and confirmed, and the more difficult it will be to oppoſe it afterwards: ſo on the other hand, it will be ſome conſolation to know, that if we can but once gain the victory over any headſtrong paſſion, it may be more eaſily dealt with another time, and the falſe appearance of good or evil may be gradually weakened, until at laſt it be compleatly vanquiſhed.

It is in every man's power, if he pleaſes to reſiſt the attacks of fancy, and ſuſpend the gratification of his deſires; which will certainly be worth his pains to put in practice, upon many occaſions, if it were only to learn ſomewhat of an habit of ſelf-denial: he may begin this forbearance in matters of leſs moment, where the affections are not ſo ſtrongly attached, and by continued uſe, he may proceed at laſt to his moſt favourite inclinations; by which means he may inſenſibly gain the maſtery over his paſſions, and not be carried away by every forward appearance, until it has been brought to undergo a fair examination.

Upon the whole it appears, that ideas and fancies of all kinds, will be continually preſenting themſelves, and playing upon the imagination; and they do not always appear what they really are, but are frequently diſguiſed, and ſeen in a

falſe light; or elſe they afford us only a ſide glance or a partial view; or ſome will approach too near, while others are thrown at too great a diſtance; but reaſon will bring them into a clear light, and by viewing them on every ſide, and at a juſt diſtance, will ſoon diſcover what they really are, and after an impartial ſcrutiny, ſome it will approve, others it will alter, many it will abſolutely reject, and it will ſubdue and chaſten all before they are allowed to paſs.

When the imaginations of pleaſure and apprehenſions of evil, come to be fairly examined and brought to the teſt of reaſon and right ſenſe, they will in moſt caſes appear without diſguiſe; and the true ideas of good and evil will preſent themſelves, united with their proper objects; and as all thoſe falſe opinions, all the ſpectres, phantoms, and apparitions, which haunted us before, will vaniſh and diſappear, the deſires and averſions which they had raiſed, will of conſequence ceaſe; and we ſhall find no difficulty to forbear the purſuit of that which fancy repreſented to be good, but is found in the whole to be rather the contrary; and be content to endure that which appeared to be evil, but in the main is quite the reverſe.

And thus it is plain, that by comparing the conſequences of things, and balancing the ſum total of good and evil which they contain, withdrawing our attention from matters of leſs concern, and fixing it upon what is of the greateſt moment, we have it in our power to correct ap-

pearances and regulate our affections; by which means we may learn to deſpiſe preſent pleaſure, which is fraught with future miſery; and chearfully to undergo any preſent hardſhip, which may hereafter procure us greater and more laſting pleaſure: reaſon will recommend this as highly advantageous, and repeated uſe will render the practice of it eaſy.

This curbing and reſtraining of our motion, and the conſequent diſcipline and caſtigation of our fancies and opinions, where it can be duly put in practice, will not only direct our affections to their proper objects, but alſo reduce them to a juſt proportion with the real good or evil that is before us. It will caſt off all the falſe luſtre and glaring colours either of the flattering or diſmal kind, wherewith objects are arrayed; and thereby prevent all extravagant admiration on the one hand, as well as all unreaſonable abhorrence on the other, and render our deſires and averſions our hopes and fears more moderate and calm.

Preſent evil will not by fretfulneſs and impatience be rendered more grievous than is neceſſary, but, by looking forward, hope will chear us with a pleaſing proſpect of relief; or if it is an evil which cannot be avoided, the conſideration of the common appointments of life, and how neceſſary it is that all men ſhall receive evil as well as good, will help us to bear it with contentment. It will teach a man not to think mournfully of ſuch diſaſters as are incident to the human nature, but chearfully to meet ſuch evils as he

knows it is his lot to undergo, and patiently to bear ſuch misfortunes, as with his utmoſt precaution he cannot ſhun.

We ſhall not always be inconſolable for good which is loſt, ſo as not to be recovered; but as the idea will be leſs brilliant, it will ſooner wear out of the mind, and the ſorrow it occaſions will neither be exceſſive, nor of long duration; and we may at length attain to that conſtancy and firmneſs of ſpirit, as not to be much diſcompoſed with either the ſmiles or frowns of fortune, but ſhall be enabled to meet all events with an equal temper.

By this method we ſhall alſo ſuffer leſs from eager and immoderate deſire, and ſhall feel leſs uneaſineſs in the want of good ſuppoſed to be attainable; becauſe it will be no longer in the power of fancy to render objects ſo alluring, by dreſſing them up in falſe colours, and ſhewing them different from what they really are; and when we are in purſuit of good, our motion will be deliberate and ſteady, and we ſhall not through too great impatience be apt to take raſh and haſty meaſures, ſo as to occaſion diſappointment.

As every forward imagination of good will not be allowed to paſs unexamined, we ſhall not be drawn aſide to follow mean and low entertainments; nor be dazzled with gay amuſements and ſplendid trifles, which are precarious and uncertain, and not at our own command; and if we ſhould be ſo happy as to gain them, can yield us little ſatisfaction, but are more like-

ly to occaſion a greater ſhare of trouble and diſquiet.

A diligent inquiry will inform us that there are certain enjoyments, which yield the greateſt, moſt exalted and moſt durable pleaſure, and yet they depend only upon ourſelves, being always in our power; and reaſon will certainly direct us to enjoy contentedly the good we are poſſeſſed of, without purſuing with too much anxiety things of outward dependence, which perhaps we ſhall never obtain.

This will be ſo much real felicity; and it will ſtill be productive of more, as it tends, by preventing all occaſions of diſturbance, to preſerve chearfulneſs and good humour, and maintain that natural calm and eaſineſs of temper ſo eſſential to our happineſs: this will contribute ſtill more to fill the mind with gladneſs, and render our preſent condition always pleaſing and delightful; it will diſpoſe us to receive all evil accidents meekly, and we ſhall not be ſo induſtrious to ſpoil the reliſh of preſent enjoyments, by too craving deſires after abſent good, nor by anxious fears of future evil. It will ſuffer no dark and diſmal terrors to take poſſeſſion of our minds, but will brighten every proſpect, and incline us more to hope than to fear, eſpecially where hope is rational and well grounded, and will never deceive us with vain and deluſive expectations, which are ſure to be followed with grief and diſappointment.

And thus we ſee that the more we take from

fancy, the more we ſhall add to our own quiet; and though this reſtraining practice may poſſibly diminiſh the velocity of our motion, it will very much increaſe the eaſe and tranquility of our lives; it will free us from numberleſs pains and anxieties, which for want of this we may bring upon ourſelves; and, ſo far as it prevails, it will cure the mind of all eager and impatient expectations, of all gloomy and diſmal apprehenſions, of all extravagant tranſports when we meet with ſucceſs, and of all immoderate ſorrow for any loſs and diſappointment.

It will baniſh all anxious and diſtracting cares about what is to come, and all tormenting reflections on what is paſt; and if we can but once ſettle within ourſelves juſt opinions of good and evil, we ſhall not be wavering and fickle in our conduct, nor diſapprove and repent what we have done, and reproach ourſelves with having acted contrary to our true intereſt; but our purſuits will be uniform and conſtant, and as to all our affections and inclinations, we ſhall be likely to continue the ſame perſons, always aiming at our true ſcope and end, and ſteering a ſteady courſe to the ſame harbour.

Thus it ſhould ſeem that there is a certain method to be purſued whereby any man may bid fair for obtaining the greateſt pleaſure he is capable of receiving, intermixed with as little trouble as his condition will admit of; or, in other words, he may be happy if he pleaſes: and it alſo moſt plainly appears, how great a ſhare the powers of

reaſon and underſtanding have in directing our conduct, how near we may approach to happineſs if we will ſubmit to their guidance, and how wide of our true aim we muſt be if we neglect it: for human life may in ſome reſpects, though imperfectly, be compared to a veſſel at ſea, where the winds which ſwell the ſails, and put the veſſel into motion, are the affections and paſſions; and reaſon is the maſter, who preſides at the helm, and gives orders when to crowd, and when to furl the ſails, when to go right before, and when to work againſt the wind; and having always an eye to the compaſs, guides and directs the motion, ſo as to avoid all rocks and ſhoals, and bring the ſhip ſafe to the intended port. If there was no wind ſtirring, the ſhip would be perfectly becalmed and without motion; and when it blows a freſh gale, if there was no pilot to take care of the helm, but the veſſel muſt be left to drive before the winds, ſhe could never keep any certain courſe, nor reach the place for which ſhe was bound, but would ſoon be daſhed upon the rocks, or ſwallowed up by the mercileſs waves.

SECT. V. *How reaſon cannot always govern our motion; with ſome remarks concerning the imperfection of human nature.*

BUT though the pilot ſhould uſe his utmoſt care, yet the winds may prove contrary, or ſtorms may ſometimes ariſe to drive the ſhip out of its courſe; which will be ſtill more likely to happen if the pilot is negligent or unſkilful: and juſt thus it is in life, many wrong affections and inclinations, altogether contrary to our true intereſt, will be contracted by imitation, and confirmed by cuſtom; or from ſtrong impreſſions, the paſſions may be ſometimes ſo impetuous, as to admit of no reſtraint.

That all men ſhould regulate their conduct ſo as to live as happily as their condition will allow, is not to be expected; becauſe their are many who cannot ſtop and ſuſpend their motion, ſo far, as to conſider what is moſt for their happineſs; nor will they be at the pains to reflect on their own conduct, but rather chuſe to follow every foremoſt inclination, and take up with every firſt appearance of good or evil. To take things at firſt view as they paſs in our minds, and to yield to the riſing impulſe of every deſire or averſion, ſeems moſt agreeable to a man's caſe; but to ſtop and reſiſt his inclination, this is painful; and to examine his opinions, to call other ideas into his view, and compare them with attention, this is toilſome and laborious; it is a ſour and ungrateful taſk, ſcarce conſiſtent with

gaiety of humour, and the delicacy of pleaſure will hardly endure it; as if common accidents and misfortunes did not make life ſufficiently unhappy, but we muſt ſtill render it more ſo, by refuſing to enjoy thoſe delights that are in our power, and by being ſo very ſtudious to give ourſelves trouble which might be avoided: and eſpecially after a long uſe of indulgence, the averſion will ſtill be greater to this method of ſelf-denial.

But if we could ſuppoſe that men upon all occaſions might command their paſſions, and take time to examine how they might live moſt free from pain, and enjoy the greateſt pleaſure, yet they could not always be ſecure from making wrong judgments.

How few are to be found who beſtow the neceſſary care to cultivate and improve their reaſon, and to furniſh their minds with uſeful knowledge; and even theſe cannot always avoid going aſtray, ſometimes through invincible ignorance, and often through inadvertency; though we employ our utmoſt care, yet we ſhall be betrayed into errors, by the prejudices and prepoſſeſſions of our early years, or by the force of imitation and evil cuſtom, which cannot always be eaſily conquered; by the narrow capacity of our minds, and by the undue poſition of objects; for ſome will be ſet too near, and ſome too far, that we cannot view them from the true point of ſight.

And what makes the caſe ſtill more deplorable is,

that though by a careful uſe of reaſon it were poſſible for us to form right opinions, in our ſedate and cooler hours; yet the will does not always follow the dictates of the underſtanding, nor can we always ſteadily purſue that which we know to be our greateſt good. It is not a bare conviction of reaſon that can govern our motion; but if the taſte is vitiated and depraved, and the appearances which ſtrike upon the imagination are of the oppoſite ſide, the attraction will be moſt powerful that way.

Though the underſtanding may clearly diſcern what things are moſt worthy to be purſued, as tending moſt to our happineſs, yet that will not always be ſufficient to influence our behaviour; but there will ſtill be required a further correction and a careful working upon our own minds, before we can rectify the depraved ſenſe, and withdraw the fancy and appearance of good or evil, which cuſtom has united with many things to which they do not properly appertain: nay, ſo ſtrong will be the aſſociation, that in many caſes it will not be in our power, but we ſhall remain at variance with ourſelves, and fancy will often recommend what reaſon condemns, and we ſhall upon ſome occaſions follow that moſt which our deliberate judgment leaſt approves.

And thus it ſeems, that though much may be done towards governing our motion, by a right uſe of the underſtanding, without which it could not be directed at all; yet it is in a man-

ner impoſſible to attain to perfect happineſs, because we are expoſed to innumerable errors; and the only guide which ſhould lead us in the right path, is often not conſulted, or, if he is, may ſometimes be at a loſs, or unable to direct us, or when he is both able and ready to ſhew us the right way, yet, ſo ſtrange is the infatuation, he is not always followed.

But of ſo great importance is the right uſe of our nobler faculties, that where reaſon does not govern our motion, nay, where it has not the ſole and abſolute command, nothing can proceed as it ought, nor can we ſteadily purſue our true ſcope and aim; but in proportion as that loſes its authority, all will be folly and madneſs, as it is moſt certain miſery and ſlavery.

He alone can be ſaid to be maſter of himſelf, who can control his inclination, and ſuſpend his motion, until he has conſidered whither it will tend; and can afterwards continue or alter its direction, as he ſhall find moſt reaſonable: it is this which denominates one a rational and free agent; and the more perfect we are in this practice, the nearer we ſhall approach towards being compleatly happy.

It is this regimen which raiſes us to any degree of ſteadineſs and ſtrength of mind, gives us the command over ourſelves, and at the ſame time that it makes us free, it makes us happy: whereas the contrary method of yielding to every foremoſt opinion of good or evil, as it enſlaves us to every imperious fancy, every mean

and unworthy paſſion, it reduces us to the loweſt and moſt abject ſtate of ſervitude, and at the ſame time makes us in the laſt degree wretched and unhappy.

As he is by no means at his own command, who cannot ſtop and govern his motion, but is carried away by the prevailing impulſe of every haſty paſſion; ſo neither can he be deemed happy or free, who has not a capacity to judge of good or evil, or, which is the ſame thing, who dares not make uſe of his reaſon, who cannot think at large, with a moſt free and impartial uſe of his underſtanding, but is curbed and reſtrained, and remains ignorant of his own true intereſt, for want of a right uſe of thoſe natural powers he is endowed with.

As it is highly requiſite, in order to be happy, that we employ that natural talent of thinking, which GOD has given us; ſo it is no leſs neceſſary that we ſhould think freely without any reſtraint; for if once we ſtop ſhort, and cannot or dare not freely examine into every thing which offers itſelf, and brings along with it the appearance of good or evil, we are ſo far liable to be deceived and betrayed into error and miſconduct.

How can we hope to ſurmount the prejudices of education, and the prepoſſeſſions of our early years, or to rectify thoſe falſe notions that have been imbibed by imitation or wrong inſtruction, if thought muſt be reſtrained, and the mind is debarred from the free cenſure and examination of

its own opinions; or how can we avoid being deceived by the undue poſition of objects, or by ſhort and partial views, if the underſtanding, which is at beſt but weak and ſcanty, muſt be ſtill more confined, or if any thing whatever muſt take off from that largeneſs and freedom of thought, on which our happineſs as well as liberty depends.

Yet is this noble faculty, the reaſon of mankind, frequently hood-winked and reſtrained, and by that means eaſily impoſed upon; and it is as often openly inſulted and forced to quit the ſtage, that triumphant impoſture may act its part without control.

But of all others, he is ſurely the moſt wretched, and the moſt enſlaved, whoſe reaſon is convinced, but whoſe fancy is ſo ſtrongly prepoſſeſſed, that though he can plainly ſee his true happineſs and good, yet is chained down and ſo faſt bound in fetters, that it is not in his power to purſue it; or rather is carried away by a contrary impulſe, which he cannot reſiſt, from what he knows to be his good, to purſue what his deliberate judgment confeſſes to be evil.

The more ſuch a perſon turns his eyes towards liberty and happineſs, and thoſe ſublimer joys, which he can clearly diſcern, but muſt never hope to obtain; the more he will bewail his own captivity, and lament the wretched ſtate of miſery and ſubjection to which he is reduced.

Yet it is not to be ſuppoſed, but that this will ſometimes be the caſe, if we conſider how

eaſy it is for ſtrong impreſſions of ſenſe to prevail over reaſon, and what a bewitching force there is in cuſtom, which is alſo confirmed by daily obſervation.

And thus, though it were much to be wiſhed, that our opinions might be rectified, and all appearances chaſtened and ſubdued, that ſo our paſſions might be moderated, and our motion always guided to true felicity; and though we ought to make it our conſtant endeavour to attain this great end; yet, with our utmoſt efforts, we ſhall not be able fully to accompliſh it: for while men are fallible, they will be ſubject to errors, being liable ſo many ways to be poſſeſſed with falſe opinions, which lead them aſtray; and appearances will ſometimes ſtrike upon the fancy in ſo forcible a manner, as to render our motion too haſty and violent to be under the command of reaſon.

All perſons have ſome particular foible in their natural temper; and education and cuſtom will eſtabliſh various habits, which will occaſion great diverſity of reliſhes and meaſures of life, and create a vaſt variety of interfering motions in almoſt infinite directions, all of them ſwerving more or leſs from true happineſs, and the perfection of moral excellence.

All theſe errors and deflections, when ſeen in a limited view, do appear irregular and wrong, in which light they will and always ought to be ſeen by us; and if we are guilty of ſuch errors, we reproach ourſelves with folly whenever we re-

view our own actions; but though these deviating motions, this clashing and opposition of different interests, seems to us to occasion infinite disorder and confusion in human affairs, yet had we a clearer and more extensive view it would be found to be quite the reverse; that nothing could be better ordered than it is, and that all the faults we find in the administration of the universe, are owing only to our own blindness, and want of capacity to see the wise dispositions of providence.

Though the compass of our knowledge is but small, yet we may perceive that pleasure and pain, good and evil, which are so constantly interwoven, have each a good effect, and do produce, in the main, a most agreeable mixture.

It has been already observed, that a state of perfect indolence or freedom from pain, is a state of rest; it is the centre to which all our motions are directed; and if we could arrive at it, we should quickly cease to move: but it is what comes athwart, and throws us off in our pursuits after happiness, that keeps us in continual motion; and many such causes of uneasiness will arise from the action of objects which surround us: but more proceed from interfering interests amongst ourselves, when one person aims at that as his happiness which will tend to make another miserable, or when there are many rivals striving to obtain the same good.

In all these cases opposition and resentment renders our motion more vehement and active,

without which it would be apt to languiſh, and all would ſink into a dull lethargic ſtate of inactivity, wherein we ſhould feel but little pain, and perhaps enjoy leſs delight: but after eagerly contending for a prize, the difficulty of the acquiſition heightens very much the pleaſure of the enjoyment.

Beſides, if there were no contrary inclinations, no oppoſite meaſures of conduct, there could ſcarce be any ſuch thing as moral excellence; or, at leaſt, it could never exert itſelf, nor be ſhewn to any advantage; for without a conflict there could be no victory: and if there was no trial nor no difficulty and danger to be encountered, nothing great and worthy could ever be performed: it is this that raiſes virtue to the higheſt pitch, diſplays its ſovereign beauty, and makes it well deſerving of a crown: for when it has been ſtruggling with misfortune, has ſurmounted oppoſition, and is ſet off by proper foils, it is then that the dignity of ſentiment, and the ſublime of action, like the ſun breaking out from clouds of darkneſs, are ſeen in their greateſt luſtre.

We know, or at leaſt are capable of knowing, what is good for ourſelves; but what is good or evil in the whole, we cannot fully underſtand; becauſe we cannot ſee the whole of things; yet from what we can diſcover, we have reaſon to conclude, that all is ordered for the beſt; or at leaſt we muſt acknowledge that what is apparently and relatively evil, may poſſibly be really and abſolutely good; and that all the ſeve-

ral blemiſhes and imperfections of the parts, may contribute to the beauty and perfection of the whole.

But of this we are very well aſſured, that whatever is acted contrary to our true intereſt and advantage, is ſo far ill to us; for happineſs is our right ſtate, and miſery our wrong, the one is moſt induſtriouſly ſhunned, as the other is affectionately ſought; it ought therefore to be our buſineſs to regulate our own conduct, ſo far as we are able; leaving it with all reſignation to the Supreme Being to govern the whole; and the ſole deſign of this diſcourſe is only to make it appear, that the more freely and ſincerely we employ that degree of reaſon which he has given us, the nearer it will guide us to our chiefeſt good, and the leſs apt we ſhall be to run into errors. This will inform us, that we were not deſigned to be compleatly happy; and that the main ſecret conſiſts in not following pleaſure too eagerly, but in being ſometimes willing to forbear when it might be enjoyed, and in chuſing ſometimes to endure a little trouble, which for the preſent might be avoided; becauſe without this we cannot eſcape the greateſt evil, nor obtain the beſt and greateſt good.

If this be allowed, we would next endeavour to enquire, where our chief intereſt lies, and to lay down a certain poſition of whoſe truth we have long been fully perſuaded; that whoever will be at the trouble of a little reflection, will ſoon diſcover, that there is a certain rule accord-

ing to which he ought to form his ſentiments, and regulate his conduct. And though we have hitherto conſidered man ſingly, without including the relation he bears to thoſe of his own kind, yet as we proceed further, it will moſt plainly appear, that he is not of himſelf entire and independent, but muſt be regarded as a part of that whole to which he appertains: and it may juſtly be ſuppoſed, that the wiſdom which preſides in nature, has given to all creatures deſigned for ſociety, ſuch diſpoſitions as render them ſociable, and lead them to promote the good of others as well as their own private advantage.

And as man, of all animals, is the leaſt fitted for a ſolitary life, his whole dependence being upon fellowſhip and mutual aſſiſtance, we may reaſonably preſume, that he will find his own private account beſt in working towards the general good: and though none can attain to perfection, the nearer we approach the ſtandard of moral truth, which conſiſts in virtue; the more we ſhall advance our own true happineſs, in the enjoyment of the greateſt and moſt laſting pleaſure.

A TREATISE ON VIRTUE AND HAPPINESS.

PART II.

SECT. I.

An inquiry into the various powers of affection we are endowed with: and firſt, of the pleaſures and pains of the external ſenſes.

THAT we may trace out the various pleaſures and pains we are capable of receiving, and diſcover amongſt theſe, which pleaſures are moſt ſuitable to the dignity of human nature, which are the moſt exquiſite and refined, as well as the moſt conſtant and durable, and conſequently yield us the higheſt enjoyment; and which pains are moſt grievous and tormenting, as alſo moſt permanent and laſting, and therefore occaſion the greateſt miſery; it will be neceſſary to inquire into their ſeveral ſenſes or powers of affection wherewith we are furniſhed, and to conſider the affections ariſing from them, firſt ſingly by themſelves, and afterwards to compare them with one another.

Self-preſervation, is the firſt principle of nature, and all ſenſitive beings have implanted in them a love of life, and an abhorrence of death, which they ſtrive to eſcape by all the means within their power; and nature is not only averſe to what might totally deſtroy the frame of our bodies, but alſo to whatever might be hurtful in any degree, to whatever might injure or impair any particular parts, ſo as to hinder them from performing their proper actions, and thereby render life leſs perfect, and by degrees bring on a total diſſolution.

To provide againſt which, it is abſolutely neceſſary, that the mind ſhould be informed of the various changes, which happen in the ſeveral parts of our bodies, either from internal cauſes, or from the application of outward agents; and alſo that we ſhould be apprized which are ſalutary and agreeable to the conſtitution of the body, and which are hurtful and tending to its deſtruction.

This is performed in the moſt ſpeedy and effectual manner, by the ſenſations of pleaſure and pain, which are annexed to the impreſſions made by objects on our ſenſes; for whatever by too violent action ſhall diſtend or diſunite the fibres of our bodies, or diſorder our organs, and render them unfit for performing their functions, excites a ſenſation of pain and thereby moves us moſt powerfully to fly from and avoid it; alſo when inwardly the ſmall tubes and canals are obſtructed, and the vital motion of the fluids is di-

ſturbed, this cauſes uneaſineſs, and warns us to ſeek after proper remedies: a moderate degree of heat ſo neceſſary to life is pleaſing and agreeable, but an exceſs of heat as well as that of cold, which are equally deſtructive to it, are both of them troubleſome and painful.

When the parts are in danger of being injured by too much labour and toil, the ſenſe of wearineſs bids us to forbear, and invites us to betake ourſelves to reſt; and when freſh ſupplies of nouriſhment are wanted for the ſupport of our bodies, this we are advertiſed of, and moſt effectually prompted to ſeek after, by the uneaſy ſenſations of hunger and thirſt: alſo the amorous inclinations betwixt the ſexes, are no leſs prevalent, without which the race of mankind would quickly periſh.

Thus, whatever leads towards death and deſtruction, is painful and tormenting, is naturally regarded with dread and averſion; but that which tends to produce or preſerve life, is pleaſing and delightful; and we are not only made to deſire it by the idea of abſent good, preſented to the mind, but we alſo feel a ſort of indigence by painful and uneaſy ſenſations in the body.

All theſe powers of affection are abſolutely neceſſary for the preſervation of every individual, and for the propagation of the kind; and therefore are far from being ſuperfluous, much leſs are they criminal, when in a juſt proportion, and kept within due bounds: but as theſe private affections are not always of the greateſt impor-

tance, it is neceſſary that the pains ſhould ſometimes be indured: and alſo that our appetites ſhould be reſtrained, and theſe ſenſual pleaſures frequently forborn, when they come in competition with others that are more valuable and worthy.

It is the part of fortitude and courage, to be able to endure pain and hardſhip, and to deſpiſe danger, and even death itſelf, upon a fair and honourable occaſion: as temperance and chaſtity give perſons the command over themſelves, and enable them to refrain from ſenſual delights, when it is expedient ſo to do: but too great a fear of danger and death, averſion to labour and hardſhip is cowardice, effeminacy, indolence and ſloth; as too great indulgence of theſe ſenſual pleaſures, is luxury, intemperance, voluptuouſneſs, ſenſuality, lewdneſs and debauchery; all which, when we come to compare theſe pleaſures with others of a higher and more exalted nature, will be found inconſiſtent with true happineſs.

But without comparing theſe joys of ſenſe with others, if we conſider them only by themſelves, and how they may be improved to the beſt advantage, we ſhall find that abſtinence and forbearance do very much contribute to enhance theſe enjoyments; and that ſome pain and hardſhip muſt be endured, elſe we ſhall taſte but little pleaſure. After exerciſe and labour, reſt is ſweet and refreſhing; and the natural uneaſineſs of hunger and thirſt, do very much increaſe the

pleaſure of eating and drinking; and that not only as the removal of a pain enhances the pleaſure, but principally becauſe the pleaſure itſelf is then more exquiſite and intenſe.

Theſe ſatisfactions do above all others require due intervals of forbearance, after which we naturally feel the want of them, by an uneaſineſs in our bodies, and the organs of ſenſe being then in the beſt diſpoſition to receive thoſe impreſſions, the ſenſations thence ariſing are the moſt delightful.

Whereas when we do not wait the call of nature, but anticipate the ſenſe, and raiſe forced deſires, by ideas in the mind, though theſe may by ill habit and cuſtom become more uneaſy and impatient than thoſe which proceed from the healthful conſtitution of the body; yet the pleaſure of gratification will be really leſs: for when the keenneſs of the natural ſenſe is wanting, there can but be ſmall enjoyment, and it will be in vain to endeavour to ſupply it by the moſt ſumptuous table, or by all the arts of the moſt elegant and refined luxury.

Though what is preſented from without be never ſo apt to excite pleaſure, yet if we are in no diſpoſition from within to receive it, all that the moſt tempting objects of the kind can produce, will be only a ſickly delight, intermixed with nauſeating and diſtaſte.

Thus it appears, that nature has endued us with theſe powers of affection for a certain purpoſe and end; which end is the preſervation of

our bodies, and of every particular part of them in a ſound, vigorous and healthful ſtate; but it is well known, that the health and vigour of our body is beſt maintained by temperance and exerciſe, as it is moſt injured and impaired by ſloth and exceſs.

We have alſo found that a moderate forbearance of eaſe and pleaſure, and endurance of labour and hardſhip, do very much contribute to ſweeten theſe ſenſual enjoyments; and that without ſuch ſelf-denial they can yield but little ſatisfaction, but will ſoon degenerate into diſguſt and diſeaſe: from whence it follows, that whoſoever can regulate and govern his appetites, ſo as to make them moſt ſubſervient to that end for which nature deſigned them, will enjoy theſe delights in the greateſt perfection; and he that is moſt addicted to pleaſure, even in the loweſt ſenſe of the word, and purſues it as his chief good, will find his account beſt with regard to his immediate ſatisfaction, in avoiding too much indulgence, and in uſing abſtinence and labour, ſo much at leaſt as will be ſufficient to preſerve his health uninjured and entire.

SECT. II. *Of ſympathy and ſocial affection.*

THE condition of human nature is ſuch, as renders us utterly unable to live ſingle and independent; but, on the contrary, we ſtand in abſolute need of mutual aſſiſtance and ſupport. Other animals while young are hardy, ſenſible and vigorous, ſoon helpful to themſelves, knowing how to ſhun danger and ſeek after their good: but man in infancy is of all others the moſt helpleſs and infirm, and without a long-continued and moſt tender care could never be raiſed; and when come to a full growth, his wants are ſo many, and his ſingle ability to provide for them ſo ſmall, that he could never live with any tolerable convenience out of a ſocial and confederate ſtate: he would find it very difficult to provide himſelf with food and ſuſtinence, or habitations of defence againſt the inclemency of the ſeaſons; and his make is ſo tender, weak and defenceleſs, that he would ſoon become a prey to other animals of ſuperior ſtrength and fierceneſs. Our union is our main ſupport; and the ſpecies could no otherwiſe increaſe or ſubſiſt, than in ſocial intercourſe and company.

And as mutual help and ſuccour is ſo neceſſary to our preſent ſtate and condition; it is therefore requiſite there ſhould be ſomething in our inward frame correſpondent to our outward circumſtances, ſomething in the temper and diſpoſition, inclining men to grant this help, and

assistance to each other, which all do so much stand in need of.

As society is the natural state of man, he is in some sort united with those of his kind, and to be considered as a part of the whole community, and therefore his affections should not be confined within himself, or lead him only towards his own private good, but there must also be something in his nature prompting him to do good to others.

This is most effectually answered by that principle of sympathy and compassion, so visibly implanted in the heart of man, whereby when no opposite passions do interfere, he feels the same affections of grief and joy, wherewith he perceives others to be touched: he naturally rejoices to see them pleased and happy, and it gives him grief and anguish, to view their misery and pain; whereby the good of others becomes a real good to ourselves, as their misery is a real evil; which must of necessity move us to use our endeavours to procure the one, and to avert and remove the other, as much as any other good or evil whatsoever of the private or selfish kind.

It is most evident, that as man was made for society, out of which he could not long subsist, he has interwoven in his constitution those dispositions which lead him to promote the public welfare, and the interest of society, as much as those that move him to take care of his own life, health, and private good.

This sympathetic sense of feeling, has been

thought ſo eſſential a part of human nature, that it has been always called by the name of humanity; and every action that betrays a want or abſenſe of this ſenſe, is accounted barbarous and inhumane. The diſpoſition itſelf is called good nature, and the affections ariſing therefrom are natural affections, and whoever can be inſenſible to the good or evil of his fellow-creatures, eſpecially he who can behold their miſery unmoved, is looked upon as unnatural and depraved, and to be as much deficient in his inward make, as if by ſome diſeaſe he had loſt the uſe of his outward ſenſes, or could not feel the natural appetites of hunger and thirſt.

It can never ſurely be made a doubt of, but that this ſympathy is implanted in our nature, and not acquired by example or habitual practice; elſe why thoſe ſighs, and falling tears which flow involuntarily, and all thoſe marks of anguiſh, which ſhew themſelves in the countenance, unknown to us, upon the ſight of another's miſery; and though we may ſtrive to ſuppreſs all outward tokens of this paſſion, becauſe the exceſs of it is accounted weakneſs, yet there are few who can forbear ſhewing ſome indications of it, unleſs it be ſuch as by long practice, have worn off all ſenſe of pity, and acquired a hardneſs of heart, an inſenſibility, which has been always reckoned a manifeſt unnatural depravity.

Our own happineſs being thus bound up in that of others, we ſhall conſequently deſire their welfare, as a thing that is to us directly and im-

mediately good; which is the foundation of thoſe general affections of kindneſs and benevolence, charity and good will, that we naturally bear to all mankind, or at leaſt to that ſmall part of them, with whom we have to do, or who fall within the compaſs of our notice and acquaintance.

This ſympathy will not ſuffer us to confine our views to a narrow ſelf-intereſt, but will give full ſcope and exerciſe to the ſocial paſſions; it will teach us not to love ourſelves only but our neighbour as well as ourſelves, and to take all opportunities to promote his happineſs, becauſe our own does in ſome meaſure depend upon it.

Kindneſs will ſuppreſs all pride and immoderate ſelf-eſteem, which leads us to prize ourſelves too much, and others too little; it will incline us to entertain favourable opinions of thoſe we converſe with, not to dwell upon their faults and imperfections, ſo as to deſpiſe and think meanly of them, but rather to value them for what we ſee in them that is excellent; and when we make a compariſon, it will diſpoſe us to be modeſt and humble, and to think others more worthy of honour than to ourſelves; and conſequently our behaviour, will not be inſolent and overbearing, but affable and courteous to all, teſtifying by all outward tokens of reſpect, that ſincere good-will which is implanted in the heart.

This benevolence is accompanied with a general love to the whole ſpecies. There is a beauty in the human form ſuperior to any thing elſe in the whole creation, which makes us pleaſed and

delighted with the appearance of our fellow-creatures, eſpecially when we behold them in happy circumſtances, bleſſed with health and eaſe, and contentment: but the pleaſing affections never put us into motion, for the happy do not want our aſſiſtance, which is the reaſon that the joy we receive from the proſperity of others is leſs obſerved; but the compaſſion excited in our breaſts by the view of another's calamity, is ſufficiently viſible, and moves us moſt powerfully to help and relieve them.

The wretched and miſerable do before all others claim our notice and regard; and the firſt as well as the moſt pleaſing office of charity, is to ſuccour the diſtreſſed, to comfort the afflicted, and to ſupply the wants of the indigent, and, in one word, ſo far as we are able, to alleviate the ſorrows of all who are oppreſſed with trouble and misfortune of any kind.

Though in the exerciſe of kindneſs we may ſuffer ſome loſs and inconvenience, though we may ſacrifice part of our own eaſe, forego ſome inferior ſatisfaction, and abate ſomething in point of intereſt and fortune, yet compaſſion will overrule all theſe conſiderations, and will lead us to ſeek out the neceſſitous and friendleſs, the moſt dejected, deſtitute and forlorn, who have not aſſurance to be importunate, and, excepting a grateful acknowledgement, are utterly unable to make any return.

Charity will ſingle out theſe preferable to all others, as the moſt proper objects of her fa-

vour, becauſe they are in greateſt want of it; and when we relieve from miſery, and at the ſame time beſtow real happineſs, this is the greateſt good we can poſſibly do to one another, and will conſequently yield the higheſt delight.

Every benevolent and generous ſpirit, who ſincerely delights in the good of others, will not fail to improve all opportunities to promote the poſitive happineſs of all who come within his influence. There are none ſo compleatly proſperous, ſo perfectly free from all trouble and diſturbance as to ſtand in no need of the good offices of their fellow-creatures; but there are numberleſs occaſions wherein, without being injurious to ourſelves, we may do another a pleaſure, and contribute greatly to his ſatisfaction.

So far as ſympathy can prevail, it will make us ſolicitous for the good of others as our own, becauſe we have a real ſhare in it; and it will lead us to employ as much of our thought and care to promote their welfare, as we poſſibly can, without being too much wanting in what we owe to ourſelves, or to thoſe, who, ſtanding in a nearer relation, do demand our more immediate concern.

For though this benovolence is extended to all mankind, even to perfect ſtrangers, yet it will in the main operate more ſtrongly towards thoſe who are near, than to ſuch as are diſtant and remote; it is, and ought to be more powerful to thoſe of our own nation and community than to

foreigners, ſtill more to our neighbours and acquaintance, and to our own family and poſterity, moſt of all; ſuch different degrees of affection being neceſſary for the general good.

Though it may not always be in our power to do good to thoſe about us, yet compaſſion, however, will reſtrain us from doing them any harm; it will induce us in the firſt place to remove or leſſen their miſery, and in the next to promote or increaſe their happineſs, ſo far as we are able; but in no caſe will it allow us to leſſen their happineſs, or increaſe their miſery. Where it is not over-ruled by other motives, it abſolutely forbids every thing which is injurious and unkind. It is not in human nature to delight in the calamity of another, or to deſire it for its own ſake; but the natural ſenſe of compaſſion may ſometimes be overpowered, and in a manner totally ſuppreſſed for a time by other paſſions which are oppoſite and more prevailing.

Where the affections are not governed by reaſon, and kept within due bounds, ſome will grow exceſſive, while others are weakened and impaired; thus too great a kindneſs for one may move us to do an act of cruelty to another; too ſtrong a deſire of private good, and above all a violent paſſion of reſentment, as ſhall hereafter be ſhewn, may quite extinguiſh all tenderneſs and pity. So that it is not to be expected, that benovolence ſhould be always the ruling principle; becauſe it will upon innumerable occaſions be forced to

yield to ſtronger and more prevailing inticements.

For this reaſon all civil governments have wiſely annexed the ſeveral penalties to all acts of cruelty and injuſtice, thereby to deter men from doing harm to each other, and to unite a ſtrong appearance of evil, with ſuch actions as they might otherwiſe be tempted to commit, by the prevalence of other paſſions, acting contrary to the common affections of humanity.

But ſurely none who can reaſon juſtly concerning his own happineſs, and has any command over his affections, will ever ſtand in need of a priſon, or a gallows, a gibbet, or a wheel, to be ſet before his eyes, in order to rectify his opinions, and regulate his actions.

The principle of benevolence, when duly cultivated, and maintained in full force, will diſpoſe a man to be every way an uſeful member of ſociety; it will kindle in his breaſt a ſincere affection to his king and country, and make him a moſt dutiful loyal ſubject, always ready to do whatever he is able for the ſupport of that government, which affords him ſecurity and protection, and has no other aim but the general welfare. As he will never fall in with ſuch meaſures as tend to public miſery and ſlavery; he will be as far from oppoſing a juſt and legal adminiſtration, from being factious and ſeditious, or ever once attempting to diſturb the public tranquillity, or hinder what might tend to the public good, to gratify his own private paſſions.

He will moſt chearfully contribute whatever

the law requires of him, for the relief of ſuch particular perſons as are not able to provide for themſelves; and charity will alſo lead him to find many opportunities of doing acts of kindneſs and compaſſion, which no law can require of him, and to which nothing but a kind and generous diſpoſition can oblige him.

Such an one will ſave the magiſtrate the regret of puniſhing him for any crimes; becauſe the feeling of his own heart will ſufficiently reſtrain him from whatever may be injurious, or hurtful to his neighbour in any reſpect. He will no more attempt to wound his reputation, or leſſen his good name by vile ſlanders and aſperſions, than he would be guilty of what might affect his fortune, or his life, either by open violence, or by the more ſecure and ſecret way of treachery and deceit. He will be as far from impoſing upon, or over-reaching another, when he is in his power, or from working his harm by ſecret fraud and hypocriſy, as he will be from committing an open robbery or murder, both being equally contrary to the principle of humanity; and, conſequently, where that prevails, and is ſeated in the heart, can never be admitted.

As that is called good or evil with reſpect to a particular perſon, which contributes to his private happineſs, or miſery; ſo thoſe ſentiments and affections, manners and behaviour, of rational agents, which make them uſeful and beneficial one to another, and lead them to promote the mutual happineſs of the whole community, are

called morally good; as on the contrary, thoſe inclinations and actions, which render men hurtful and pernicious to each other, and which are apparently detrimental to the public, are termed morally evil.

And from hence he may juſtly be called morally good or virtuous, who has this ſympathy or ſocial paſſion, this kindneſs and benevolence, in due ſtrength and vigour, always governed and directed by right reaſon, ſo as to be every way ſuited to the general good; as on the contrary, he is termed morally bad or vicious, in whom this ſocial diſpoſition, this tenderneſs and humanity, is either wholly abſent, or elſe weak and deficient, or through wrong judgment ſo partial and miſguiding, as not to be conducing to the general good.

But there is ſomething further commonly required to compleat a virtuous character, which never fails to accompany a kind and benevolent diſpoſition, in creatures endowed with reaſon and reflection.

SECT. III. *Of the moral ſenſe; which makes us pleaſed with every repreſentation of virtue, and offended at the contrary.*

FOR we are not only moved directly by this ſympathy, to promote the happineſs of thoſe of our own kind, as a thing which to us has the appearance of good; but whenever theſe ſocial affections, ſentiments and actions, come to be re-

preſented to the mind, they appear decent and handſome, and command our admiration and applauſe; it is here that we perceive the honeſtum and decorum ſo much admired by the ancient ſages: as on the other hand, every action which betrays a want of this kind affection, and eſpecially every evidence of a contrary diſpoſition, appears moſt odious and deformed, and raiſes our averſion and diſdain.

This natural impreſſion is ſo univerſal, and ſo widely diſplayed, that there is no human creature who is not conſcious of it; even the moſt refractory minds, whoſe inclinations are unhappily bent the wrong way, are yet conſtrained to acknowledge what is morally right and true, and in their cooler hours, to diſapprove and condemn all oppoſite behaviour.

It is alſo judged to be of ſuch dignity and excellence, that it ought always to be the governing principle of our lives; and whenever it preſents itſelf, every other paſſion ought to ſubmit. The utile ſhould always yield to the decorum, nor ſhould any hope of private advantage, or fear of the greateſt evils that can be inflicted, ever induce us to conſent to any action or meaſure of life, contrary to this firſt reliſh or taſte on which virtue and happineſs ſo much depend.

It is not here as in natural beauty, where we are unconcerned ſpectators, but only for the pleaſure we take in beholding it: this is of much nearer concernment; becauſe by this moral ſtandard, every ſentiment and action of our own muſt

be tried; and as the conſciouſneſs of having done ſuch actions as are decent and right, fills the mind with inexpreſſible ſatisfaction, ſo whenever, thro' a falſe judgment, we are drawn to act any thing contrary to this primary rule of honeſty and worth, it muſt occaſion continual remorſe, and is unavoidably attended with repentance and ſelf-condemnation.

Every man's own actions and behaviour, muſt of neceſſity paſs frequently under his inſpection and review, and he will approve of whatever he has acted prudently for his beſt advantage; as the remembrance of what is done fooliſhly, in prejudice to his own intereſt and happineſs, will give him uneaſineſs.

But beſides this conſciouſneſs of what relates to our own private good or evil, we are evidently ſo formed by nature, as to perceive another difference in actions, reſpecting the general good, in which every particular has a ſhare. Thus all thoſe inclinations which do apparently tend to the public happineſs, and to render men mutually uſeful and beneficent to one another, are in themſelves, abſtracted from any view to private advantage, moſt amiable and engaging; but every contrary diſpoſition, which leads men to be hurtful and injurious to each other, is moſt odious, and is always regarded with averſion and abhorrence.

This power of the mind to diſtinguiſh ſentiments, diſpoſitions and actions, and to be thus differently affected by them, is called a moral

ſenſe, or ſenſe of right and wrong, which as it reſpects our own actions and behaviour, is commonly known by the name of conſcience; and the approbation of a man's own mind, with the conſciouſneſs of his own integrity, in the beſt ſenſe of the word, is termed honour; a poſſeſſion which is juſtly valued above any thing elſe in the world.

It is peculiar to benevolence and humanity, that they are not only pleaſing in their immediate exerciſe, but they alſo yield us delight in reflection and remembrance; which no private or ſenſual pleaſures can pretend to. All thoſe enjoyments are of ſhort duration, but the others are permanent and laſting; for there is a power in the human mind, to perceive a beauty and a grace, in kind affection, when governed by reaſon; and every action proceeding from thence, commands our conſtant approbation in review, and yields continual joy and ſatisfaction.

Thus a good diſpoſition, is always attended with a high approbation of whatever is acted from that generous principle, and is ſtrongly ſupported by a love of right, and an abhorrence of wrong; inſomuch that when we are moved by kindneſs and benevolence, rather than by ſelfiſh motives, and do an action which is morally good, though greatly diſadvantageous with reſpect to private intereſt, it may yet afford us greater pleaſure in reflection, than will be ſufficient to recompenſe the loſs; but whenever a man is guilty of treachery and injuſtice, or commits one diſhoneſt action, though it may tend never ſo much to his

private advantage, it will be ſure to gall him in remembrance, and the regret may overballance any advantage it can procure.

This conſideration may tend to ſupport moral goodneſs, and will help to withſtand all oppoſite affections, and carry us through any difficulties we may meet with in the exerciſe of benevolence; ſince that peace of mind, that inward ſatisfaction, which reſults from the conſciouſneſs of having done well, will prove a laſting reward to virtue; while every action that is morally evil, ſhall be puniſhed with remorſe, and the ſtings of an evil conſcience, which are moſt grievous and tormenting.

Though every one has implanted in him that degree of ſelf-love, as it is commonly called, which moves him to take care of his own private good; yet there can be no juſt ſelf-liking, or ſelf-eſteem, but where a man, when he looks into himſelf, can find ſomething in his character which is morally excellent, and can value himſelf upon ſomething worthy and deſerving.

It is a moſt commendable pride implanted in the breaſts of all mankind, to deſire ſo to behave themſelves, as to merit their own approbation and eſteem; and there is ſomething in manners and behaviour, which is eſtimable and excellent, honeſt and becoming, which affords inexpreſſible delight whenever we perceive it in ourſelves; but where this is wanting, and inſtead of honeſty and worth, we meet with villainy and baſeneſs, the

mind can never be at reſt, but the odious deformity is ſo ſhocking, as to create continual ſelf-diſlike; which is attended with inevitable diſturbance and confuſion.

This inherent love of right, and the conſciouſneſs of a man's own worth, is both a natural and exquiſite pleaſure, yielding the trueſt ſelf-enjoyment, and upon many occaſions ſupporting perſons under all private evils, enabling them chearfully to undergo the greateſt ſufferings, and even death itſelf; whereas on the contrary, the reproaches of a man's own conſcience, and the grievous ſenſe of ſhame and guilt, deſtroys all inward peace, and ſometimes raiſes ſo ſtrong a ſelf abhorrence, as to make even life itſelf an inſupportable burthen.

It is not only a man's own behaviour which comes under the inſpection of his own mind, but the affections and manners of others will alſo fall under his cenſure, and though, from a principle of humanity, we bear good-will to all mankind, without conſidering their moral qualities, ſuppoſing them to be in all nearly the ſame, yet the moral ſenſe makes a great diſtinction; and while the general benevolence is towards ſome increaſed to the higheſt degree, it will with regard to others be reduced to nothing, or even the contrary affections of hatred and ill-will be excited in its room.

When we compare different characters, as to their moral conduct, one with another, there ariſes a new trial of the heart, and the ſentiments,

inclinations, and affections of others become the objects of our affection.

Then all thoſe diſpoſitions and actions, that render mankind generous and beneficent, and that evidently tend to the public good, and to the order and harmony of ſociety, do always appear beautiful and amiable; they heighten and increaſe general benevolence, and do naturally win our love and eſteem of the agent, even though we receive no ſpecial advantage by them; but if they are particularly beneficial to us, they excite a farther affection called gratitude.

Whereas on the contrary, ſuch actions as proceed from malice and ill-nature, or which ſhew the want or abſence of natural affection, appear odious and deformed; they impair or extinguiſh good-will towards the agent, and excite our hatred, ſcorn, and indignation, even though we are not immediately prejudiced by them; but if they are hurtful to us, they raiſe in a particular manner the paſſion of anger and reſentment.

We are not only determined by nature to purſue our own private good, but we have alſo implanted in us that ſympathy which leads us to deſire the good of others; and conſequently we ſhall highly approve of every thing which tends to promote either of theſe ends: we may in ſome ſenſe be ſaid to love that which gives us pleaſure of any kind, or contributes to our private good in any reſpect; and we are alſo ſaid to hate whatever gives us pain and diſturbance, when it comes

into our thoughts, though it is not preſent to the ſenſe: but theſe affections of love and hatred are properly applied to moral agents, according as they are good or evil with reſpect to others, in which caſe theſe paſſions are more exquiſite than when our own private intereſt only is concerned.

But when both theſe are united, the affections ariſing therefrom will be more intenſe, than when they are ſingle. As when that moral goodneſs and virtue, which makes a man uſeful in ſociety, is immediately beneficial to us, when we are ſharers of his kindneſs, and partake of his bounty and generoſity; this increaſes our love, and raiſes eſteem into gratitude: and when thoſe morally evil qualities which render a man pernicious to ſociety in general, do make him injurious to us in particular, this increaſes our hatred, and heightens averſion into reſentment.

Yet it is moſt certain, that excluſive of any private advantage, whenever we perceive in any character a ſtrong ſympathy and compaſſion, and conſequently a delight in the good of others, and a deſire to promote it, joined with a juſt ſenſe of honour, and all thoſe beautiful moral graces of honeſty, faith, integrity, friendſhip and generoſity, theſe can never be viewed with indifference, but though our own private intereſt is no ways concerned, every repreſentation of this kind will affect us with pleaſure, and command our ſincereſt love and eſteem.

But when we perceive in any perſon the

want or abſence of theſe diſpoſitions, when we ſee plain ſymptoms of a hard heart, or an inſenſibility to the good or evil of his fellow-creatures, without any ſenſe of honour, attended with treachery, cruelty, and ingratitude; theſe do at firſt ſight excite our hatred and abhorrence, even though we are wholly unconcerned in their influence, and receive no prejudice with regard to our own private intereſt.

Whether we contemplate theſe different manners in real life, or ſee them repreſented in feigned characters upon the ſtage, or read them deſcribed in hiſtory or fable, there will always be found an apparent difference, a beauty on the one hand, and an odious deformity on the other, and we ſhall naturally applaud the one, and condemn the other.

And this view of the delicate ſentiments and affections of the human mind, the various emotions of the heart, and the ſubſequent behaviour and conduct in life, is of all others the moſt enchanting; nothing affects the mind like what proceeds from itſelf; and it is here that the harmonious, the beautiful and comely, as well as the diſſonant, the odious, and deformed, by ſtriking upon this ſenſe, do move us more powerfully than in muſical numbers, or than any outward forms or repreſentations of ſenſible things, raiſing our higheſt admiration and eſteem, and alſo exciting our keeneſt averſion and ſcorn.

This is ſo great a truth, that it ſeems to be univerſally acknowledged; the politeſt part of

mankind being ſo very ſenſible how amiable moral goodneſs is, and how odious the contrary, that they always endeavour to form their carriage ſo as to bear a ſemblance of benevolence and humanity. If theſe affections are not implanted in the heart, there muſt at leaſt be a ſhew of them in their outward behaviour. If there is not real good-nature, there muſt be good-breeding, and good manners; and every defect in point of kindneſs and good-will muſt be carefully concealed, if we would live in any tolerable repute amongſt thoſe we converſe with. And for what reaſon? becauſe every appearance of ill nature is by all mankind regarded with deteſtation.

SECT IV. *Of ſeveral abilities, which, when joined with a good diſpoſition, do alſo appear.*

IT is not a kind and good diſpoſition alone that is ſufficient to make a perſon uſeful and beneficient in ſociety, and conſequently to render a character perfectly amiable; but there are other qualities which ſhould act in conjunction with it, and will always claim a ſhare in our eſteem. Every paſſion ought to be reſtrained and governed by reaſon, elſe we ſhall ſcarce attain to happineſs, and in that particular branch of it which conſiſts in doing good to others, the very beſt and nobleſt affections will lead us wide of our true aim, if they are not directed by prudence.

Therefore, when we love and eſteem any

perſon for having a kind and generous diſpoſition, we always ſuppoſe him to be endowed with at leaſt a common capacity of reaſon and judgment; otherwiſe good nature will be apt to be deſpiſed; as the kindeſt intentions may become fruitleſs if there is not prudence to chuſe the moſt proper means to render them effectual; and if the affections themſelves are not rightly directed, but are partial and miſguided, while they are beneficial to ſome, they may be injurious to others.

Even conſcience itſelf, which is a kind of a ſupreme judge of all our actions, approving or condemning whatever is done or propoſed to be done, if it is erroneous and wrong informed, may lead men into immoral practices; which they will the more obſtinately perſiſt in, as they are perſuaded they are doing right while they do wrong, and imagine that conduct to be meritorious and praiſe-worthy, which is really odious and ill-deſerving.

It is celeſtial wiſdom alone which can guide us in the paths of virtue, by ſhewing what is truly beautiful and decent, honeſt and becoming; and in general, by removing all falſe appearances, and repreſenting all things as they really are, it will ſave us from running into errors, and lead us in the right way towards happineſs: in one word, it will raiſe men to the higheſt degree of dignity and excellence that it is poſſible for their nature to attain.

For which reaſon the beauties of the under-

ſtanding have been always admired; a large capacity and reach of thought, a quick diſcernment and a penetrating judgment, a mind well ſtocked with uſeful knowledge, and a reaſon cultivated and improved, when joined with good nature, do cauſe a perſon to be exceedingly valued and eſteemed, as the want of this and every evidence of ignorance and folly, dulneſs and ſtupidity, render him deſpicable in the laſt degree.

Yet, though benevolence were directed by prudence, it could not upon many occaſions obtain its end, if it was not ſupported by courage and reſolution; becauſe it is this alone which can carry us with ſteadineſs and vigour through any enterpriſe which reaſon dictates to be right without ſhrinking at any difficulty or hazard which may be in our way. It enables men to look danger in the face without being diſmayed or diſcompoſed; preſerves that calmneſs and preſence of mind, and that free uſe of reaſon, ſo neceſſary to find out the moſt proper meaſures to be taken on any ſudden and dangerous occurrence, and to put thoſe meaſures in execution. By this means we ſhall be more likely to avoid any impending evil, than when we are terrified and diſmayed, if it is an evil which may be ſhunned; but if it is what muſt be endured, fortitude will teach us to meet it with a firm temper, and bear it with patience, which very much weakens the force of any calamity.

Thus it is exceeding uſeful with regard to private happineſs: but it ſeems to ſhine out in

its greateſt brightneſs when employed in a common cauſe, as it enables a man generouſly to protect the weak, to ſuccour the injured, and upon all occaſions to ſerve thoſe who are under his influence, in the moſt effectual manner.

Courage or magnanimity has ſomething in it extremely taking; inſomuch that nothing has been celebrated with ſo great applauſe, nor ſung in ſuch paſſionate ſtrains as the atchievements of heroes, and the valiant exploits of men fearleſs of death, eſpecially when they are performed in the ſervice of the public; for death is always glorious, and thoſe wounds are honourable which men receive in fighting for their country's good.

Temperance, or a power to forbear ſenſual pleaſures, and to deny ourſelves private and ſelfiſh enjoyments, whenever it ſhall be requiſite, is in itſelf always handſome and becoming; as, on the contrary, to have the appetites ungoverned, and to follow thoſe ſatisfactions with too much greedineſs, is odious and indecent, making up a contemptible character: and it is not only when theſe inclinations are exceſſive that they are indecent, but men are commonly aſhamed of every thing which betrays ſelfiſhneſs, even in caſes where it is innocent; and they ſtudy to conceal all private pleaſure when others do not partake with them: all indulgence is diſapproved of, but forbearance is applauded.

Nor is it at all ſtrange, that this virtue ſhould appear ſo amiable, and be ſo much praiſed and ad-

mired, if we conſider its ſingular uſefulneſs in life; for whoever is inſlaved to thoſe low deſires, and immerſed in ſenſual delights, is in a manner abandoned and loſt, incapable of reliſhing higher enjoyments, and utterly diſabled from purſuing them with ſucceſs: and as too great a bent towards private pleaſure in many caſes acts in direct oppoſition to the public affections, it will not only render us incapable of doing good to others, but it inſenſibly leads us into ſuch actions as may be highly injurious, and will conſequently tend very much to the prejudice of ſociety.

But temperance, if we can once attain to it, diſengages us from all theſe inferior attachments, and ſets us at liberty to purſue what is moſt excellent and worthy. Whoever has this command over himſelf, will find little hinderance in following ſuch meaſures as his beſt judgment tells him are moſt conducing to his happineſs. The kind affections being no longer oppoſed by more powerful paſſions, will then act in their full force, and there is nothing great, generous and beneficent, which a mind ſo cultivated will not produce.

Wealth and power alſo are held in high veneration by the greateſt part of mankind, and do cauſe the poſſeſſors of them to be exceedingly honoured and reſpected; ſo prone are weak minds to be dazzled with riches and honours, that theſe are more regarded by the generality, than virtue or wiſdom, or any other eſtimable quality whatſoever: as many perſons are apt to make money

their ſovereign good, and fondly imagine happineſs to conſiſt in acquiring endleſs riches, ſo they pay their higheſt eſteem to the wealthy and the great, whilſt poverty is the object of their ſcorn, and merit in rags is ridiculed and deſpiſed.

But though this proceeds entirely from a wrong eſtimation of things, yet it muſt be acknowledged, that if wealth and power are not in themſelves valuable, they are yet the principal means of procuring whatever is deſirable and good; and when thoſe who are poſſeſſed of them underſtand the art of enjoying them, they will not only be ſubſervient to their own private pleaſure, but will alſo enable them to contribute greatly to the good of others, and to do the moſt kind and generous actions.

Whoever conſiders the great uſefulneſs of theſe things, will induſtriouſly endeavour to obtain them by all the ways that are conſiſtent with juſtice, prudence, and honour; and will alſo pay a greater degree of reſpect to thoſe who have theſe abilities joined with a benevolent inclination, becauſe they will then diffuſe a more extenſive beneficence, and by communicating happineſs to great numbers, render a character more illuſtrious.

Natural beauty of the outward form, and a becoming carriage and deportment, do at firſt ſight ſtrike upon the mind of every beholder ſo as to excite love and reſpect; and all the inward graces of the mind, how engaging ſoever they may be, when they are diſcovered in a beautiful perſon, do appear ſtill more agreeable.

Modeſty and humility, wherever they are found, are always amiable; as, on the contrary, every inſtance of pride, or an overweening opinion of one's ſelf, is odious and diſpleaſing.

Truth and ſincerity are alſo highly valued, whilſt treachery and falſhood are treated with deteſtation, nothing being more pernicious to ſociety; becauſe a man may do that harm to another by ſecret fraud and diſſimulation, which he could not compaſs by direct and open dealing; and under the ſemblance of friendſhip, may do him greater injury, than by declared enmity and violence. Hence it is, that every imputation of falſhood is accounted moſt ſcandalous; and to give a man the lie, is deemed ſo great an affront, that it is never received but with moral reſentment.

Thus, by inquiring what it is which wins the love and eſteem of others, and gains a man the reſpect and good opinion of thoſe he lives amongſt, and what thoſe qualities are that make up an amiable character, it will be found that natural beauty of the body when united with the beauties of the mind, makes a perſon appear more lovely and agreeable; that in like manner the endowments of reaſon and underſtanding, when joined with great humanity and good-nature, are worthy of our higheſt eſteem. Temperance and courage are in themſelves excellent, as they evidence a moderate degree of private affection, and ſhew the ſelfiſh paſſions to be under command; but eſpecially when they are made uſe of to ſerve the

purpoſes of benevolence, they appear exceeding amiable. Alſo wealth and power, when they are employed for the public good, render a man more extenſively uſeful, and do therefore challenge a greater degree of veneration and reſpect.

Theſe are the fair poſſeſſions and endowments for which we admire others, and upon which we are alſo apt to value ourſelves; they command our approbation immediately at firſt ſight, and we have endeavoured to point out the reaſons why they ought to do ſo. But if we impartially examine this matter, it will alſo be found, that neither beauty nor wit, nor heroic bravery, nor temperance, nor riches, nor power, without benevolence, will appear in the leaſt agreeable. This is the main ſpring and motive to all worthy actions, and the reſt are moſtly abilities which render it more effectual; and though all theſe do add a greater luſtre to benevolence, yet they ſeem to derive their own ſplendor wholly from it, becauſe where this is wanting, outward beauty loſes all its charms, and the greateſt natural abilities are ſo far from appearing amiable, that they only render a man more odious and more dreadful; they will then be made uſe of to gratify other paſſions, and to ſerve wicked purpoſes, and if they are not employed to do good, they will be ſure to do abundance of harm. The fineſt underſtanding will be ſo far from improving in wiſdom, that it will rather degenerate into cunning; valour will be brutal fierceneſs, and power

will be no better than tyranny and oppreſſion.

So true it is, that of all the graces which adorn human nature, a kind and generous diſpoſition governed by prudence, and directed by right reaſon, is the moſt engaging; and every action flowing from this principle, appears exceeding amiable; but where this is wanting, there can be nothing excellent and praiſe-worthy, nothing that can merit eſteem or approbation; but a mind ſo defective is inſtantly laid waſte, and becomes a wild and frightful deſart, every thing fair and handſome being removed, and nothing left but what is deformed.

SECT. V. *Of the ſenſe of honour and reputation; as alſo of mirth and ridicule.*

WHICH leads to the ſecond grand ſupport of moral goodneſs, viz. the praiſe and approbation of others; for next to that peace and ſatisfaction which reſults from the teſtimony of a man's own conſcience, this is a moſt pleaſing reward to virtuous actions.

All men have naturally implanted in them a love of honour and reputation, and are apt to be very much delighted with every token of the eſteem and good opinion of others, though thy expect no further advantage from them; and to be extremely diſturbed and uneaſy, when they are deſpiſed and ill thought of, though they dread no farther evil.

This ſenſe of honour and ſhame, diſcovers itſelf very early in children, who ſoon become ſenſible of praiſe; they feel a pleaſure in being valued and commended, and are uneaſy when they find themſelves ſlighted and contemned, without conſidering any farther conſequence.

This is undoubtedly a natural paſſion, implanted in the very frame and conſtitution of human nature, and every ſudden apprehenſion or conſciouſneſs of having done what will bring upon us ſhame, diſcovers itſelf in the countenance by bluſhing; which comes without our knowledge, and which is not in any man's power to prevent, unleſs in ſuch as have loſt all ſenſe of ſhame, and by being long engaged in an infamous courſe, have at laſt acquired an habitual impudence.

This affection, when duly cultivated, is a moſt powerful incentive to young minds, which, if theſe rewards and puniſhments are rightly applied, may be inſenſibly led to the practice of what is morally good, and reſtrained from what is evil. The love of praiſe, and fear of ſhame, will have a great influence in that tender age, to prompt young perſons to ſuch actions as are praiſeworthy, and alſo to curb many unruly and contrary paſſions which would not otherwiſe be controlled.

Though this is not the truly principle of virtue, which proceeds from a good diſpoſition, and a love of what is right; yet that principle is very much ſtrengthened and encouraged, by the

tribute of praiſe which all mankind do by general conſent pay to virtuous and well-ordered actions.

All men do delight in reputation, and there is no way ſo ſure to obtain it, as the practice of moral goodneſs: becauſe that which evidently tends to the general good, will ſeldom fail of being univerſally applauded; the generality of mankind being ſo far true to the intereſt of ſociety, that in the main they ſeldom beſtow their approbation, but upon ſuch actions as they apprehend to be conducing to the public happineſs; nor do they often err very wide, unleſs they are depraved by wrong education, and by monſtrous and abſurd opinions inſtilled into their minds, when young.

This love of praiſe, when kept within its due bounds and when men ſtrive to obtain it by real merit, as it is highly beneficial to ſociety, ſo it is no way culpable in particular perſons, but rather commendable; the moſt generous minds are moſt ſuſceptible of this paſſion, and are thereby ſometimes excited to perform the greateſt and moſt heroic actions, ſurmounting all difficulties, through which other motives without this aſſiſtance, would have wanted force to have carried them; but as this is not a ſocial, but a ſelfiſh pleaſure, wherein others cannot always partake with us, but may rather think themſelves robbed of what might juſtly have fallen to their ſhare, therefore the wiſeſt have always endeavoured to conceal it; they would

have the world believe that they act from other and better motives, and are ashamed to receive openly commendation and applause; they rather seem to disclaim and renounce it, well knowing that modesty is an amiable quality, but an assuming disposition is odious and displeasing.

Too great an opinion of one's self, joined with too great a desire after honour, and laying claim to more than is our share, is vanity and pride; which when it is apparent, commonly disappoints its own purpose, and, instead of gaining esteem, rather brings a man into contempt.

Whatever in human sentiment and action is discerned to be right and just, and agreeable to moral truth, commands our admiration and applause; but whatever varies from this primary measure and rule of right, every thing immoral, foolish, and absurd, appears deformed, and tends to move our scorn and contempt.

Thus every thing of this kind which is injurious to ourselves or others, in any great degree, especially when we are in a serious mood, is apt to give us disturbance, and excite a mixture of hatred and resentment; but if it has no very bad influence, with respect to the happiness of ourselves or others, nor amounts to much more than error and folly, or some oddness and singularity, whim and extravagance, this, when it is viewed in good humour, seldom gives us any disturbance, but rather affects us with a peculiar kind of pleasure, and raises our mirth and laughter.

That this power of affection is natural to mankind, will hardly be diſputed; becauſe it ſhews itſelf ſufficiently by outward tokens, and ſeems to be implanted in all men, but in different degrees, according to the natural temper: ſome are more ſmitten with the ſilent admiration of what is beautiful and juſt, while others are prone to view every thing in a ludicrous light, and ſearch out whatever is fooliſh and abſurd, and may conſequently ſerve to raiſe a laugh. The giddy, frolickſome, and gay, are provoked to laughter by every trifle, frequently by matters which are not proper ſubjects of mirth, while others more grave and ſplenetic, have but little reliſh for this kind of pleaſure, and are perhaps ſcarce ever ſeen to ſmile; the ſame perſons alſo at different ſeaſons, are more or leſs ſuſceptible of this diverſion. When a man is pleaſed and in good humour, he will make many things matter of merriment, and ſhew his diſapprobation only by deriſion, which at other times would have been apt to move his diſpleaſure. It is moſt certain that we are beſt diſpoſed to reliſh this entertainment, when we are in chearfulneſs and good humour; for when a man is uneaſy he will be but little inclined to mirth, and when he is out of humour he will be more ready to reſent every little incident, than to carry it off with an air of pleaſantry.

Yet it muſt be acknowledged, that this ſenſe of ridicule, as it is the foundation of raillery and humour, gaiety and feſtivity, helps to furniſh

out a great part of the pleaſures of life; it makes even the miſtakes and imperfections, the faults and follies of our conduct, afford great matter of pleaſantry and diverſion, and the mirth which they create, helps to ſoften our cares, to temper our more ſerious thoughts, and ſerves as an antidote againſt ſpleen and melancholy; for this pleaſing affection has a wonderful efficacy to baniſh ſorrow and inſpire the mind with gladneſs, it exhilerates the drooping ſpirits, and, in its turn, promotes chearfulneſs and good humour.

If it is rightly managed, it may alſo contribute very much to put vice out of countenance; for in this method, even leſſons of wiſdom and moral inſtruction, are often moſt effectually conveyed; ſince all the errors and blemiſhes in men's conduct, may, by the elegance of wit, and the nice touches of a refined raillery, be ſo naturally drawn and placed in ſo facetious a light, that we cannot help being diverted with the repreſentation, and at the ſame time, if we are conſcious that any of theſe failings belong to our own character, a ſecret kind of ſhame will excite us to correct and amend them.

Hence it is that good company and polite converſation tend ſo much to refine men's manners, and to work off whatever is indecent and immoral; for ſuch perſons in the midſt of gaiety and humour, mutually give and take uſeful inſtructions, and do alternately hold the glaſs to each other, wherein every one may behold his own blemiſhes and imperfections. This will not fail

to excite him moſt powerfully to reform, and ſo to adjuſt his behaviour, as to be no longer the mark of jeſt and ridicule; for there is nothing which men covet more than eſteem, nor any thing they dread more than being deſpiſed, and expoſed to ſcorn and deriſion.

It is no ſmall advantage to this method of inſtruction, that it may be managed with pleaſantneſs and good humour, without any ſhew of hatred or ill-will, and without any ſour aſpects or magiſterial airs, to create offence, and render it diſguſtful.

Any ſudden tranſport of joy, occaſioned by ſome good fortune befalling ourſelves, or the view of any misfortune happening to another, will in ſome tempers be apt to produce laughter, and many are too much given to ſneer at the imperfections of their neighbours; but ſurely nothing can be the proper object of ridicule but what is immoral or abſurd, and conſequently mean and contemptible; and even amongſt theſe things, ſuch only are to be ſelected as are of leſſer moment and no ſerious nature; for what is exceeding wicked, will rather cauſe reſentment and indignation, and what is extremely weak and ſilly, will be more apt to raiſe compaſſion.

Too great a degree of ſelfiſhneſs of any kind, call it ſenſuality, cowardice, or avarice, is the proper object of ſatire, and has been always ridiculed with ſucceſs; as is every thing vicious and immoral, and every ſymptom of pride and ill-nature: but temperance, courage and genero-

ſity, with whatever is virtuous and honeſt, and bears the mark of good nature and humanity, theſe will be ſure to ſtand the teſt; and in whatever light they are viewed, will always appear beautiful; nor can they ever be made a jeſt of, or rendered contemptible. Yet, as was intimated before, the beſt affections can be of no uſe, but will rather prove pernicious, if they are not directed by reaſon; therefore every inſtance of weakneſs or folly will be deſpicable and ridiculous, but wiſdom and good ſenſe will be always admired.

Upon the whole, it ſeems that in human affairs there is a certain end, which, when rightly underſtood, will to every human creature appear extremely deſirable. Whatever is apparently contrary to this end, is immoral and irrational, fooliſh and abſurd, indecent and deformed, always regarded with ſcorn and contempt, and is unavoidably the ſubject of reſentment or ridicule; as on the other hand, whatever tends to promote this great end, is right and true, moſt reaſonable and fitting, beautiful and juſt, always regarded with eſteem, and from which we cannot withhold our admiration and applauſe.

SECT. VI *Of the ſenſe of beauty in natural ſubjects.*

IT is not in moral ſubjects only that we perceive a beauty and a charm, but alſo the productions of nature and art, when they come under our ſurvey and contemplation, do many of them excite a pleaſing admiration: they are no ſooner brought into our view, but they affect us with pleaſure directly, and immediately, without our reflecting on the reaſon why they do ſo, and without their being conſidered with relation to ourſelves, or as advantageous in any other reſpect, even where there is no poſſeſſion, no enjoyment or reward, but barely ſeeing and admiring.

Theſe objects are, therefore called beautiful; as others are termed ugly and deformed, which are not viewed with this ſatisfaction, but are rather apt to create diſapprobation and diſlike.

Theſe pleaſures being excited by the images of things received by the ſight, from objects which are actually before our eyes, or elſe called up by the memory, and formed into agreeable pictures, are called the pleaſures of the imagination; for though theſe ideas are originally received by the ſight, yet the pleaſures they afford are not allowed to belong to the outward ſenſe, but are aſcribed to another faculty. Of this, however, we are certain from experience, that there are ſeveral modifications of matter, which the mind, without any previous conſideration, pro-

nounces at firſt ſight to be beautiful or deformed.

All bodies which, by nature or art, are faſhioned into regular figures, are more pleaſing than ſuch as are irregular and confuſed; a pile of building ariſing according to juſt order and proportion, ſtrikes the eye more agreeably than a rude heap of miſhapen rocks.

A ſpacious horizon and an azure ſky, with the ſun ſhining out in his meridian glory; or when riſing or ſetting, he gilds the mountain-tops, and paints the clouds with glorious colours, is a ſight moſt pleaſing and delightful; nor is it leſs entertaining when the ſun is left our hemiſphere, and the ſhades of night cover the earth, to view the heavens adorned with ſuch an infinity of ſparkling ſtars, beſides the neighbouring planets, and the pale moon, that ſhine with borrowed light.

If we take a ſurvey of our planetary ſyſtem, with that glorious luminary the ſun in its centre, the fountain of vital heat, and ſource of thoſe continually emitted ſtreams which enlighten and invigorate the ſurrounding worlds; for around him all the planets, with this our earth, either ſingle or with attendants, do perpetually move, and all partake the bleſſing of his light and genial warmth, performing their revolutions in juſt proportion, and invariable meaſure: this is a ſpeculation not only delightful, but amazing; and eſpecially if we conſider the almoſt infinite number of fixed ſtars, as ſo many ſuns, no leſs diffuſive of

vital treaſure, nor leſs attended with their proper planets, who pay their circular homage, and partake of the ſame enlivening influence, this will preſent an idea of the grandeur and munificence of nature, and the immenſity of the material world, too vaſt for our narrow capacities to entertain.

Theſe ſublime contemplations may alſo fill our minds with worthy conceptions, and excite us to a grateful adoration of the guardian Deity, and the ſovereign Ruler of the world; the ſource and principle of all beauty and perfection, who animates the ſeveral parts of this ſtupendous frame, and moves them all from the leaſt to the greateſt, by ſacred and inviolable laws, contrived by unerring wiſdom and moſt conſummate goodneſs, for the welfare of each particular being, ſo far as may ſuit with the order and perfection of the whole.

But not to launch too far into theſe boundleſs views of nature, if we return to this our globe, the various landſkips and rural ſcenes which preſent themſelves upon the ſurface of the earth, diverſified into hills and vallies, woods and ſpacious plains, covered with refreſhing verdour, and enlivened with ſuch diſtinction of light and ſhade; in ſome parts adorned with pleaſant ſeats and ſpiry cities, and watered with winding rivers; while in others the proſpect varies to wilds and ſandy deſarts, craggy rocks and lofty mountains; all theſe together do form agreeable viſions, and ſtrike the imagination with an irreſiſtible pleaſure.

And it is not only the ſurvey of theſe larger ſcenes of the material world that is ſo entertaining, but if we deſcend to contemplate particular bodies, we ſhall find all the works of nature wrought up with the moſt exquiſite art, exhibiting new ſcenes of wonder, and they will be more admired the better they are underſtood; but much will ſtill remain myſterious, which the moſt diſcerning ſenſe, aſſiſted by the acuteſt reaſon, can never fully unfold.

Thoſe who ſearch into the bowels of the earth, do there diſcover hidden wonders to gratify their curioſity, which, though more ſimple in ſtructure, are not leſs exquiſite in beauty than other productions more compounded; gems and precious ſtones, though their ſubſtance is moſt homogenial, and beſides their hardneſs and incorruptibility, have little in them worthy of admiration, but their luſtre and beautiful colour, are yet moſt highly prized. Metals of the nobler kind are ſufficiently idolized by the generality of mankind, and even thoſe of the baſer ſort, as well as many other mineral ſubſtances, are endowed with ſuch wonderful properties, and when tried through all the various methods of inquiry by fire, do yield ſuch ſurpriſing appearances, as ſtrike upon the fancy, and furniſh out matter of employment, for the buſy mind of man; ſo far that thoſe who turn their thoughts towards theſe ſubjects, can in theſe experiments ſpend their days with pleaſure.

If we examine what paſſes upon the ſurface of

this globe, we ſhall find it ever fruitful of an infinity of beautiful forms, which do all originally proceed from their parent earth, and having appeared for a ſhort time, return to earth again; which brings forth more to undergo the ſame fate: they ſoon quit their borrowed forms, and by a quick circulation are reſolved into their primitive matter, and yield their elementary ſubſtances to new comers. But though theſe particular beings are thus tranſitory and ſhort-lived, yet by ſeminal powers they produce their like, and by ſucceſſion live through endleſs ages.

There are multitudes of ſpecies of plants, which in all their various growths, from the ſilver moſs to the ſtately oak, are both in their inward fabric, and their outward form, exceedingly beautiful; and, by thoſe who are curious in this way, are not beheld without admiration. How wonderful is the ſtructure of the root which ſhoots downward, and of the ſtem which grows upwards! how uniform the branches, how curiouſly figured are the leaves, and, above all, how exquiſitely beautiful are the flowers! inſomuch, that this ſingle production of the vegetable kingdom furniſhes a moſt elegant entertainment to thoſe who have a juſt knowledge of theſe beauties, and a refined taſte for this kind of pleaſure.

If we aſcend to animals, and ſurvey only the inſect tribe, yet even here will ſoon be found ſufficient cauſe of admiration, the ſmalleſt works of nature being framed with no leſs conſummate

ſkill than the greateſt; as theſe are endowed with ſenſe and ſelf-motion, ſo all their limbs and inſtruments of action are adapted to their circumſtances with the niceſt art, to enable them to avoid their enemy, or to ſeize their prey, and to perform all the actions proper to their kind: many of them have the art of ſpinning with wonderful quickneſs; others do alſo weave nets; ſome build cities, and live in ſociety under a regular government.

It is alſo peculiar to theſe creatures, that after a certain ſeaſon, they ſeem to be grown weary of life, and faſhion to themſelves ſepulchres, wherein they lie intombed, and are to all appearance dead; but after a ſhort time they riſe again with greater glory in a different form, having undergone a ſurpriſing change, and inſtead of creeping on the earth, they now expand their wings, and become inhabitants of the air.

It is moſt entertaining to behold theſe mean and contemptible inſects, when accurately viewed, to be adorned with ſuch a vaſt variety of glorious colours and ſuch great profuſion of dreſs and attire, to which no borrowed magnificence, nor artificial embelliſhments are to be compared.

The birds of the air may alſo be the ſubject of a moſt agreeable ſpeculation, whether we attend to the great variety and harmony of their notes, or conſider the beauty of their form, and the glory of their plumes; or if we examine the mechaniſm

of their wings, which enables them to bear themſelves up in ſo light and yielding a fluid, and cut the air with ſo much eaſe, in all the varieties of flight. There is alſo ſomething entertaining in the ſtructure of their neſts, the form and various colours of their eggs, and eſpecially in their care and ſolicitude to provide, not only for the ſubſiſtence, but ſafety of their young.

As thoſe fowls that are tame and domeſtic, or of the mild and harmleſs kind, are different in their tempers and inclinations; ſo they are alſo of a weaker make, unfurniſhed with thoſe weapons which are allotted to ſuch as are in their natures fierce and rapacious, and live by preying upon the weaker ſort.

It is obſerved, that ſome are birds of darkneſs which come abroad only in the night, teſtifying their joy by hideous ſcreams; but before the riſing of the ſun, they withdraw themſelves into dark corners, or deep caves, where light has no acceſs.

Many of them are birds of paſſage, coming at a certain time, and after they have ſtayed their appointed ſeaſon, they aſſemble together, and take their flight in the greateſt order and diſcipline, to remote countries, over wide ſeas and tracts of land, without either chart or compaſs, in a manner too wonderful for us to underſtand.

The fiſhes which inhabit the watry element, and the terreſtrial animals, whether wild or tame, will be viewed with no leſs admiration and delight; and to crown all, the human form is of

all other beauties, the moſt inchanting; and where nature and art have not with-held their favours, the ſymmetry of features, the fine turn of ſhape, the blooming countenance and the graceful mein, do ſtrike every beholder with irreſiſtible pleaſure.

It is a large ſcene for delightful contemplation which the works of nature do afford: and not only theſe, but the works of art, and the ſymmetries of human invention, do alſo claim their ſhare of beauty; and there are many who perhaps may overlook what is fair and handſome in other ſubjects, and yet are ſmitten with admiration of this order of beauties. The models of houſes and buildings, in juſt proportions, with their accompanying ornaments and decorations; the plans of gardens, and their compartments, the ordering of walks, plantations, and avenues, are moſt elegant and delightful amuſements.

Thoſe who have attained a juſt knowledge in the plaſtic or deſigning arts, ſuch as ſculpture or painting, how are they charmed with a fine ſtatue or a finiſhed picture; and how are we all apt to be tranſported with the imagery, the deſcriptions of beautiful objects, which we meet with in poetry: for in theſe caſes it is in the artiſt's power, to adorn and embelliſh what he offers to our view, by heightening every grace, and concealing the defects which often accompany them; or by aſſembling a greater number of beauties than are uſually put together by nature.

It is the talent of affecting the imagination,

by ſelecting ſuch things as are moſt proper to ſtrike upon the inward ſenſe, and painting them in the moſt lively manner, that makes a fine genius in moſt kinds of writing, and renders not only poetry and fiction, but real hiſtory entertaining; and though what is drawn from life, and from the paſſions, is the principal part, nothing being ſo engaging as the beauty of ſentiments, the turn of character, and the grace of actions, when ſet off with proper foils; yet the repreſenting of natural beauties, intermixed with thoſe of the moral kind, do render a work more agreeable.

If harmony and proportion, is ſo taking in viſible objects, it is no leſs inchanting in ſounds; the power of muſic being ſufficiently experienced, and the wonderful force it has to move the paſſions, to calm all anxious and tormenting agitations, and to fill the mind with rapture and delight.

The pleaſures of the underſtanding, which reſult from the diſcovery of truth, and the perception of the agreement of ideas, or their relations and proportions to each other, are thought to be ſtill more exquiſite and refined. We cannot help being pleaſed with the lively turns of wit, which, by happy alluſions, ſhew a ſurpriſing agreement betwixt things, which were thought to be quite different. But theſe ſudden flaſhes only ſtrike upon the imagination, and are not always exactly juſt, nor will they bear a ſtrict inquiry, but often tend to lead us aſtray. We are apt to reſt ſa-

tisfied with the agreeable viſion without farther examination, whereby we ſometimes miſtake one thing for another, or, through a partial reſemblance, imagine them to be in all reſpects alike.

But when, by a careful uſe of reaſon, through a long chain of intermediate proofs, we diſcover the relation of two ideas, which could not be immediately compared, how far they agree, and in what reſpects they differ; we are led to a true judgment, clear of all fallacy and deluſion, and the mind is affected with a moſt exalted pleaſure, making ample amends for the toilſome and laborious ſearch.

SECT. VII. *How all theſe determinations are implanted in our nature, and others may be acquired by cuſtom.*

AND thus it appears that we do not only receive pleaſure and pain from our outward ſenſes, but are alſo endowed with various powers of affection which are internal and ſeated in the mind; and ſo far as we can learn from obſervation, theſe are no leſs natural than the former, not gained by the accidental aſſociation of ideas, not learned by imitation, or acquired by habit, but interwoven in the frame and conſtitution of human nature; all the race of mankind being evidently poſſeſſed of them, though in various proportions, and different degrees.

There is no human creature, that is not visibly defective in his make and temper, but, besides the pleasures and pains he receives from his outward senses, will very early discover an internal sense of beauty, by being pleased with what is regular, orderly, and uniform; and when he comes to be tried by proper objects, will shew evident tokens of the sympathetic affections, such as kindness, compassion, gratitude and love; and though it may be somewhat later before he comes to reason and judgment, yet as soon as he is capable of reflecting, he will be pleased with every shew and representation of the social passion; think nothing more amiable than this, nor more odious than the contrary, and thereby clearly disclose a sense of right and wrong.

The sense of honour and shame, shews itself much sooner; and it is most reasonable and fitting, that, before we arrive at a moral judgment of our own, our actions and behaviour should be governed by the sense, and opinion of others.

Though all these senses or dispositions seem to be implanted in the human nature, yet they do not shew themselves equally in all persons, and at all times; nor are they in their nature fixed and invariable; but may, by several causes, be increased and diminished, depraved and altered, and are frequently concealed so as to seem most totally extinguished and destroyed.

The affections arising from different senses do frequently act contrary one to another, in which

caſes the ſtronger will for a time ſuppreſs the weaker. Thus reſentment of injury, is contrary to kindneſs and compaſſion, and will frequently overcome, not only the affection which we naturally bear to others, but even ſelf-love, or the regard we have to our own ſafety. The ſenſual appetites, and what we call ſelf-intereſt, do often act in oppoſition to ſocial affection; ſo far as for the preſent to over-rule and ſubdue it.

Humanity will indeed diſpoſe men to love thoſe of their own kind; and, while no oppoſite paſſion interferes, to treat them with kindneſs, and avoid doing any thing which may tend to their prejudice and harm; yet there are implanted in our nature other principles which excite contrary affections, and will upon many occaſions break the bands of friendſhip, and ſet men at variance one with another.

Thoſe who would perhaps be the fartheſt from offering an injury to another, are ſometimes apt to receive, very impatiently, any indignity or abuſe, and to proſecute the offending party with the utmoſt hatred and reſentment. All men have that natural abhorrence of wrong, that they cannot view any act of cruelty or injuſtice, without being highly offended with the agent, even though they are no ways concerned with reſpect to their own private intereſt; but much more if it is hurtful to themſelves; and ſo partial are we in our own cauſe, that we are ready to judge every thing done by another, which tends to our prejudice, to be

an injury, and conſequently to reſent it in a moſt heinous manner.

When one man deprives another of any good, or brings upon him any evil, whether it be by robbing him of his property in any kind, or by leſſening his reputation and good name, refuſing him that reſpect which he may think his due, or by doing what is any way contrary to his intereſt, eſpecially if he thinks it is done unjuſtly; this will be ſure to raiſe his indignation, and excite him ſtrongly to revenge.

It is impoſſible but this muſt frequently happen, becauſe intereſts will often interfere: and even where intereſt is no way concerned, yet the different humours of mankind, their different manners, cuſtoms, and behaviour in many reſpects oppoſite to each other, will create prejudice and diſguſt, which is apt to degenerate into ill-will: and ſo prevalent is pride and ſelf-conceit, and ſo fond are all men of their own opinions, that though they are perfectly agreed in all things of importance, yet if they differ in their ſentiments about trivial matters, this is often found to produce mutual hatred and reſentment.

Thus it is not to be expected that benevolence ſhould always prevail, but it will be often vanquiſhed and ſubdued, being unable to ſtand its ground againſt ſuch powerful aſſailants: all kindneſs and friendſhip will be ſuſpended, and enmity introduced in its ſtead; and the ſeeds of ſtrife, and animoſity, hatred, and ill-will, being thus

plentifully ſown, will be ſure to ſpring up in abundance.

And yet, notwithſtanding this, the friendly diſpoſitions may ſtill remain in the mind and temper; and will not fail to ſhew themſelves, when thoſe more prevailing paſſions are removed. But by wrong inſtruction, education, and example joined with long practice and cuſtom, ſome of theſe powers may be very much impaired, and almoſt entirely loſt and effaced; while others are ſtrengthened and increaſed beyond their due proportion.

Thus a man may be drawn in to do a hard and injurious action, by the prevailing force of ſome oppoſite paſſion, which may ſuppreſs all the motions of humanity for the preſent, though the ſenſe may yet remain entire; but by long uſe and cuſtom, he may be trained up to the exerciſe of cruelty, until at laſt he arrives at a total inſenſibility, and all tenderneſs and compaſſion ſhall be in a manner extinguiſhed.

The powers and faculties of the mind, as well as the organs of the body, gain ſtrength by action and exerciſe, as, by the want of it, they grow weak and feeble; and cuſtom, which is a ſecond nature, will by degrees increaſe our reliſh or diſpoſition, to be pleaſed with any enjoyments that are frequently deſired, and often repeated; while the ſenſe of other pleaſures with which theſe are inconſiſtent, ſhall through diſuſe be very much impaired and weakened.

It is in the power of cuſtom, not only to aug-

ment and diminiſh theſe natural powers of affection; but to create pleaſures, or at leaſt ideas of pleaſures, which are purely fantaſtical and unnatural.

There are many things which perſons are brought to chuſe, not for their own ſakes, or from any pleaſure which they yield, but merely in compliance with the faſhion, and to avoid being thought ſingular; yet by long uſe they become habitual amuſements, and we begin to be uneaſy in the want of them, to hanker after, and paſſionately to long for them, when the firſt inducement to chuſe them is no longer thought of. And thus what was not pleaſing in itſelf, but only choſen as a thing that was mediately good, and proper to procure us ſome other pleaſure, is, by a ſort of magic, transformed into a thing that is immediately good, and becomes deſirable in itſelf, as the want of it gives us ſo much uneaſineſs.

From hence, among many other irregular affections, we muſt account for that ſtrange paſſion called the love of money, which is often begun by imitation, or from a juſt notion of the uſefulneſs of riches, which though not excellent in themſelves, will yet procure us many conveniencies and pleaſures of life; and therefore we may reaſonably deſire them, and endeavour to obtain them, as a means of happineſs, by all juſt and honeſt ways; but when men have been long accuſtomed to purſue them, they inſenſibly join with them an opinion of good in themſelves, and ſtrive to acquire

them for their own ſakes. The ultimate end which was at firſt propoſed, is no longer remembered, but all the appearance of excellence is tranſferred to the means.

Thus gold comes at laſt to be idolized, and men are ſo impious as to pay their adoration to bags or heaps of ſhining metal; and ſo wonderful is the faſcination, that though riches are no ways valuable but as they are ſubſervient to our pleaſures, yet they who are poſſeſſed with this frenzy, ſacrifice their eaſe and pleaſure for the ſake of money; they ſtrive to obtain it with induſtry and toil, and ſtudy to preſerve it with no leſs anxiety and care, denying themſelves the chief enjoyments of life, rather than part with any ſhare of their beloved treaſure.

And thus we ſee, that we are not only liable to be betrayed into wrong judgments of good and evil at a diſtance, but the reliſh of it when preſent may be altered, and our taſte by degrees be vitiated and depraved: and though men ſhould not fail to purſue that moſt, which affects them with the greateſt pleaſure, yet even in this they may be ſubject to error; and we find many who place their higheſt ſatisfaction in mean and contemptible enjoyments, while the more valuable are neglected and deſpiſed.

For all the various pleaſures we are capable of receiving, cannot be enjoyed together in their full extent; but, if we will ſtrive to make the moſt we can of ſome, we muſt allow of ſome abatements with regard to others. If a man is reſolved to

indulge himſelf to the utmoſt in ſenſual pleaſure, he muſt be content with a leſs ſhare of the pleaſures of the mind. He muſt not hope to improve in knowledge, nor can he expect to gain much honour and reputation. If he is wholly governed by ſelfiſh views, and determined upon any terms to advance his own private intereſt, he muſt bid adieu to all the joys of friendſhip, kindneſs, and generoſity; nor muſt he ever taſte that ſincere delight, which reſults from the conſciouſneſs of having done ſuch actions as are decent and worthy. If honeſty is his greateſt pleaſure, he will not fail of having the teſtimony of a good conſcience, and the applauſe of all good men; but then he muſt abate ſomething in point of intereſt, and often deny himſelf the gratification of his private paſſions.

If he is deſirous to excel in ſcience and learning, this will require application and ſtudy, and may perhaps make him leſs polite in his behaviour, and give him a thoughtful and diſagreeable air in company. If he courts military glory, he muſt be willing to endure hardſhip, and deſpiſe danger and death; but if his choice is indolence and eaſe, theſe may be had on other terms; it is but to quench the love of fame, and the thirſt after gain, to conquer love and ambition, and every other reſtleſs paſſion: if this can be done, all will be eaſy.

And thus it is apparent, that what we gain on one hand, we muſt loſe on another; every thing goes by exchange, and therefore it will be-

hove us to inquire which are the moſt profitable exchanges; which way we may beſt afford to be loſers, and where we ought to bend all our endeavours to be gainers: that ſo with a ſlight regard to ſuch enjoyments as are of an inferior nature, and yield but a ſhort and tranſient ſatisfaction, we may principally direct our aim to thoſe that are more exalted and refined, and which afford a more durable pleaſure.

If it is but once rightly underſtood which enjoyments are in themſelves the moſt worthy, and alſo the leaſt attended with pain and diſquiet, and leaſt ſubject to loſs and diſappointment; we may then be better able to deal with thoſe falſe ideas of pleaſure that will be ſolliciting us, and to diſcover whether they will not deprive us of greater pleaſure, or bring upon us more trouble and diſturbance than will be balanced by all the ſatisfaction they can afford.

SECT. VIII. *A compariſon of all theſe various affections, in order to diſcover which are of the greateſt importance.*

THE pleaſures of ſenſe, in the vulgar acceptation of the word, are univerſally acknowledged to be inferior to thoſe of the mind, as being only ſuch as we enjoy in common with other animals, to whom we reckon ourſelves to be much ſuperior; and therefore ſhould place our happineſs in the exerciſe of thoſe higher and nobler powers, which are peculiar to ourſelves

and wherein the dignity of human nature does principally conſiſt.

The objects of ſenſe are too groſs and material, to afford a ſuitable and refined entertainment to the mind; and as the pleaſures of this ſort are the loweſt, they are alſo ſhort and tranſient, they vaniſh in enjoyment, and yield no ſatisfaction in reflection and remembrance; and eſpecially when the averſion to the pains, or the indulgence to the pleaſures of ſenſe, are beyond a juſt degree, they will be manifeſtly inconſiſtent with our true felicity, as they deprive us of much greater pleaſures, and likewiſe bring upon us the greateſt evils.

Thus an exceſſive love of eaſe, and averſion to labour and hardſhip, utterly diſables us from obtaining the higheſt ſatisfaction; as an immoderate fear of danger, or of death itſelf, renders a man incapable of performing the common duties of life, or of being uſeful in ſociety, depriving him thereby of the moſt valuable pleaſures, and is therefore juſtly reckoned a mean and deſpicable character.

It is alſo ſufficiently known how much an exceſſive indulgence to the pleaſures of ſenſe, either of the luxurious or the amorous kind, unfits us for all other delights; and how many evils and miſchiefs it brings upon us, as it introduces a general looſeneſs and diſorder in the whole oeconomy, dethrones a man's reaſon, and enſlaves him to every mean and abject paſſion; and eſpecially as it deprives us of the two greateſt bleſſings in

ſife, health and good humour, impairing by degrees, the natural harmony and vigour of the conſtitution, and with an equal pace bringing on a ſourneſs and uneaſineſs in the temper.

The paſſion of ſelf-intereſt, as it excites to the purſuit of wealth and riches, or at leaſt a competency of the means of happineſs, is in a juſt proportion very requiſite. All are not born to a plentiful fortune, and therefore, by their own care and induſtry, muſt provide a maintenance for themſelves and family. The common mechanic can by his daily labour gain an honeſt livelihood, and, if his deſires are adapted to his circumſtances, may live as happy and contented as others of a higher rank; and he that is bleſt with a ſuperior genius, and a more liberal education, may in ſome higher profeſſion prove eminently uſeful to ſociety, and in return acquire to himſelf a plentiful eſtate; or if the love of money is not ſo prevalent in his temper, as to make him extremely ſucceſsful that way, yet a moderate regard for it is highly neceſſary, becauſe every man would wiſh not only to be eaſy in his body and in his mind, but he muſt be alſo eaſy in his circumſtances, and above the fear of want, or elſe his happineſs will be very imperfect.

As deſpicable as riches may appear in ſome perſons eyes, and as little worthy to be purſued for their own ſakes, yet they ſerve to relieve us from the many wants and ſufferings, to which human nature is expoſed; they enable men to do acts of kindneſs and compaſſion to others, and

by this means make them taſte the generous pleaſure of relieving the needy and diſtreſſed; and in ſhort, they are things without which very few ſatisfactions of any kind are to be obtained: but as they are not good in themſelves, but only the means of procuring what is really good, and all the advantage lying in a right uſe and application of them, it follows, that to purſue and admire them, as excellent in themſelves, without any view to their uſe, is altogether ridiculous and abſurd; it is employing all our endeavours to obtain the means, and at the ſame time neglecting the end.

When men once come to aim at getting money for its own ſake, they ſeldom ſet any meaſure to their deſires; but the more they have acquired, the more eager they are to increaſe their ſtore; and as too ſtrong a deſire after riches, even though no injurious methods are made uſe of to obtain them, renders a man entirely ſelfiſh, and by degrees extinguiſhes all kind and generous affection, depriving him of the higheſt and beſt enjoyments, and affording nothing in their room but the poor and low gratifications of a ſordid and unnatural paſſion, which yet is in its nature ever inſatiable; it has therefore always been juſtly accounted a wretched and miſerable character.

The pleaſures of the mind, ariſing from the ſtudy and ſurvey of natural beauty, in every object wherein it is to be found, are judged to be far ſuperior to ſenſual enjoyments, and to yield a more noble and refined entertainment.

As in what relates to the human ſpecies, ſuch diſpoſitions, ſentiments, and actions, as tend to the general good of the whole, do ſtrike the inward ſenſe, and appear exceeding amiable; ſo in all other creatures, thoſe inclinations and affections, which make them uſeful to their kind, ſo far as they were deſigned to be ſociable; as alſo thoſe ſhapes and proportions, that are beſt adapted for the activity, vigour, and perfection of the particular animal, do appear beautiful, and affect the mind with pleaſure.

It is the ſame with regard to that harmony and order, and thoſe ſacred general laws, which ſupport univerſal nature, and make all the ſeveral parts ſubſervient to the perfection of the whole; for all men are originally ſo formed, as to perceive a beauty and a charm in whatever is harmonious and proportionable; as the proportionate and regular ſtate, is the truly proſperous and natural one in every ſubject, contrived by wiſdom and deſign, for the greateſt utility and advantage.

This is that conſummate beauty of nature, with which ſome of the moſt celebrated writers, both ancient and modern, have been ſo tranſported, as to affirm it to be, in its full extent, the higheſt and the chiefeſt good; in the ſurvey and contemplation of which, the greateſt pleaſure did conſiſt: for this contemplation of beauty, is the delightful exerciſe and employment of the mind; and they thought it unworthy of their high rank, for men to place their happineſs in the joys of

ſenſe, which brutes enjoy ſo much above them; but that we ought to place it in our minds, which were abuſed and cheated of their true felicity, when drawn to ſeek it in the objects of ſenſe, or in any thing elſe but the enjoyment of beauty, and of whatever is fair, decent, and handſome.

But without entering far into ſuch refined ſpeculations, it is eaſy to obſerve, that the charms of beauty are widely diſplayed: we find it in almoſt every thing we view, and every one courts a Venus of one kind or another, either in the works of nature, or of art; though different minds may be captivated with different beauties, and engaged in various purſuits. Thus in high life, a palace and apartments in the utmoſt grandeur and magnificence, with avenues, viſtos, ſpacious gardens, groves and woods; within a ſumptuous table, rich ſervices, numerous attendants, equipage and dreſs, in the niceſt order and beauty, do affect the mind with admiration and delight. Some are ſmitten with the love of painting, ſtatuary, muſic or poetry; while others are more enamoured with the beauties of nature, and even in ſhells and butterflies can diſcover ſomething extremely pleaſing to their fancies: ſome are delighted with animals, and can admire and even doat upon a horſe, a hound, or a hawk; and others more mindful of their own kind, are tranſported with the charms of a fine ſhape, or a beautiful face, ſo far as to think all things deſpicable and mean.

Thoſe of a more exalted genius, and capa-

cious mind, can ſlight all the allurements of inferior pleaſures, and, ſolely intent on the purſuit of knowledge, can labour night and day at the ſolution of a difficult problem, or the demonſtration of a general theorem, and think themſelves well rewarded for their pains.

They are curious to ſearch into the ſecrets of nature, the virtues of plants, the formation and oeconomy of animals, the union of the elements, and the ſtructure of the univerſe; can deſcribe the order of the celeſtial bodies, and the courſes of the planets, the force which retains them in their orbits, and the laws of motion which they univerſally obey; all which ſtrike the mind with wonderful pleaſure, and yield a moſt refined and elegant entertainment.

SECT. IX. *The ſocial affections are of the greateſt importance.*

IT ſeems to be very plain, that the main thing which renders a character eminent or worthleſs, honoured or deſpiſed, is the different proportion of ſelf-love and ſocial affection, which obtains in the temper and diſpoſition.

Some modern philoſophers delight to run diviſions upon ſelf-love, and deduce every motive to action from this ſingle principle; and indeed it muſt be owned, that it ſeldom wants its due force in the natural conſtitution, and, beſides, that example, and the prevailing faſhion are apt in theſe days, to give too ſtrong a biaſs towards

private intereſt. Thus ſome are led to place their happineſs in luxury and ſenſual delight; others are influenced by ambition, or by envy and reſentment, while many, who are no inconſiderable perſons, ſeem to be too much governed by avarice, which of all ſelfiſh paſſions is the loweſt.

Yet it muſt be allowed, that there is a pleaſure in action as well as ſpeculation; and as the joys of the mind are preferable to thoſe of ſenſe, ſo of all thoſe inward ſatisfactions which do properly appertain to the mind, the moſt valuable are thoſe which flow from ſympathy and ſocial paſſion. For how ſtrange ſoever it may ſeem, and perhaps contrary to the general opinion; yet whoever is a competent judge, will declare it is a truth, that the greateſt pleaſure is to pleaſe another; and that the exerciſe of benevolence and humanity yields the moſt exquiſite delight.

We may ſafely appeal to any one of the human kind, who has experienced what condition the mind is in under a lively affection of love or gratitude, kindneſs and compaſſion, bounty and generoſity: nay, it is moſt manifeſt, that whenever any perſon is touched with any ſtrong impreſſion of a ſocial and friendly kind, the eyes, the outward features and geſtures, with other evident tokens, do plainly expreſs a moſt piercing anguiſh, or elſe a moſt lively and tranſporting joy; which ſilences and ſubdues every other motion, wherever it preſents itſelf: no affection

of any other kind can be a match for it, as we may obſerve in numberleſs inſtances, that men will forego their eaſe and pleaſure, endure all manner of hardſhip, and defy torments and death itſelf, when animated with a ſtrong deſire to ſerve thoſe they love, to defend them from injury, ſave them from impending harm, or even to revenge their wrongs; and what is ſtill more, every action of this kind meets with univerſal approbation, and in the common ſenſe of mankind, is judged to be right and good, as well as handſome and becoming.

And though, on the contrary, there are many who prefer the joys of ſenſe to the ſatisfactions of the mind, and chuſe private and ſelfiſh pleaſure before ſocial enjoyments; yet this muſt be a manifeſt wrong judgment, ariſing from the tyranny of evil cuſtom, which has vitiated the taſte; or from ignorance and inexperience of other pleaſures: becauſe we are apt to blame ourſelves for ſuch a choice, whenever we ſeriouſly reflect upon our own conduct, and every ſettled diſpoſition of that ſort is condemned by all mankind, and always looked on with abhorrence.

But however the reigning faſhion may eſtabliſh a falſe reliſh, yet ſurely truth and reaſon will never allow, that we can by ſuch meaſures ever obtain the greateſt and moſt exalted pleaſure, or that ſuch a conduct is in the leaſt amiable and praiſe-worthy; on the contrary, as ſelf gains the aſcendant beyond a juſt degree, it makes a character appear leſs lovely; and as it deſtroys

all noble and generous ſentiments, and is productive of nothing but what is villainous and baſe, it can therefore merit nothing but diſdain.

Where there is too much kindneſs and good-nature, and too little care of ſelf-intereſt, though it is an unhappy miſtake, yet it may ſometimes claim a ſmall degree of love and eſteem, or, however, will be always looked upon with compaſſion. But when ſelf-love and ſelf-eſteem, ſelf-intereſtedneſs and ſelf-conceit, grow ſo very prevalent, and the love of our neighbour is in a manner extinct; in a word, when we ſhew ſuch a vaſt regard for ourſelves, and ſo little for others, the ſatisfaction we ſhall gain by indulging ſuch a diſpoſition will be but ſmall, in proportion to what we ſhall loſe: and as it is the grand principle of every thing which is baſe and unworthy, it can never be deemed honourable, but will be ridiculous in the laſt degree, and always treated with ſcorn and deteſtation.

It muſt alſo be allowed, in behalf of ſocial paſſion, that every pleaſure we have is doubled by being ſhared and communicated; and every joy, and contentment of others, by this kind ſympathy, becomes our own. Which is ſo true, that even the joys of ſenſe, both in luxury, and amours, derive their principal charms from a mixture of ſomething kind and friendly, without which they would be extremely inſipid.

And though this diſpoſition makes us ſharers in the pain and miſery of others, as well as in their happineſs; yet by this mutual feeling we

have it in our power to alleviate the anxiety of our friends, without increaſing our own in the ſame proportion; becauſe even that grief and ſorrow which is truly of a ſocial nature, and flows from human ſympathy and compaſſion, is a ſort of pleaſing anguiſh.

The kind and tender affections, though intermixed with ſomewhat of horror and diſturbance, do yet occaſion a moſt agreeable emotion of ſoul, which is the reaſon why men will often croud to ſee a ſpectacle of calamity; and ſuch repreſentations as move our paſſions, even in this mournful way, do ſometimes yield a more delightful entertainment, than the higheſt enjoyments of the ſenſual kind.

Theſe pleaſures will not grow dull and taſteleſs in the exerciſe, nor are they apt to be tireſome, but will be always repeated with increaſing joy; neither is there any danger they ſhould interfere with other pleaſures, and deprive us of ſuch as are more valuable. The honeſt man is no leſs capable than the immoral one, of enjoying all the pleaſures of the underſtanding and imagination; his head will be as clear, and his reaſon as well fitted for the moſt refined ſpeculations; and his power of being pleaſed with the contemplation of beauty, either in the works of nature or of art, will be no ways impaired: he will alſo be no leſs diſpoſed for mirth and gaity, becauſe he will be likely to ſhare no leſs of chearfulneſs and good humour; and he will have this advan-

tage, that ſo far as he is virtuous and good, the ridicule can never be turned upon himſelf: and even as to ſenſual delights, he will enjoy theſe in a greater perfection, becauſe he will in all probability, be more temperate and ſparing, and eſpecially as he will choſe it in a ſocial and friendly way, not to regale himſelf alone, but to have others partake with him, which will very much increaſe the pleaſure.

Thus the exerciſe of kind and ſocial affections will not deprive us of any other valuable ſatisfactions, but will rather diſpoſe us to enjoy them with greater advantage; and it will be ſo far from bringing upon us any future evil, that its conſequences and effects will be highly beneficial. For theſe pleaſures are not only ſuperior to all others in their immediate exerciſe, but they are of a permament and durable nature, they do not periſh in the uſing, nor do they take their flight the moment they are enjoyed, but will ſtill remain a laſting treaſure: becauſe the remembrance of ſuch actions is always ſweet, and the conſciouſneſs and reflection ever affords a moſt pleaſing and delightful entertainment.

The exerciſe of benevolence is highly pleaſing, as the end which is obtained is moſt deſirable and good; and not only ſo, but even thoſe inclinations and actions which lead to that end are decent and handſome, yielding entire ſatisfaction in the review: ſo that here we find the moſt pleaſing action united with the moſt delightful contemplation; for there is nothing ſo grateful

as a generous action, nor any beauty so engaging as a kind and friendly disposition.

Honesty is adorned with most powerful charms, which afford such ravishing delight, as renders it, for the sake of its own intrinsic beauty, more eligible than any other good; even though for its own sake we should be brought to suffer the greatest evils. Poverty, pain and death, have been justly embraced, and most chearfully endured, rather than consent to any thing contrary to this first impression of beauty and worth, which ought to be the ruling principle of all our actions.

We ought certainly to pay the highest regard to conscience, so as to maintain it sacred and inviolable, as it is of the last importance to our happiness or misery; because the most exquisite pleasure, and the most tormenting anguish, take their rise from this moral sense.

Continual peace and serenity of mind is the genuine product of a virtuous life; for a man may then look into himself without any disturbance, when he finds nothing there that is odious and ill-deserving; when he is not conscious of any injustice, or dishonesty, nor of having done any cruel, hard or injurious actions; and what is more, if his conscience can testify that in the main he has governed himself by the rules of virtue and honour, and the chief tenor of his conduct has been generous, kind, and beneficent, so far as his ability would extend; this will afford him continual joy, and may be justly a source of never-ceasing pleasure.

It is this moſt pleaſing review, which ſtrikes the inward ſenſe in ſo lively a manner, as to excite a moſt exquiſite and inexpreſſible ſatisfaction; inſomuch that the approbation of a man's own breaſt, and the conſciouſneſs of his own virtue and merit, has been reckoned of all the bleſſings of life, to be the deareſt and moſt ineſtimable; the beſt and nobleſt part of mankind, having always valued it above any thing elſe in the world, ſooner chuſing to die than to violate their honour, or do one ſingle action that is villainous and baſe; as well knowing, that even life itſelf, when this is gone, is but a wretched being, hardly with the keeping.

For he who has not the honeſt teſtimony of his own heart, but is conſcious of ſomething in himſelf, which is morally evil, odious and ſhameful, can never have any real ſelf-eſteem, but muſt of neceſſity hate and deteſt himſelf; and the continual reproaches of his own mind will render his days extremely miſerable, thought attended with the higheſt degree of outward proſperity.

This natural principle is not eaſily ſuppreſſed; for though it may poſſibly be lulled aſleep, and lie dormant for a while, yet it will at laſt awake with greater fury; and the laſhes of a guilty conſcience may fill the mind with horror and remorſe, ſufficient to create a hell upon earth, and make even life itſelf an inſupportable burden.

But if we could ſuppoſe this ſenſe of right and wrong, to be almoſt totally effaced, and

that by long cuſtom a man ſhould be grown wholly inſenſible of moral good and evil, to whom villainy ſhould be no ways odious, nor vittue amiable; yet this muſt imply, at the ſame time, an utter abſence of every thing which is generous and worthy, and that all ſympathy and kind affection is wholly rooted out of ſuch a temper; whereby he muſt conſequently loſe all the moſt valuable pleaſures of life, and be ſubject to the moſt unnatural and tormenting paſſions. And if the conſciouſneſs of the greateſt inward deformity cannot move or affect him, ſo far as to make him out of love with himſelf, it will be ſure to make him ſo much the more deteſtable to others, and render him the ſcorn and the jeſt, the hatred and averſion of all mankind.

For as all men have implanted in them this natural ſenſe of right and wrong, whatever is immoral and ill-deſerving will, to the generality, appear odious and deformed; and though they may be ſometimes ſo partial, as to overlook the inward deformity of their own charcters, they will be apt enough to mark it in others, and moſt ſincerely to hate and deteſt them for it.

As all perſons do naturally delight in the eſteem and good opinion of their fellow-creatures; to be ſlighted and deſpiſed by all we converſe with, muſt occaſion a moſt grievous trouble and diſturbance, which a haughty ſpirit will ſcarce know how to bear; but whoever deviates from the paths of virtue, will be likely ſo far to in-

cur the general cenſure and reproach: whereas he who places his chief delight in the practice of moral goodneſs, will beſides other advantages, be ſure to gain the approbation and eſteem of all good men, which to an honeſt mind is a moſt exquiſite ſatisfaction.

There is no paſſion more ſtrongly implanted in our breaſts, than the love of honour and applauſe, which all men ſtrive to obtain by various and ſometimes unaccountable methods; but when this affair is rightly underſtood, it will be found, that virtue and real merit, will prove the ſureſt way to honour and reputation; becauſe thoſe actions which do manifeſtly tend to the general good, will ſeldom fail of being crowned with univerſal applauſe.

It has been always urged as no ſmall recommendation of theſe moral pleaſures, that they do not depend upon fortune; they can never be taken from us, nor can we be hindered in the enjoyment of them, unleſs by ourſelves; for every man may be honeſt if he pleaſes, and no one is neceſſitated to be wicked, but only from his own wrong choice.

Whenever our deſire is fixed upon a good that cannot be obtained, it muſt occaſion conſtant uneaſineſs while it continues; and as the loſs of a pleaſure does often produce a moſt exquiſite pain, we ſhall continually be expoſed to affliction and calamity, when we ſet our hearts upon that which at any time may be loſt, or taken from us; and therefore our greateſt wiſ-

dom will be to withdraw our deſires from thoſe goods that are precarious, and not in our power to acquire or retain, and direct them to ſuch as are fixed and conſtant, which we can at any time beſtow upon ourſelves; by which means we may be always ſure to obtain what we deſire, without any apprehenſion of loſs or diſappointment.

If our fancy is ſtruck with the luſtre of things without, ſuch as adventitious honours, eſtates, and preferments, and we purſue them as our greateſt good, we are neceſſarily expoſed to grief and vexation; becauſe theſe things are ſo fickle and unſteady, that though we are proſperous and ſucceſsful at preſent, we know not how ſoon we may meet with croſſes and misfortunes; may be rich to-day, and to-morrow ſtript of all, and reduced to extreme poverty: but he who has learned to ſet the higheſt value on the inward objects of worth and beauty, ſuch as honeſty, faith, integrity, friendſhip and honour, and is but once poſſeſſed of theſe, will be rich beyond expreſſion; as he will have obtained a treaſure none can rob him of, nor can the utmoſt malice of fortune bereave him of it; becauſe under the greateſt ſufferings, and even in the article of death, theſe will adminiſter unſpeakable comfort and delight.

And thus it ſeems to be moſt evident, that theſe moral affections are of the greateſt importance, and we make no ſcruple to pronounce theſe pleaſures to be the moſt exquiſite, and the pains the moſt tormenting; and that whoever is

ſtudious to obtain the greateſt pleaſure he is capable of receiving, intermixed with as little diſturbance as is poſſible, will endeavour to form his taſte to kindneſs and humanity: he will be obliged, for the ſake of his own private happineſs, to cultivate a benevolent diſpoſition, and ſo to regulate his conduct, as may beſt tend to promote the general good.

For the intereſt of every particular is moſt certainly bound up in the public welfare; and whoever, by working upon his own mind, can bring his paſſions and affections to that juſt harmony and proportion, as is moſt conducing to the general good, will thereby procure to himſelf the greateſt and moſt durable ſatisfaction; as, on the contrary, where the ſelfiſh affections exceed their due bounds, and men purſue a ſeparate intereſt in oppoſition to the general happineſs, they fondly aim at a leſſer good, which deprives them of a greater, and not only ſo, but they bring upon themſelves the moſt tormenting anguiſh and diſtreſs.

Therefore this natural ſympathy, this ſocial paſſion, ought not to be rudely oppoſed, or induſtriouſly ſuppreſſed, as mere weakneſs and folly, but rather ſhould be cheriſhed and maintained in its juſt proportion; only ſo far it muſt be reſtrained, as to be under the command of reaſon, that it may beſt anſwer its own end; for if it is partial and miſguided, and not directed by prudence, it may prove moſt pernicious.

A TREATISE ON VIRTUE AND HAPPINESS.

PART III.

SECT. I.

How our ſeveral paſſions ought to be managed; and firſt, in general, that all ought to be moderated and kept in ſubjection.

AFTER having taken a ſurvey of the various pleaſures and pains we are capable of receiving, in order to diſcover which are of the greateſt importance to our happineſs and miſery; it may be neceſſary to inquire how all theſe affections, and the various inclinations ariſing from them, are to be regulated, ſo as to be moſt conducing to our happineſs, which is the point we ought to aim at in all our actions.

It has been ſufficiently intimated already, how neceſſary it is, that all our paſſions ſhould be moderated, becauſe that will ſave us abundance of trouble and diſquiet, and will alſo enable us at any time, to ſtop and ſuſpend our mo-

tion, and take a little time to conſider whether it is conducting us towards happineſs, or whether we are not rather going aſtray; and afterwards we may continue or alter its direction according to the dictates of reaſon: but when our affections are exceſſive and immoderate, our averſions too violent, and our deſires too eager and impatient, they are productive of nothing but diſturbance; for when the uneaſineſs is greater than is neceſſary to put us into motion, there is ſo much immediate miſery more than was requiſite; and not only ſo, but as they grow exceſſive, they grow headſtrong and ungovernable, refuſing to obey ſuch directions as our deliberate judgment had preſcribed.

When our motion is more gentle, it is more eaſily managed, and may be made orderly and regular, always guided to its proper end; but when it is impetuous, it is not at our own command, but will be apt to occaſion the wildeſt diſorder and confuſion.

We can neither direct our aim aright, nor chuſe the moſt proper means to attain any end, but are hurried into meaſures contrary to our own happineſs, and alſo highly injurious to others.

By this means, that harmony and juſt proportion of the affections ſo neceſſary to virtue and happineſs is deſtroyed: for while ſome paſſions do gain too great an aſcendant, others will be too much reduced, which would not have happened, if none had been ſuffered to exceed

their juſt bounds; and therefore our firſt care ſhould be to work by the reſtraining, rather than the encouraging practice: and it may be premiſed as a general maxim, that every paſſion ought to be moderated, requiring more the bridle than the ſpur; and though this may coſt ſome trouble before they can be broke to the bitt, and taught to obey the reins, yet upon the whole it will certainly be beſt not to give a looſe to every forward inclination, nor be impatiently following every fancy and opinion of good, but rather chuſe on many occaſions to forbear, and reſt contented our preſent condition.

We are not only obliged carefully to examine every appearance of pleaſure which preſents itſelf; but even the general idea we entertain of happineſs, ought to be chaſtened and corrected. We ſhall but deceive ourſelves with fond imaginations, if we expect a conſtant ſucceſſion of the higheſt bliſs; for we muſt be ſometimes willing to ſuffer a little pain, and often think ourſelves ſufficiently happy in being relieved from trouble, and obtaining perfect eaſe and tranquillity, or, however, in the poſſeſſion of moderate ſatisfactions.

Though the main branch of happineſs may be ſaid to conſiſt in the enjoyment of the greateſt and moſt exalted pleaſure, yet there is one eſſential part of it which ought to be our firſt concern; and that is, to be free from miſery, ſo far as our preſent circumſtances will allow. Therefore we

ſhould be ſtudious how to leſſen our cares, and provide for our eaſe and quiet, rather than aim at high and difficult attainments, or engage in purſuits before we are well adviſed whether they may not be likely to end in diſappointment, or be attended with more anxiety and pain than can be ballanced by any real joy they will afford.

The wiſer diſpoſer of all things has blended pleaſure and pain ſo intimately, that they are not to be ſeparated; and has made it neceſſary for us to endure the one, to quicken us in the purſuit of the other, and to encreaſe the reliſh of it when obtained: yet may every man ſtrive to avoid it as much as lies in his power, and to render his uneaſy moments as few as poſſible.

When we have guarded ſo well as we are able againſt all anxious and tormenting impreſſions, we may then be at liberty to ſeek after pleaſure; though even here we ought to be temperate and modeſt, not aſpiring after high enjoyments, nor captivated with gay and ſplendid amuſements. There are indeed ſome who were born to greatneſs, being endowed with natural abilities, vaſtly ſuperior to the generality of mankind; and theſe may be allowed to entertain a little ambition, and to ſtrive by all worthy and juſtifiable ways to obtain authority and pre-eminence: but in the main, it will become all men, in the firſt place, to learn to know themſelves and their own talents, and be cautious never to engage in matters which they are not fit for; but make choice of ſuch a courſe of action, as will be moſt ſuitable to their genius

and capacity, not always ambitious of grandeur and diſtinction, but rather chuſing privacy and retirement, being content to live in obſcurity, and to enjoy ſuch ſatisfactions as are within their power to obtain; which, though they may not have ſuch a gaudy appearance as to ſtrike upon the fancy, yet will be found to be ſolid and laſting, as they eſtabliſh inward tranquillity, and afford the ſweeteſt and ſincereſt pleaſure.

But whoever is aſpiring after higher matters, and will ſet his heart upon things of outward dependence, ſuch as riches, honours, titles, precedencies, the favour of courts, or the breath of vulgar applauſe, will find that he has neglected what is infinitely more valuable; and by eagerly purſuing objects whoſe poſſeſſion is ſo uncertain, will be expoſed to continual vexation and diſappointment: and, which is the greateſt misfortune, he will ſometimes be obliged to part with his honour before he can arrive at the top of his ambition, bartering ſweet peace and true contentment for the vain deluſive hopes of obtaining gilded trifles.

Though greatneſs may appear moſt ſpendid and dazling, yet happineſs does not always attend it in equal proportion; but he who acts in an humbler ſphere, even the honeſt artizan, who lives by his induſtry, enjoying what is ſufficient to anſwer all his reaſonable wants, and who is content, and aſpires after no more; who is generous, free, and kind-hearted, ſo far as he is able,

and conſcious of nothing criminal or ill-deſerving, may vie for eaſe and tranquillity of mind with thoſe in higher ſtations; yet it is moſt certain, that thoſe who are placed in the higheſt ſphere, and entruſted with the greateſt power and ability to do good, if they make a right uſe of it, may diffuſe a moſt extenſive beneficence, and conſequently enjoy the moſt exalted pleaſure.

A good prince, who has no ambition but to make his ſubjects happy, nor any intereſt ſeparate from that of his people, who though he has given the greateſt proofs of courage, can yet uſe moderation, and is too wiſe to place his glory in making conqueſts; how will ſuch a king be honoured and revered! and how much more happy in the conſciouſneſs of ſuch a god-like diſpoſition, than thoſe who have been unjuſtly celebrated as the greateſt horoes! He needs not envy his renown, who is recorded to have conquered eight hundered cities, ſubdued three hundered nations, fought in ſeveral engagements againſt more than three millions of enemies, one million of which he deſtroyed, and took another million priſoners; who though he obtained the greateſt honours that could be beſtowed in a free government, yet could ſet no limits to his boundleſs ambition, but employed his fine talents and great abilities, not to ſerve, but to enſlave his country; and after a bloody civil war, in which he proved victorious, aſſumed to himſelf a tyrannic power, for which he ſoon met with his reward, falling

by the hands of his neareſt friends, and thoſe upon whom he had conferred the greateſt benefits.

But to return to common life. Whatever ſtation we are placed in, it were certainly much to be wiſhed that our deſires and averſions might be moderated, and that we could procure to ourſelves an equal mind; and this can only be affected by that diſcipline and caſtigation of our fancies and opinions before mentioned, and by taking a little time to conſider the real moment of that pleaſure or pain which they bring along with them; weighing the conſequences they will draw after them, and ballancing the ſum total of good and evil which they contain. This will ſhew us the imperfection of all worldly enjoyments; that they are always daſhed with ſome bitterneſs and diſtreſs, which will tend to lower thoſe high and florid imaginations we are too apt to entertain, and thereby render our deſires more temperate and calm; it will alſo convince us, that many evils are not ſo dreadful as at firſt ſight they might appear, but may poſſibly contain a mixture of good; which will help to baniſh all black and diſmal ideas, and render our fears and averſions leſs tormenting. By due conſideration, and withdrawing our attention from ſlighter matters, and fixing it upon that which is of the greateſt concern, we may at laſt bring all our ideas of pleaſure and apprehenſions of evil to be rational and juſt. We ſhall then be no longer governed by fancy, nor will our af-

fections be ſo eager and exceſſive, but we may, by continued uſe, gain a habit of patience, moderation and ſelf-command.

One inducement to all men, from the higheſt to the loweſt, to moderate their paſſions, may be drawn from the conſideration of the frailty and uncertainty of human life; for though outward objects were ever ſo fixed and ſteady, yet we have but little aſſurance as to the time of our own continuance; and though from a reaſonable probability, we may be concerned for the future as well as for the preſent, yet it were certainly the greateſt wiſdom, not to be immoderately anxious, nor too full of expectation, about what ſhall be hereafter. In the midſt of all our joys and griefs, our hopes and fears, which do alternately agitate our breaſts, we ſhould always remember, that this very day may poſſibly be our laſt; and he, who is now engaged in the buſieſt and moſt active enterprize, purſuing what he aims at with the utmoſt warmth and eagerneſs, (ſo quickly may the ſcene be changed!) may be motionleſs and cold to-morrow, his eyes cloſed, and his countenance inanimated, and all his grand deſigns and towering projects at an end.

SECT. II. *How the ſenſual appetites are to be reſtrained; alſo of ſelf intereſt, or the love of money.*

THE joys of ſenſe in the vulgar acceptation of the word, are generally acknowledged to be the loweſt, and therefore ought not to be purſued as the moſt worthy.

Though we are far from aſſerting that pleaſure is no good, nor pain no evil, yet as too great indulgence to the pleaſures of ſenſe, as well as too great averſion to the pains, will entirely deprive us of much greater pleaſures, and bring upon us the greateſt evils, we ought here to put in practice thoſe leſſons of forbearance and endurance before-mentioned; and our appetites and deſires of this kind ought ever to be reſtrained, and kept within bounds.

This we ſuppoſe will hardly be conteſted; but what puts the matter out of all poſſibility of diſpute, is that though we ſhould allow theſe pleaſures to be of the greateſt moment, and that our chief care ſhould be to enjoy them in the greateſt perfection; yet this can only be obtained, by a leſs frequent uſe of them, and by intermixing ſomewhat of abſtinence and laborious exerciſe, which will give them an uncommon and exquiſite reliſh; whereas if they are too long continued, or too often repeated, they grow nauſeous and offenſive, dull and heavy, and inſupportable. So neceſſary is forbearance and ſelf-denial, to the true enjoyment of even ſenſual delights; and ſo much does the alleviation of

a pain, ariſing from the craving of a ſound and natural appetite, when added to a pleaſure, enhance the value of it. Thus temperance is eligible for its own ſake; and ſtill more ſo, as it is a preſervative of health and good humour; for health is the ſovereign balſam of life, and the main ingredient towards happineſs: it is this which enables us to taſte the ſweets of every ſenſe, and to perform every action with eaſe and pleaſure; but when health is impaired, and the curious organs are out of order, every impreſſion is grating and diſagreeable, and every motion uneaſy.

It is health alſo which greatly tends to promote chearfulneſs and good humour, prevents all peeviſhneſs, ſpleen and melancholy, and keeps the mind clear and ſerene; not ſuffering it to be clouded with ſulleneſs and diſcontent, nor overcaſt with dark fears and diſmal apprehenſions, which though purely imaginary, yet in ſome caſes are obſerved to be more tormenting than any ſenſe of preſent evil.

Self-intereſt, or the love of money, ſhould not be ſuffered to grow exceſſive, and exceed its due proportion; but prudence ſhould teach us to moderate theſe deſires, ſo as to keep in the golden mean, betwixt negligence and extravagance on the one hand, and ſordid avarice on the other. Every man ſhould be diligent and induſtrious to acquire a competency of the means of happineſs; and if he is poſſeſſed of it, he ought not profuſely to laviſh it away upon every

wanton appetite, or forward fancy; he ought certainly to forbear unneceſſary gratifications, rather than bring himſelf to want what is neceſſary; but to deny ourſelves the chief enjoyments of life, even thoſe which are moſt eſſential to our happineſs, purely to gratify a fantaſtical deſire of heaping up riches, without either meaſure or end, will ſurely be no wiſe man's choice. It is not a ſmall ſacrifice that muſt be made to this inſatiable paſſion, when it once gains the aſcendant: we muſt not only forego all eaſe and pleaſure, but muſt forfeit the love and eſteem of all our friends, and, which is ſtill more, we muſt loſe the ſecret approbation of our own minds. And what are we to gain in lieu of all theſe? only the bare ſatisfaction of being poſſeſſed of wealth which we dare not uſe. Or if we ſhould ſuppoſe it employed to the beſt advantage, yet riches cannot always make or preſerve us happy; they cannot cure a fever, nor remove the racking pain of the gout, or ſtone; much leſs can they eaſe the mind of care, or heal that remorſe of conſcience, which the hard and injurious methods men take to acquire them too often create.

Whether a good name, and the fair eſteem of our acquaintance, be not preferable to a large eſtate, may poſſibly admit of ſome diſpute; but we may ſurely venture to affirm that a man's own innocence and honour, and the peace and quiet of his mind, are far more precious than gold; and whoever parts with theſe, though it were in exchange for all the wealth of the

Indies, will find that he has made a fooliſh bargain.

Yet are we far from derogating from the uſefulneſs of riches, when they are rightly applied; for he who is bleſſed with a plentiful fortune, and has alſo the art of enjoying it, may live much more happy than he could without it: yet even in this favourable circumſtance, there will be required a ſtricter government and ſelf-command; elſe where perſons have it in their power to gratify every inclination to the full, they may be tempted to run into exceſs.

A rich man muſt in many reſpects live like a poor man, elſe his riches will be no advantage, but a ſnare to him: he muſt uſe exerciſe, which is voluntary labour, and he muſt often practiſe forbearance out of choice, which the poor are forced to do out of neceſſity; and after all, he cannot taſte the pleaſures of ſenſe in much greater perfection than others, becauſe they are beſt enjoyed with temperance, and at ſmall expence; but he may purchaſe a greater ſhare of the pleaſures of the mind; he may adorn the ſcene wherein he lives, and will have leiſure to contemplate the beauties of nature and of art. He may have all the advantage of education, and good inſtruction, and opportunity to improve his mind by travel, and the beſt converſation: but his main privilege will be the having it in his power to do acts of kindneſs and generoſity, to raiſe drooping merit, to relieve the unfortunate and diſtreſſed, and to befriend all about him in the moſt

effectual manner: here he ſhould bend all his endeavours to excel, and make this his principal care, as it is indeed the moſt glorious uſe of riches, and will certainly turn to the beſt account.

It is this which yields the moſt exquiſite pleaſure, and hereby he will gain honour, and eſteem from all mankind, and alſo lay up for himſelf a more ineſtimable treaſure, which can never be loſt or taken from him.

But ſurely he muſt be loſt to all ſenſe of ſhame, and wholly ignorant of his own true happineſs, who ſuffers all his views to centre into a narrow ſelf-intereſt; who can ſee a worthy object in want while he is able to relieve him, or is ever backward to ſerve his friends and country, who ought to be as dear to him as himſelf.

SECT. III. *How the pleaſures of the underſtanding and of the imagination are to be regulated.*

THE pleaſures of the underſtanding and imagination are highly valuable, as they yield a more refined entertainment than the joys of ſenſe, or the low gratification of the love of money: yet even theſe may be purſued too far, as is generally acknowledged to be the caſe, when mens thoughts are wholly turned this way, to the neglect of the more important and neceſſary cares of life. The virtuoſo, the chemiſt, the mathematician and the poet, are all of them ſome-

times ſo tranſported, each in his own way, with the ſeveral objects they have in view, as to be almoſt entirely regardleſs of every thing elſe. So enchanting is beauty, that whoever enters into a deep contemplation of any branch of it, is ſure to be ſmitten; and though the pleaſure he receives is never ſo great, yet as the buſy part of mankind will ſcarce allow any thing to be a real good, or of any uſe, unleſs it tends to increaſe a man's fortune; they are apt to look on theſe men of deep ſpeculation with ſome ſort of pity, judging them to be a little touched in their brain, and under a degree of madneſs.

But this elegance of fancy will be moſt apt to draw us to inconvenience, when we are not content with ſeeing and admiring, but muſt be aiming at the property and poſſeſſion; for by this means a perſon of a moſt ample fortune, having his imagination too ſtrongly turned for ſuch things as ſtately buildings, gardens, ſtatues, pictures, equipages, and ſuch-like exhibitions of grandeur, may run out ſo far, till the year's income will not anſwer the expence: and he will find, that he has laviſhed away that wealth upon ſuperfluous amuſements, which ought to have been reſerved for more important and neceſſary occaſions.

But whoever has leiſure to apply himſelf to the ſtudy of beauty, and would improve it to the beſt advantage, ſhould endeavour principally to form his taſte according to the beſt judgment, and the true ſtandard and rule of reaſon; for though this ſenſe is naturally implanted in all men,

yet by imitation and evil habit, it may be vitiated and depraved, and we may be led to overlook the higher orders of beauty, and to fix our attention on ſuch as are of the inferior ſort; and even amongſt thoſe of the ſame kind, we may fancy and admire ſuch as are mean and trivial, containing but a ſmall ſhare of real beauty, and conſequently can afford no true or laſting pleaſure.

A man muſt cultivate his reaſon, and improve his natural genius, ere he can clearly diſcern what is truly agreeable and entertaining, what is preferable and principal in theſe ſubjects of eſtimation; and it will require ſome uſe and practice, ere he can form his reliſh accordingly. Harmony and proportion, on which beauty depends, are founded in nature; nor will they be as we fancy them, or be governed by humour or the prevailing opinion.

Therefore whoever would attain to a true taſte of beauty, muſt endeavour to frame it according to the juſt ſtandard of nature; and it will coſt him ſome pains to call in queſtion his early prejudices, and reclaim his fancy from the power of faſhion and education, to commit it to the guidance of reaſon.

Where this is not done, we ſhall certainly be betrayed into wrong judgments, and by degrees the ſenſe will be altered, and the taſte will be depraved. It is this way that men are brought to prefer artifice to honeſty, pleaſure to virtue, and can ſometimes part with their honour, and

barter inward worth and beauty for ſplendid trifles without.

If we regard only the ſtudy of nature, and the politer arts, how apt are we to run into a falſe reliſh! Many are delighted with what is gothic and irregular in architecture, with a falſe ſtile in painting, with groteſque and monſtrous figures, gloſſy paint, and glaring colours; and in muſic, that does not always pleaſe the moſt which is according to the beſt manner, and trueſt harmony.

Some men are employed in ſurveying inſects and cockleſhells with the deepeſt attention; while others, no leſs liable to ridicule, are buſied in framing hypotheſes and imaginary ſyſtems, whereby the various operations of nature are accounted for, and whimſically explained: not content in ſilent obſervation to admire that harmony and order that reigns through the whole creation, they ſeem to be more delighted with the fictions of their own brains; can cenſure and find fault with the contrivance of infinite wiſdom, and deform the beautiful order of things with their vain imaginations and fond conceits.

It is alſo owing to a manifeſt wrong fancy when perſons are ſo fond of novelty, as to neglect what is truly beautiful and agreeable, and can be pleaſed with nothing but what is ſtrange and uncommon, wonderful and ſurpriſing. For though it is the frailty of our nature, that we cannot be pleaſed with any thing long, but muſt be relieved with ſomething new, yet that novelty

which adds freſh charms to beauty, has nothing pleaſing in itſelf. But they who are far gone in this taſte, fall in love with any thing for the ſake of its rareneſs; and, deſpiſing that beautiful ſimplicity which is plainly to be diſcerned in the moſt common ſubjects, come at laſt to delight in what is myſterious and miraculous, monſtrous and prodigious.

It is owing to this vitiated reliſh, that hiſtorians are not ſatisfied with ſuch narrations and deſcriptions as would be both inſtructive and entertaining; but they muſt often be inventing ſomething ſtrange and aſtoniſhing to embelliſh their works, and deal ſo much in omens, prodigies and apparitions. The writers of voyages and travels love to ſtretch beyond the bounds of truth, and relate ſomething marvellous and incredible; and even the moſt celebrated poets do abound in deſcriptions of things quite out of nature, which are certainly more fit to excite laughter than any other paſſion; for even fiction itſelf ſhould bear ſome reſemblance to truth, and appear with an air of probability; elſe, however it may pleaſe the ignorant and the vulgar, it will hardly paſs with men of juſt diſcernment. There is indeed in all men a natural propenſity to wonder at what they do not underſtand, delighting to be amuſed with fabulous narrations and idle dreams, which lays a foundation for the wildeſt enthuſiaſm, and makes the weak and ignorant become the dupes of artful

men, who know how to manage this foible of the human nature to their own advantage.

Yet the ſtudy and ſurvey of theſe ſorts of beauties, when duly regulated, is in many branches of it, beſides the immediate pleaſure which it yields, attended with very great advantage. That ſtrict attention to mathematical demonſtrations which the pleaſing ſpeculation inſenſibly leads us to, gives young minds a quickneſs of perception, and a habit of clear and concluſive reaſoning, which will lead them to the diſcovery of truth in every ſubject; as it prevents them from being impoſed on by weak and ſuperficial arguments, it will tend to baniſh all error and prejudice, credulity and ſuperſtition.

The improvements in natural knowledge, beſides many uſeful inventions for the eaſe and convenience of life, will lead us into moſt exalted and entertaining ſpeculations, and make the face of nature appear moſt fair. Here every inquiſitive mind may be convinced that in the main, all things are ordered for the beſt, by the moſt conſummate wiſdom. That in this univerſal ſyſtem, all the ſeveral parts have a mutual relation and ſubſerviency to each other; and while the various orders of beings are endowed with thoſe powers and inclinations which lead them (though not unerringly) to their particular good, we have cauſe to believe that all are over-ruled ſo, as to conſpire to the general advantage.

This concluſion is moſt reaſonable, becauſe,

ſo far as our knowledge does extend, all is diſpoſed according to perfect order; and if ſome things do appear irregular and confuſed, that muſt be owing to the ſhortneſs of our ſight, and our want of capacity to comprehend the whole ſyſtem, and diſcover all the various relations as they regard particulars: though there is apparently in all things a mixture of evil, yet that may be productive of much greater good; the moſt perfect harmony ariſes from a compoſition of jarring and oppoſite principles. The reſignation of inferior kinds, is the preſervation of the ſuperior; and even the errors and imperfections of the ſeveral parts do probably contribute to the order and perfection of the whole.

This conſideration may help to inſpire worthy conceptions of the DIVINE BEING, and correct all falſe and injurious repreſentations; ſhewing moſt clearly, that the Sovereign Ruler of the world is not influenced by weak paſſions, like ourſelves; nor does he act in a partial and capricious manner, but governs by general, ſteady, and inviolable laws, which are as juſt as they are unalterable; that he is not favourable to ſome of his creatures and cruel to the reſt; nor is one part of the creation the object of his peculiar care; but he is good to all, and all do equally partake of his bounty and munificence, enjoying as great a ſhare of good as is ſuited to their condition.

From what we are able to underſtand of the ſtructure of the univerſe, we may draw this cer-

tain concluſion, that it is not the work of a fooliſh architect, nor ſo ill concerted, or ſo weakly contrived, as to ſtand in need of mending afterwards, and that there are no flaws nor miſtakes, no diſorder nor confuſion in this beautiful ſyſtem, where all is conducted by infinite wiſdom and goodneſs.

SECT. IV. *Of the management of the ſocial affections.*

THAT the practice of moral goodneſs and virtue yields the greateſt pleaſure, and that we ought therefore principally to cultivate ſuch a diſpoſition, has been already ſhewn; but even here will be required great circumſpection, and a careful uſe of reaſon, elſe the very beſt affections, not being governed by prudence, may prove hurtful to ourſelves, and injurious to others.

Nature has implanted in our breaſts this ſympathy, as a ſecret charm to draw us to the performance of all ſocial duties, making it the intereſt of every particular to work towards the general good; and therefore we ſhould make that the conſtant rule of our conduct, and, ſo far as a moſt free and impartial reaſon can direct us, endeavour to avoid being deceived with falſe appearances; and not ſuffer a partial and miſtaken benevolence to uſurp the place of that which ought to be rational and juſt, and conſequently univerſal and entire.

As we ought, upon all occaſions, carefully to examine, whether what we take to be our good, may not in the main prove the reverſe of it; ſo eſpecially in that chief part of good, which conſiſts in giving way to ſympathy, and in doing good to others, we ſhould proceed with all due care and deliberation: here we ought to ſuſpend even the motions of benevolence, until we have well conſidered, whether what we are prompted to from a principle of kindneſs, will really be conducing to the general good; or whether what we deſign as a benefit to one, may not prove an injury to another: for we ought ſo to regulate this very beſt and nobleſt diſpoſition, as that it may not be partial and narrow, and limited to a few, but entire and univerſal, and extended in a juſt proportion to all mankind.

For whatever is acted contrary to the general principle of humanity, through a partial, though ever ſo kind and generous affection, is in itſelf an inconſiſtency, far from yielding any true and laſting ſatisfaction; it is only a falſe and deceitful good, and the pleaſure it affords deprives us of much greater pleaſure, and will be ſure ſooner or later to bring upon us ſorrow and remorſe.

Benevolence ſhould indiſpenſibly oblige us to do juſtice to all in the firſt place, and not to wrong or injure any; when this is ſecured, it will give full ſcope to the exerciſe of kindneſs and compaſſion, bounty and generoſity, towards proper objects, ſo far as our ability will extend;

but to do good to others, by bringing a greater evil upon ourſelves, is what no rational benevolence will require, neither is it conſiſtent with the general good, to which a juſt degree of ſelf-love, in every particular, and a due regard to ſelf-intereſt is abſolutely neceſſary.

Benevolence itſelf may exceed its due bounds, when it runs into mad profuſion and extravagance; and beſides that, good-nature and kindneſs to an exceſs, has in it ſomething too cheap and eaſy; ſo far from being valued as it ought to be, it is rather apt to be deſpiſed, and if it is ſo tame as meekly to ſubmit to all abuſes, it will be always treated with indignity; ſo that it ſeems to require ſometimes a mixture of aſperity, oppoſition, and reſentment; for there is no man, how great ſoever his benevolence may be, who can live in the conſtant exerciſe of kindneſs to all about him, but he will ſometimes be provoked to anger, and meet with juſt occaſions of reſentment and diſpleaſure. We are not always led to do good to others, but are ſometimes moved ſtrongly the contrary way, to their hurt and prejudice, by other incitements; which indeed men's jarring intereſts, the principle of ſelf-love and reſentment of injury, will be very apt to produce.

It is this mixture of the mild and fierce, the gentle and the furious, which helps to invigorate and enliven human affairs, without which they would ſoon grow dull, and our motion, if it was not quickened by oppoſition, would in a manner

ſtand quite ſtill; and it alſo helps to raiſe the value of any character. For in common eſtimation, it is not ſufficient that a man is beloved as a friend, and known to be generous, bountiful, and kind, but he muſt alſo, upon ſome occaſions, exert himſelf vigorouſly in the vindictive way, ſo as to be dreaded as an enemy, elſe he will not be ſo much regarded.

We ſhould not only ſtudy to do acts of kindneſs and beneficence, but every one ought alſo to employ ſome part of his care, to guard againſt the ill deſigns of ſuch as would impoſe upon and injure him. As there are many who, through ſome fault in their temper, or elſe through wrong practice, are brought to love themſelves too much, and others too little; theſe will not ſcruple (when intereſts interfere, as will often happen) to ſeek their own advantage at another's expence. This they will not ſtick to do by open violence and injuſtice, when they have the power, or elſe they will chuſe to work by the more ſecret way of artifice and deceit. Therefore, whoever has but a ſmall ſhare of experience in the world, will be cautious how he truſts to fair pretences, and will alſo defend himſelf, as well as he is able, againſt manifeſt outrage and abuſe.

Yet, with all his precaution, he will ſometimes be deceived; and as he will often meet with open injuries and affronts, this will not fail to move his indignation, and ſometimes call out loudly for revenge, reſentment of injuries being as natural

to mankind, as gratitude to a benefactor, or as benevolence is at firſt view towards thoſe whoſe moral qualities we are ſtrangers to, and from whom we never received either good or harm, and is perhaps a no leſs neceſſary ingredient in their compoſition.

Humanity will certainly diſpoſe men to love thoſe of their own kind, while no oppoſite affections do interfere, and to treat them with kindneſs, avoiding every thing that may tend to their prejudice and harm; yet there are implanted in our nature other principles, which excite contrary paſſions, and will not fail, upon many occaſions, to break the bands of friendſhip, and ſet men at variance one with another.

Thoſe who would perhaps be fartheſt from offering an injury, are ſometimes apt to receive very impatiently what appears to be an indignity or abuſe, and to proſecute the offending party with the utmoſt diſpleaſure.

All men have the natural abhorrence of wrong, that they cannot view any act of cruelty or injuſtice, without being highly offended with the agent, even though they are no ways concerned with reſpect to their own private intereſt; but much more when it is hurtful to themſelves: and ſo partial are we in our own cauſe, that we are apt to judge every thing done by another which tends to our prejudice, to be an injury, and conſequently to reſent it in a moſt heinous manner.

When one man deprives another of any good, or brings upon him any evil, whether it be by robbing him of his property in any kind, or by leſſening his good name, refuſing him that reſpect which he may think his due: or by doing what is any way contrary to his intereſt, eſpecially if he thinks it is done unjuſtly; this will be ſure to raiſe his indignation, and excite him ſtrongly to revenge.

It is impoſſible but this muſt frequently happen, becauſe intereſts will be often thwarting; and thus benevolence will be often vanquiſhed and ſubdued, being unable to ſtand its ground againſt ſuch powerful aſſailants; all harmony and friendſhip will be deſtroyed, and enmity introduced in its ſtead. And thus the ſeeds of ſtrife and animoſity, hatred and ill-will, being ſo plentifully ſown, will not fail to ſpring up in abundance.

This will not only happen amongſt particular perſons, but alſo betwixt nations and communities; in which caſe theſe malevolent paſſions will be more intenſe, as they are engaged in one common cauſe; for they are then in ſome ſort increaſed by ſympathy, and gain ſtrength by being ſocial and communicative.

But it is moſt certain that love and friendſhip, harmony and peace, will always appear to us to be the right ſtate of ſociety; as hatred and anger, contention and war, is the wrong ſtate: and though, according to the preſent conſtitution of things, both theſe muſt unavoidably be blend-

ed together, as in the private ſyſtem pleaſure is mixed with pain; yet we always wiſh there may be as much of the one, and as little of the other as poſſible; and every man would ſtrive to form his temper to the amiable and agreeable part, rather than to the odious and perverſe.

Sympathy and kind affection, under juſt reſtrictions, ought certainly to be cheriſhed; and though it ſhould grow greater by indulgence, there will be no great harm; it is but to grow better natured, and to enjoy more and more the higheſt and the nobleſt pleaſure, which will not ſurely be contrary to our true intereſt.

If all immoderate ſelf-love could be reſtrained, and we could learn to love our neighbour as ourſelves, and do unto others even as we could wiſh they ſhould do unto us, this would be the perfection of charity and benevolence. And if we could ſuppreſs the riſing motions of reſentment, ſo far as to forgive thoſe who do us wrong; return good for evil, and even to love our enemies, or at leaſt not to hate them for any particular harm done to ourſelves; this is no more than what chriſtianity does abſolutely require of us. The commands of our holy religion will, from their own juſt authority, ſurely claim an implicit obedience: yet if we will alſo hearken to the voice of reaſon, it will convince us, that all theſe precepts are righteous and good, perfectly adapted to our preſent as well as future happineſs. And though, notwithſtanding our great profeſſions of chriſtianity, experience ſhews

us, that humility, meekneſs and charity are not very faſhionable qualities, and this practice of forgiveneſs is contrary to the way of the world; yet if we could attain to it, though it were but in part, it would not perhaps be found ſuch egregious folly as is generally imagined; becauſe it would prevent abundance of vexation and diſturbance, and contribute not a little to the eaſe and tranquillity of our lives. It would render a man ſuperior to thoſe ſtorms of paſſion, that wrath and provocation, which involve the lower world in ſtrife and variance, and create ſo much more uneaſineſs than is neceſſary to the generality of mankind.

Though the wiſdom of the world lays it down as an eſtabliſhed maxim, that every man ſhould be active to defend his right and vindicate his honour; and therefore, that he ought highly to reſent an indignity or wrong; yet it muſt be allowed, that in ſome caſes, at leaſt, a generous forgiveneſs of injury is more honourable than revenge; and is alſo in common prudence much more eligible, not only as it helps to keep the mind calm and eaſy, but alſo as it tend to create peace, and make our enemies our friends; for ſuch a conduct may ſometimes put a period to that animoſity, which the retorting of abuſes, and retaliating ill offices, might have rendered perpetual.

And thus it appears, that this ſocial paſſion, if it is not partial and miſguided, if it does not exceed its due bounds, and is careful not to render

itſelf deſpiſed, by being too forward and eaſy; and laſtly, if it is ſo managed, as not to treſpaſs too much upon private intereſt, it cannot be too much indulged: becauſe it is the exerciſe of kindneſs and benevolence which yields the trueſt happineſs, and ſome of its moſt difficult and ſelf-denying duties, which ſeem to be the moſt contrary to ſelf-love, are found, in the main, to tend much to our private advantage.

But if ſelf-intereſt and benevolence were ever ſo much oppoſed to each other, yet, in many caſes, the former may decently yield to the force of the latter; as for inſtance, if any perſon is willing to ſuffer any hardſhip, or even death itſelf, to ſave his friend, whom he highly values, from the ſame evils which he chuſes to undergo, this is no harm to the public; the moment of good or evil to the whole, being equal in both caſes: neither is ſuch an action blameable, but, on the contrary, will be always admired and applauded.

Alſo, were a man to lay down his life in defence of his country, though the advantage accruing to particular perſons will not equal the evil that he ſuffers, yet as great numbers are likely to be gainers by what he voluntarily throws away, it is no loſs to the public, but, on the contrary, is eſteemed highly uſeful and beneficial. And as no government or community can long ſubſiſt, nor be ſecure from being injured and oppreſſed by their neighbours, unleſs the members thereof be reſolute to hazard their lives in its defence;

therefore a contempt of death, in ſo good a cauſe, will always appear amiable and eligible, notwithſtanding all partial and ſelfiſh eſtimations of happineſs.

In theſe caſes, the generous paſſion will not bear to be controlled; diſdaining that ſelf-intereſt ſhould be brought in competition, or even ſo much as thought of. So raviſhing is the pleaſure, that men regard not the ſuffering, and their memory is treated with univerſal honour and eſteem, the *dulce et decorum* will crown every action of that kind, even though it ſhould prove unſucceſsful, and fail of obtaining the end for which it was deſigned.

SECT. V. and VI. *Of the ſenſe of right and wrong; and how it ought to be governed.*

THOUGH, from a principle of benevolence, we bear good will to mankind, yet the moral ſenſe makes a great diſtinction; increaſing very much this general benevolence towards ſome, while it quite deſtroys it with regard to others, and ſubſtitutes the contrary paſſions of hatred and ill-will in its room. It is this which inſpires the higheſt reſpect and eſteem, and alſo excites the ſtrongeſt averſion and ſcorn, driving men to the utmoſt extremes of loving and hating.

And as thoſe affections which influence men in their behaviour towards each other, do principally take their riſe from this original; there-

fore it is of the laſt importance, that this natural ſenſe of right and wrong ſhould be directed by reaſon; and that the paſſions of love and hatred ſhould not be miſapplied.

Whenever that happens, which indeed is but too often, it muſt of neceſſity create infinite miſchiefs and diſorders in ſociety; good men will be injuriouſly treated, while the bad ſhall be applauded and careſſed; nay, ſo far may people be deluded, that the beſt and moſt deſerving of mankind may ſometimes be purſued with the moſt cruel hatred, and made to ſuffer the greateſt wrongs; while the worthleſs and inſignificant, or even the wicked and immoral, ſhall be advanced to the higheſt dignities and honours.

But as every affection is governed by opinion, this irregularity in theſe moral paſſions muſt proceed from ſome falſe and miſtaken opinions; as when we ſuppoſe that men have in them thoſe morally good or evil qualities which they have not, and when we take that to be morally good or evil, and conſequently amiable or odious, which is not truly ſuch.

That love and eſteem which naturally riſes in our minds towards any perſon of eminent moral goodneſs, is certainly a moſt pleaſing affection, and the exerciſe of virtuous friendſhip yields the moſt exalted delight; but here our chief care ſhould be to form right opinions of perſons, and not to be impoſed upon by ſpecious pretences and falſe repreſentations; and much more ſhould we be cautious not to impoſe upon ourſelves by un-

juſt and partial determinations, where ſelf-intereſt is ſome way concerned; no little ſervices done to ourſelves, nor flattery, though ever ſo ſkilfully applied; no agreement in ſentiments, nor ſimilitude of manners, ſhould biaſs men ſo far, as to lead them into wrong judgments, and poſſeſs them with too favourable an opinion of any perſons, ſo as to believe them to have that moral excellence, which they really want. And eſpecially we ought to call in all the powers of reaſon to our aid, to diſtinguiſh carefully what is ſound and right in human ſentiment and affection, from what is vitious and wrong; that ſo we may admire only what is praiſe-worthy, and not ſuffer our natural notions of what is amiable and excellent to be perverted.

In order to aſſign the juſt value of every thing in life, the ſole meaſure and ſtandard ſhould be taken from moral rectitude, or the apparent tendency of men's diſpoſitions and actions to the general good. By this rule we may readily diſtinguiſh betwixt the good and the bad; and as the former will always claim our reſpect and eſteem, the latter will be treated with ſcorn and contempt. But to form any other diſtinctions amongſt men, and to mark them out for our love or hatred upon any other foundation, is both injurious and unreaſonable: friendſhip ſo ill grounded can yield no true nor natural ſatisfaction, but will be ſure to create diſturbance and regret whenever men come to diſcover their miſtake.

The degree of love and eſteem due to any character, ſeems to be in a great meaſure proportionable to the moral goodneſs and virtue which it contains: for benevolence, when conducted by reaſon, is always amiable, though the ability to do good be never ſo ſmall, or though the attempts towards it ſhould prove unſucceſsful. There are alſo many things, which though not morally excellent in themſelves, yet, when joined with virtue, do render it more illuſtrious and beneficial; but as it has been already ſhewn, that theſe great abilities, if they are not united with a kind diſpoſition, will be ſo far from being uſeful to ſociety, that they will prove moſt dangerous and deſtructive; therefore to ſet a high value on theſe things, apart from what can only make then truly valuable, and to treat them with admiration and applauſe, muſt certainly be very abſurd. And yet, from a falſe taſte of what is worthy and eſtimable, we may obſerve, that many are honoured and adored, for being placed in high ſtations, or being poſſeſſed of great power, titles and preferments, without any thing elſe to recommend them; and others are admired for their policy and cunning, to out-wit and deceive thoſe they have to do with; or for a ſuperior underſtanding and capacious mind, unaccompanied with an honeſt heart: great wealth beſtows on ſome all excellence and perfection; while others for their courage and military exploits, not in defence of their country, but to ſerve their own ambition, have been celebrated and renowned

for heroes, who in reality were no better than robbers and deſtroyers.

By education and wrong inſtruction early inculcated, falſe opinions may be imbibed, and a falſe reverence impreſſed upon the mind, whereby many things of no real uſe, nor the leaſt tending to the happineſs of mankind, are looked upon as venerable and ſacred: and thus we are drawn into honour, and admire ſome perſons for what is not morally good, and to hate and deſpiſe others for that which is no way evil. Hence it is that diſtinctions are formed, and diviſions made, as to ſects in religion; and thence proceeds the moſt malignant ſpirit of party, of infinite miſchief to the public, as well as deſtructive of private happineſs wherever it obtains.

But where reaſon has its due influence, and the moral ſenſe is not wofully depraved, men will not beſtow their approbation upon what is not morally right; and the incenſe of praiſe will never be offered to any thing but real merit.

That ſincere reſpect and eſteem, which is of ſo ſweet a ſavour, and of ſuch ineſtimable value, is in its nature moſt nice and delicate; it will not be commanded by power, nor is it to be purchaſed with gold; it will never be given to wit without humanity, nor to valour without juſtice: it is not to be won by glittering ornaments, nor awed by ſolemn airs, and reverential robes; but it will always wait upon the worthy and deſerving, even when they do not court it, but rather ſeem to decline it.

Thoſe actions and diſpoſitions, which are kind, generous, and beneficent, and do evidently tend to the general good, will always appear amiable, and win our love and eſteem of the agent, even though we receive no advantage from them; but if they are beneficial to us, they excite a farther affection called gratitude.

This is the higheſt improvement of benevolence; for nature has determined us moſt eminently to reſpect thoſe moral good qualities of others which affect ourſelves, and has given us the ſtrongeſt impreſſions of good-will towards thoſe who are kind and friendly to us. Hence will ariſe no ſmall encouragement to do acts of kindneſs and beneficence, when the benefactor is ſure to gain, one time or other, an addition to his happineſs, by a ſuitable return from the perſons obliged: or if that is not in their power, by a conſtant grateful acknowledgment, and the ſincereſt expreſſions of love and gratitude, which from the meaneſt of mankind is always pleaſing

It is alſo of no ſmall moment, that as our ability to do good is limited to a narrow compaſs, leſt our benevolence ſhould be loſt or become uſeleſs, by being equally extended to multitudes, at a great diſtance, whoſe intereſts we could not be able to promote; nature has ordered that it ſhall be more powerfully attracted by objects that are near, than by ſuch as are diſtant and remote. Thus the general good-will, which we bear to all mankind, is heighten-

ed into eſteem for thoſe of our aquaintance, whoſe moral qualities are known to be good; and it is ſtill farther improved into gratitude, towards thoſe who have obliged us with kindneſſes and favours; and thus a foundation is laid for the ſtricteſt ties of friendſhip, amongſt relations, neighbours and aquaintance, by the endearing intercourſe of mutual good offices.

And whoever is wanting in this diſpoſition, or fails to ſhew a grateful ſenſe of a benefit received, and a ſtrong benevolence towards his benefactor, is looked upon as the worſt of mankind, and always treated with the utmoſt deteſtation. The abſence of this ſenſe being always marked as the greateſt depravity of human nature, ſcarce conſiſtent with any degree of moral virtue.

Yet this affection, as well as all others, ſhould be under the command of reaſon; and it will require ſome care and caution, leſt our obligations to ſome particular perſons ſhould interfere with that general benevolence we owe to all, and we ſhould be drawn to engage in ſuch meaſures as may be injurious to others, and inconſiſtent with the general good. The ties of gratitude, how binding ſoever they may be, ſhould never lead us to do any thing contrary to the rules of juſtice and honour; for whenever that happens, we ſhall not fail to blame and reproach ourſelves afterwards.

SECT. VI.

THE ſame moral ſenſe which determines us to approve of ſome ſort of ſentiments, diſpoſitions and actions, does as naturally lead us to be offended with others. For as all the kind and ſocial affections, and whatever is morally good, do make a character appear exceeding amiable, and always give us pleaſure and delight, whenever they are preſented to our view; ſo, on the other hand, the want or abſence of theſe, and much more every contrary diſpoſition, renders a character odious and deformed, and always gives us diſturbance in the view and repreſentation.

And thus, if we compare theſe oppoſite paſſions with each other, without conſidering the happy conſequences and effects of the one, and the miſchiefs produced in ſociety by the other, it appears that every affection of kindneſs and gratitude, every motion of friendſhip and goodwill, is a real pleaſure; while every impreſſion of hatred and anger is a diſpleaſure: it is a real pain and diſturbance, and, therefore, whoever has any regard to his own immediate eaſe and ſatisfaction, would chuſe the one, and avoid the other as much as poſſible, or at leaſt he would not create himſelf more occaſions of uneaſineſs than are neceſſary.

It is true indeed, that whenever the ſocial af-

fections appear to be weak and deficient, and over-powered by the ſelfiſh appetites, this ſo defaces the beauty of a character, that we can no longer view it with pleaſure and approbation; and if it was poſſible for this ſympathy, or love to thoſe of our own kind, to be wholly wanting in the conſtitution of any human creature, ſo that he ſhould be entirely governed by ſelfiſhneſs or malice, it is hard to conceive how ſuch a one would be treated otherwiſe, than with the utmoſt hatred and deteſtation.

But as all depends upon opinion, we ought here to uſe our utmoſt care, not to entertain worſe opinions of any perſons than they deſerve, by ſuppoſing them to have morally ill qualities which they are free from. As we cannot ſee into the hearts of others, but muſt judge of their diſpoſitions by their actions, we ought never to be haſty in forming diſadvantageous opinions of any perſons; but rather ſuſpend our judgments until we have carefully examined every circumſtance, and when we have done, we ſhould put the beſt conſtruction upon every action that it will admit of.

A moderate knowledge of the world will make a man cautious, how he truſts to fair pretences, and warn him to be upon his guard againſt the wiles of crafty and ſelf-intereſted perſons; yet in the main, when we form our judgments of others, an error on the favourable ſide will be moſt pardonable; and the general benevolence we bear to all men, ſhould make us

preſume, that they are not wanting in the common affections of humanity, until we have evident proofs of the contrary.

There are many actions, which may appear to be morally evil, which yet ought to undergo a milder cenſure, when they do not proceed from an ill principle, but from kind affection, though partial and miſguided, ſo as to produce more harm than good; and this in ſome caſes merits compaſſion, rather than hatred, and ſhould excite our endeavours to rectify the miſtake.

When there is ſome ſhare of humanity in the temper, and the fault is not in the heart, but proceeds entirely from a ſhort and partial view, and from a falſe judgment of things, it is thought to be more excuſable, becauſe there is a poſſibility of amendment; and it may ſhew how neceſſary it is, that every paſſion ſhould be reſtrained and governed by reaſon; becauſe through too great kindneſs and friendſhip to ſome particular perſons, or an exceſs of gratitude to their benefactors, many have been drawn in to do actions inconſiſtent with the general good, and brought to ſuffer by the hand of juſtice, for notorious crimes.

As the very beſt affections may be miſguided, ſo they may alſo ſometimes be overcome by ſudden ſtarts and ſallies of contrary paſſions, which yet may be excuſed, if the main tenor of a man's conduct is right and good.

Too great a propenſity to entertain odious

opinions of others, and to hate and deſpiſe them upon ſlight grounds, muſt proceed from a great want of humanity, or from a falſe judgment of ourſelves and others: for whoever underſtands the frame and conſtitution of his own ſpecies, and conſiders well the great variety and ſtrength of their paſſions, and the weakneſs of their reaſon, will make great allowances for human frailty; and if he is not guilty of ſelf-deceit, but can look into himſelf with an impartial eye, he may ſee enough there to make him leſs forward to cenſure others.

There is a mixture of good and ill in all characters; the moſt excellent endowments are often attended with great blemiſhes and imperfections; and if we ſearch for the moſt ſhining qualities, we ſhall often find them obſcured by remarkable defects. But ſtill where the moral goodneſs is ſufficient to outweigh the evil in any perſons, they ought ſo far to be the objects of our love and eſteem, and the worſt ought not to ſhare a greater degree of hatred than is proportional to the exceſs of their ill qualities above the good.

We ought therefore to ſuppreſs as much as poſſible all the motions of pride, or immoderate ſelf-eſteem, which makes us delight to pry into other peoples faults, and beware of hearkening to any falſe ſuggeſtions or unfair repreſentations, which may lead us into injurious opinions of any perſons. It is eaſy for thoſe who take it upon them to draw characters, to throw ſome

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things into the ſtrongeſt light, and to ſhade and obſcure others, ſo as ſcarce to be perceived; whereby they may fix our attention ſo much upon mens faults, as to make us overlook their virtues, and bring us to entertain odious conceptions of them; as if they were wholly evil, or at leaſt deſtitute of every thing amiable and praiſeworthy.

But as every good man will ſcorn to be impoſed upon by ſuch falſe repreſentations, ſo he will be cautious not to impoſe upon himſelf, by judging partially in caſes where ſelf is concerned; he will not confine his eſteem to his own party, or to his friends, and ſuch as have done him little ſervices; nor, on the other hand, will he entertain an ill opinion of ſuch as are in a different way of thinking, who may have accidentally injured him, or by reaſon of interfering intereſts may be his enemies. He will not through envy detract from another's worth, but he will always do juſtice to merit, even in his adverſary, and embrace a generous enemy on the firſt offer of reconcilement.

As we ought not to wrong any perſon ſo far, as to ſuppoſe they have in them that moral evil which they are clear of, ſo neither ought we to deſpiſe them too much, for that which is not morally ill; poverty, meanneſs of birth, ſlowneſs of underſtanding, with all natural defects, blemiſhes and imperfections, ſhould move our compaſſion, rather than our ſcorn; and we ought never to hate one another for different opinions concern-

ing religious matters, or different methods of religious worſhip: though, as the paſſions of mankind are commonly managed, this occaſions an averſion immortal and irreconcileable; and the greateſt depravity of the moral ſenſe ſprings from ſuperſtition.

A lover of mankind would wiſh to draw a veil over this human frailty, if the fatal miſchiefs it occaſions were leſs obvious and glaring; but it is eaſy to obſerve how by playing upon the natural fears of mankind, and the dread they have of an unknown cauſe, whoſe power is not to be reſiſted, and that ſometimes brings upon them great calamities; the generality in all ages have been led to believe, that the world was governed by an arbitrary, angry, and vindictive being; ſubject to be highly provoked, and unfortunately in his wrath avenging himſelf upon others, rather than thoſe who gave the provocation, making innocent perſons ſuffer with thoſe that are criminal.

He is ſaid to ſhake the mountains with his thunder, darting his lightening at the heads of guilty mortals. He ſometimes ſends unkindly ſeaſons, and blaſts the fruits of the earth, producing a famine; or elſe he fills the air with peſtilential ſteams, and ſweeps away great numbers by untimely death. And when we find that he is offended, he muſt be appeaſed by ſacrifices and ſupplications. He has alſo been repreſented as vain-glorious, delighting in praiſe, and, like ſome eaſtern monarch, pleaſed with flattery, cringing and mean proſtration; partial to a few of his crea-

tures for ſlight cauſes, and cruel to the reſt for no cauſe at all. So prone are we to imagine the DIVINE BEING like what he is fartheſt from reſembling, I mean ourſelves we that caſt upon him the higheſt diſhonour, while we aſcribe thoſe weak paſſions to Divinity, which are the frailties and the blemiſhes of human nature.

As nothing can be ſo great a ſupport to moral goodneſs as true religion; ſo nothing is ſo deſtructive of it, as falſe and unworthy conceptions of the DEITY. The firm and ſteady belief of a GOD, who is ever repreſented as a true model and example of the higheſt goodneſs and moſt exact juſtice, who orders all things for the beſt, and conſults the happineſs of every particular ſo far as is conſiſtent with the general good; ſuch a view of divine providence and bounty, extended to all, and conſtantly employed for the good of the whole, muſt contribute very much to fix a true judgment or ſenſe of what is amiable and excellent; engage us to imitate ſo illuſtrious a pattern, and to act in our narrow ſphere by the ſame principle, ſo far as our ſmall ability will extend, which is indeed our main duty and moſt acceptable ſervice.

But if the DEITY is repreſented under an immoral character; if we take him to be cruel and unjuſt, partial and revengeful, this can have no other tendency than to ſap the foundation of all moral virtue, and reverſe the natural ſenſe of right and wrong, by making thoſe qualities amiable and adorable which are really odious and deteſtable.

This will gradually produce a partial, narrow, and unſociable ſpirit; and the moſt unjuſt and cruel actions will be no longer viewed with abhorrence, but by the force of this example may come to be conſidered as divine, and worthy of imitation.

Alſo when men are ſo irreligious as to imagine the DEITY to be immoral, his example will not only have a bad influence, but his favour and reſentment will be injuriouſly and wantonly applied, and his rewards and puniſhments unequally diſtributed. Thus he is often repreſented as being highly offended with his creatures, for making a free and impartial uſe of thoſe natural powers he has given them, to judge of what is true or falſe, right or wrong, and to regulate their conduct accordingly; though this is certainly no more than every man's duty.

Yet, in conſequence of this falſe opinion of the DIVINE BEING, thoſe who cannot reſign their underſtandings to our direction, but ſhall preſume to differ from us in their religious belief, and perhaps to worſhip GOD in a different manner; all theſe ſhall be pointed out as the objects of his wrath drawing down his vengeance on the whole community. And as others may with equal reaſon paſs the ſame cenſure upon us, this with the aſſiſtance of odious appellations, and reproachful names, may ſometimes among different perſuaſions, occaſion a mutual hatred and bitter antipathy, more implacable than could ariſe from any temporal intereſt whatſoever.

But ſurely ſuch opinions and practices as are hurtful to none, nor directly inconſiſtent with the public peace, though they may poſſibly be ſometimes fooliſh and abſurd, and conſequently the proper ſubjects for mirth and raillery; yet they ought by no means to be treated with rage and fury.

For whatever is ſo far deſtructive of natural affection and humanity, as to give us injurious opinions of others, and create in us averſion and ill-will towards them, without juſt cauſe, or beyond a juſt degree, from whatever notion or principle it may be advanced, it is utterly inconſiſtent with the happineſs of ſociety; and as it is a hinderance to the practice of virtue, it is ſo far repugnant to the welfare of every particular: it deſtroys that peace and tranquillity of mind, that eaſe and good humour, ſo eſſential to our felicity; is productive of nothing but continual rancour, and in its conſequence will be ſure to bring upon us ſorrow and remorſe.

When the moral qualities of any perſons appear to be wholly evil, and their actions extremely hurtful to others, they raiſe in us not only hatred and averſion, but alſo indignation, ſuſpending for a time, that kindneſs and good-will which we naturally bear to all, moving us forcibly the contrary way, and inciting us to their harm and deſtruction, as creatures that are pernicious to the reſt of their kind.

But this paſſion of anger and reſentment is moſt frequently and moſt powerfully kindled by

injuries done to ourſelves, becauſe we are apt to be very ſenſibly affected with that moral evil in others, by which we ourſelves come to be ſufferers; and this in a juſt degree, is very requiſite, as it fortifies us to repel injury, and reſiſt violence when offered.

If any creature was wholly void of this paſſion, and could be ſo tame, as patiently to bear all indignities, ſuch a one muſt not expect to be very free from inſults and abuſes; for it is of no ſmall efficacy to reſtrain men from ill actions, when they know that they ſhall incur not only the hatred and ill-will of all obſervers, but alſo the vengeance of the injured parties; and one perſon intending violence and harm to another, is often deterred from the execution, when he perceives by the riſing motions of this paſſion, that it will not paſs unpuniſhed. But certainly we ought here to practiſe forbearance and reſtraint, becauſe too much indulgence to reſentment is ſcarce conſiſtent with our happineſs. All the ſatisfaction we can receive in gratifying revenge, is only a ſhort-lived joy, that reſults from the removal of a moſt grievous and tormenting anguiſh; and which is often followed by heavy and laſting remorſe. We ought therefore to avoid it as much as poſſible, and eſpecially to guard againſt the exceſs of this paſſion, ſo deſtructive of humanity, and of every kind and ſocial affection.

For it ruffles and diſcompoſes the mind, deſtroys good humour and eaſineſs of temper, hindering the exerciſe of benevolence towards others,

as well as to thoſe that gave the provocation, and introducing, by degrees, a habit of perverſeneſs and ill-nature: this may at laſt alſo degenerate into cruelty, barbarity and inhumanity, the moſt horrid and unnatural of all paſſions, and attended with the greateſt miſery; as they imply a ſtate of almoſt continual bitterneſs and torment, but with little mixture of any real and natural joy, accompanied with a conſciouſneſs of the deſerved hatred and ill-will, the hoſtility, and vengeance of all mankind.

This paſſion whenever it prevails, is of all others the moſt raging and impetuous; it bears down reaſon, and every oppoſite affection like a tempeſt, hurrying men into actions, contrary to all honour and juſtice, as well as to their own intereſt and ſafety. It would therefore be the greateſt prudence, to ſtifle and ſuppreſs as much as poſſible the firſt motions of anger, and give ourſelves liberty to examine, whether what we take to be an injury, may not be an accidental harm, without any malicious intention. It is but a weakneſs to be put out of temper by every little accident which happens to incommode us; nor is any thing the proper object of reſentment, but what proceeds from an evil diſpoſition: and many actions which do ſo, and are real injuries, had yet better be deſpiſed and overlooked, or turned off with an air of pleaſantry, than ſeriouſly and ſtiffly reſented.

Weak and feeble minds are moſt prone to anger, and by their exceeding fierceneſs, generally diſappoint their own purpoſes; but the greateſt

and braveſt of men are always calm and ſedate; they are above being diſturbed with little injuries, and can generouſly pardon the greateſt, taking more delight in mercy and forgiveneſs, than in proſecuting revenge when it is in their power.

SECT. VII. *How the ſenſe of honour and reputation ought to be moderated.*

AS the practice of moral goodneſs yields the greateſt pleaſure, ſo the reflection on ſuch a conduct, and the conſciouſneſs of having done what is decent and right, affords a real and a natural joy; and next to this, we are ſo formed by nature, as to delight in the eſteem and approbation of others, which to an honeſt mind, is an exquiſite ſatisfaction.

But here it will be found very neceſſary for every man to form within himſelf a true judgment, and a proportionate taſte in life and manners, that he may not fooliſhly applaud himſelf, nor expect the approbation of others, for that which is not excellent and worthy.

If this ſenſe of honour and reputation is directed by reaſon, ſo as to regard only the judgment of the wiſe and good, obtained by real merit, it will prove a moſt powerful incentive to virtue; but if it is an undiſtinguiſhed deſire to gain the good opinion of thoſe we converſe with promiſcuouſly, it may frequently lead us aſtray. For in many perſons the moral ſenſe is very much depraved, and they are taught to meaſure right and wrong, not by the ſtandard of moral excel-

lence, but from falſe and partial rules, contrived for other purpoſes than to promote the happineſs of mankind; and thereby are accuſtomed to admire and eſteem many things which are not morally good, and to condemn others that are no way evil.

No wiſe man will ever ſet any great value upon ſo low a thing as the ignorant commendation of ſuch as know ſo little what is truly laudable. He will ſteadily purſue what he takes to be right; and as he will not be much elated with the praiſe of ſuch as are no competent judges, ſo neither will he be much dejected, when he is hated and evil ſpoken of by them, but will rather count it an honour.

Whoever is ſo fond of popular applauſe, as to make the vulgar opinion always the rule of his conduct, cannot fail of being often led into errors; and though he may by partial and immoral actions gain the applauſe of all his aſſociates, or of a party whoſe intereſt is contrary to the general good, he will at the ſame time moſt deſervedly be deteſted by others; nor can any one attain to true and laſting honour, but by real merit, and ſuch a behaviour as is adapted to the welfare of the whole community.

It will be the part of wiſdom to moderate this love of reputation, ſo far as never to aim at it by indirect methods; and ſtrive to obtain it, by ſuch actions as will, ſooner or later, deſtroy the approbation of our own minds, and that peace of conſcience, which of all worldly poſſeſſions is the

moſt invaluable. All the honour we can gain by ſuch means, is only a falſe and deceitful good, which deprives us of one much greater; and, as it is built upon a wrong foundation, can never be ſound and laſting, but will rather end in infamy and diſgrace.

The love and eſteem of others, when obtained by actions truly honourable, yields a pleaſure not only natural and juſt, but alſo exquiſitely delightful; and the beſt and nobleſt minds are moſt ſuſceptible of this paſſion, which yet ought to be reſtrained, and kept within due bounds. It ſhould always be our principle care to form juſt opinions of ourſelves; and to guard againſt flattery and falſe praiſe from without, and an ignorant ſelf-eſteem from within, that we be not betrayed into vain and conceited imaginations of our own worth, ſo as to expect a greater ſhare of deference than we really deſerve.

There are many who expect to be admired for the beauty of their perſon, or the elegance of their dreſs; or elſe may claim it by a ſhew of grandeur and magnificence, in a ſtately palace, a ſumptuous table, and a ſplendid equipage; ſome demand honour and reſpect, by ſtaffs, ribands, titles, and ſuch like glittering ware; while others build their fame upon the ſole foundation of courage and military atchievements, or of temperance and auſterity, wealth and power, wit and policy: all which are worthy of eſteem, when rightly applied. All the affectation is, we are often ſo partial, as to ſet too high a value upon thoſe endowments we

are poſſeſſed of, or elſe we imagine ourſelves poſſeſſed of more than others can diſcover: this will naturally lead us to arrogate to ourſelves a greater degree of reſpect than is our due; than which nothing can more expoſe a man to ridicule and contempt.

He that would gain true honour, muſt not openly lay claim to it, but rather renounce all pretenſions, and appear to act from a better and a nobler motive. And indeed whoever ſincerely aims at virtue and happineſs, will induſtriouſly ſtrive to keep this love of fame under ſubjection: he will be modeſt and humble, contenting himſelf with the teſtimony of his own conſcience, and the approbation of thoſe few good men, to whom he has the happineſs to be intimately known, without being ſolicitous about the reſt; ſince an immoderate deſire after honour and applauſe, which exceeds the bounds of an honeſt emulation, and riſes into pride and ambition, is ſo vain and fooliſh a thing.

Who would ever engage in ſuch a purſuit, who conſiders with what difficulty a general reputation is to be obtained; how often it is ſullied by miſrepreſentation, and how eaſily it is blaſted by calumny, ſlander, and detraction.

The moſt diſtinguiſhed excellence is commonly the mark of envy and ill-nature; for it is the fault of all proud and ambitious ſpirits, that they judge too partially of their own worth, and raiſing their expectations too high are apt to think themſelves injured when others are advanced above

them, and obtain more honour than themſelves; and this moves them to hate others, for thoſe very qualities that ought to win their admiration and eſteem, and to uſe all baſe and unworthy methods to leſſen and defame them.

And thus we ſee, that this ſort of honour which depends on the opinion of others, is but an uncertain good, difficult to obtain, and hazardous to preſerve, and beſides that, too eager a purſuit of it is attended with numberleſs diſquiets; nor is any thing more deſtructive of private happineſs, and of the peace and harmony of ſociety, than this paſſion, when it is immoderate and unreſtrained.

It is eaſy to obſerve, in common life, that many perſons of tolerable good nature, and no ways touched with pride, yet, through too tender a ſenſe of honour and reputation, are more diſturbed than is neceſſary with every little mark of diſreſpect; and from the ſame cauſe, are alſo apt to be too quick-ſighted to diſcern an affront, and look upon that as a ſlight, which was never intended as ſuch. This will often occaſion needleſs uneaſineſs and reſentment, and diſturb the mutual agreement betwixt friends, who might otherwiſe live together in uninterrupted quiet.

Where there is leſs good-nature, and a greater degree of pride, the diſorders it produces will be ſo much the greater; and eſpecially where the love of glory is very intenſe, and comes united in perſons of an high rank, with a genius enterpriſing and fiery, it diſplays itſelf in a more ſenſible

manner, ſetting nations together at war and ſacrificing many thouſands to the vanity of a ſingle perſon. But if we may be allowed, upon a fair inquiry, to ballance the whole amount of what ſuch a perſon can poſſibly gain, with regard to real happineſs and contentment, it will be found to be very inconſiderable. It is only an empty bubble, a fantaſtical good, incapable of yielding any true and ſolid ſatisfaction; but what he will be likely to loſe, is very apparent: for this affection, when it is ſo headſtrong and impatient, will be ſure to fill the hearts of ambitious and aſpiring men with conſtant anxiety, jealouſy, and miſtruſt; and the cruel ſhocks of diſappointment, the workings of envy, and the bitter ſtings of affront, will be perpetually tormenting thoſe, whoſe deſires after honour and applauſe are ſo exceſſive.

Whereas they who act from a virtuous inclination, without any ſuch ardent thirſt after fame, and can rather ſlight and deſpiſe the opinion of the vulgar, will not fail, ſooner or later, to obtain the largeſt ſhare of it; and if their ſtation in the world has been ſuch, as to enable them to be beneficial to a conſiderable part of mankind, their names will be made immortal, and they will be for ever remembered with eſteem and honour.

RECAPITULATION AND CONCLUSION.

But to draw towards a concluſion. The ſum of what has been advanced is only this: that as GOD ALMIGHTY has endowed men with various ſenſes, or powers of affection, and thereby made them ſuſceptible of happineſs and miſery, he has

alſo given them the active powers of thought and motion, which enable them to purſue the one, and fly from the other: all perſons being neceſſarily determined, by all the means within their power, to ſhun or get quit of every painful and uneaſy ſenſation; as well as to retain that which is pleaſing and delightful.

All preſent good affects us with pleaſure, which never puts us into motion, nor gives us any inclination but to continue in our preſent ſtate; but preſent or approaching evil gives us pain and diſturbance, and, by exciting our averſion, moves us powerfully to fly from and avoid it: alſo the idea of abſent good makes us uneaſy in the want of it, and by exciting our deſire, attracts us ſtrongly to ſeek after and obtain it.

If our motion could be always directed to our beſt and chiefeſt good, this would be perfectly right; but whenever we purſue that which upon the whole is not our good, as alſo when we fly from that which is neceſſarily and abſolutely evil, theſe muſt be manifeſt errors in our conduct; as they do not lead us towards happineſs, which is the centre to which all our motions are to tend.

Yet we are unavoidably expoſed to ſuch errors, becauſe we are put into motion by deſire or averſion, which, though excited by the objects of good and evil, yet they are not always proportionable to their true and intrinſic value, but to their appearance, and the impreſſion they make upon the mind, and the fancy or opinion we have of them; and it may frequently happen, from many cauſes,

that the apparent good or evil may be different from the real.

But here a main queſtion will ariſe, whether we ought to leave all things to chance, take up with every prepoſſeſſing fancy, and ſuffer ourſelves to be carried where every foremoſt inclination would lead us; or whether we ought not rather to uſe our thinking faculty, and employ ſome induſtry and care, to order and direct our motion for the beſt, that we may, ſo far as in us lies, ſhun and avoid all evil, and obtain the beſt and greateſt good.

This latter ſeems to be moſt eligible, and if we have any regard to happineſs, is certainly our duty, becauſe the author of our beings has not only made us liable to paſſions, which ſerve to put us into motion, but has alſo given us reaſon, to govern and direct theſe paſſions, which will not fail to guide us ſo much the nearer to our happineſs, as we obey its dictates, and follow its direction: whereas, if we take up with the ſuggeſtions of fancy, without further examination, and yield to the impulſe of every deſire and averſion, we ſhall be led aſtray, and wander far from our true felicity.

We are not neceſſarily determined by evey firſt impreſſion; but may have it in our power, as it is no impoſſible attainment, upon any occaſion to curb our paſſions, and thereby ſtop and ſuſpend our motion, until we have fairly examined whither it will tend; whether what we purſue as good, may not in its conſequence bring upon us greater inconvenience; and what we fly from as evil, may

not hereafter procure us greater advantage; and afterwards to continue or alter its direction, as reaſon ſhall give the word of command.

Whoever can do this, may be ſaid to be free and maſter of himſelf; but he who is hurried away by the violence of every head-ſtrong affection, which he is not able to control, is no longer free, but miſerably captivated and enſlaved.

As this power of reaſoning, comparing, and judging, is thought to be the higheſt and nobleſt faculty of human nature, being indeed the only thing we are poſſeſt of which is divine; it ought certainly to have the ſupreme and abſolute command, elſe our conduct will have a mixture of folly and madneſs. We ſhall often run headlong into ſuch meaſures as are contrary to our happineſs, and even the very beſt affections, if they are partial and miſguided, may prove moſt pernicious.

Therefore it ought to be every one's main concern, to endeavour to bring his paſſions into ſubjection, and by the frequent uſe of forbearance and endurance, to gain ſomewhat of an habit of ſelf-denial, which is the grand principle of wiſdom.

It is not by indulging, and giving a looſe to every forward inclination, that we can hope to attain to happineſs, but by curbing and reſtraining; which muſt unavoidably coſt ſome preſent pain and trouble, nor can it be done without ſome violence to the ſenſitive part of our nature: yet repeated uſe will render the practice of it more eaſy, and reaſon will certainly recommend it as highly requiſite, becauſe whatever we may ſuffer in

this conflict, will be amply repaid by the great advantages which will enſue.

For by this means, a man will gain an opportunity to ſearch the ſource and original of all errors; and, by weighing and conſidering every circumſtance, to rectify thoſe falſe opinions, which lead him aſtray, and are the occaſions of ſo much vexation and calamity. This will not fail of having a happy influence upon his conduct; for when all undue appearances are corrected, he will then forbear all wrong purſuits, and feel no hinderance in following ſteadily that path which his deliberate judgment ſhall point out to him. And thus at laſt he will come to know his true ſcope and end, and upon all occaſions, take the moſt proper meaſures to avoid what might give him diſquiet, and to obtain the greateſt and moſt laſting pleaſure.

The firſt and moſt eſſential part of happineſs is to be free from miſery, ſo far as our condition will allow; and this is thought to be beſt ſecured by a continued courſe of health, a competent eſtate, and a temper equal and compoſed. The firſt will prevent all racking pains in the body, as the ſecond will render a man eaſy in his outward circumſtances, and the third, which is of the greateſt moment, will make him eaſy in his mind.

The two firſt are not alway in our power; yet temperance and forbearance of all exceſs, in ſenſual pleaſures, joined with a moderate uſe of exerciſe and labour, will contribute very much to preſerve health, and promote chearfulneſs and

good-humour; as induſtry, and a due application to buſineſs, will in moſt caſes acquire a competent fortune, ſufficient not only to ſet a man above the fear of want, but enable him to be kind and helpful to others; yet whatever his ſucceſs may be in theſe affairs, if he is deſirous to paſs thro' the world with as little trouble as is poſſible, he ſhould principally endeavour to procure to himſelf an equal mind, and by rectifying his opinions, to moderate his affections, ſo as not to aim at high and difficult attainments, but to reſt ſatisfied with ſuch as are within his power; never vexing and tormenting himſelf with impatient deſires, nor with dreadful averſions or fears, with cruel reflections on what is paſt, nor with anxious cares about what is to come, but in every circumſtance of life to be eaſy and contented.

After guarding againſt unneceſſary pain and trouble, our next care ſhould be, to obtain the greateſt pleaſure our condition will allow of; always ſetting a juſt value upon every enjoyment, and making thoſe which are of an inferior nature, yield to ſuch as are more exalted and refined. Yet as all theſe powers of affection were given us for a good purpoſe, they may and ought to be employed under juſt reſtrictions.

No wiſe man will, with an affected auſterity, renounce all ſenſual pleaſures; but he will manage them ſo, as not to interfere with nobler pleaſures, and will always uſe them with temperance and moderation, whereby he will enjoy them in the greateſt perfection. He ſhould not

be afraid of intermixing a little pain, which will give a greater reliſh to theſe gratifications. Abſtinence and hunger will make his food more delicious, as exerciſe and labour will render his reſt more ſweet: and after having ſpent the day in buſineſs, he may better devote the evening to innocent mirth and chearful company; for gaiety and pleaſantneſs in their proper ſeaſons are exceeding uſeful; as they help to maintain good humour, and ſerve as a ſpecific antidote againſt ſerious extravagance and melancholy deluſion.

The pleaſures of the underſtanding, or of the imagination, which reſults from the diſcovery of truth, or the ſurvey of beauty, which we meet with in the purſuit of natural knowledge, and every branch of polite learning, are as entertaining to the mind, as the proper objects are to our outward ſenſes, and are by general conſent allowed to be more excellent and refined. Therefore, whoever has leiſure and opportunity for it, ſhould ſtrive to enrich his mind with the treaſures of knowledge, to enlarge his underſtanding, and improve his reaſon, which will be of great advantage in his conduct, beſides the immediate pleaſure theſe ſpeculations afford; which is of no ſmall value, ſince even the meaneſt ſubjects of this kind may furniſh a moſt elegant as well as innocent entertainment, and ſupply a great variety of amuſements to paſs away that time with pleaſure, which might otherwiſe lie heavy on our hands, or perhaps be worſe employed.

But of all the delights which human nature is

capable of enjoying, the moſt lively and tranſporting are thoſe which flow from ſympathy and ſocial paſſion; which conſiſt in the exerciſe of kindneſs and humanity, gratitude and love. For the Sovereign Ruler of the world has made thoſe affections moſt exquiſitely pleaſing, and moſt conducing to the private happineſs of every particular, which at the ſame time tend moſt to promote the general good.

And they are not only the moſt pleaſing in their immediate exerciſe, but alſo in contemplation and reflection; for every mind or thinking principle is ſo formed by nature, as to perceive a beauty and a grace in every thing that is harmonious and proportionable, regular and good, contrived by wiſdom and deſign for the greateſt advantage; and eſpecially in that harmony of the ſentiments and affections in the human mind, which is adapted to the happineſs of every particular, and alſo to the general good of the whole ſyſtem.

This moral beauty which appears in real life, is of all others the moſt engaging, and adorned with the moſt powerful charms; yielding the higheſt delight whenever we view it in others, and much more when we are conſcious of it in ourſelves. This affords continual joy, ſupporting men under the greateſt ſufferings, and even in the article of death; whereas the contrary is moſt odious, exciting our higheſt averſion and deteſtation. And whatever is acted in violation of this natural conſcience, deſtroys all inward peace, and ſets us at continual variance with ourſelves; becauſe that

which pleaſes in the action, will diſpleaſe in reflection, and create perpetual repentance and ſelf-diſapprobation.

It is alſo of no ſmall moment, that whenever we vary from this primary meaſure of honeſty and worth, we ſhall not only be ſelf-condemned, but ſhall alſo undergo the cenſure of others, and incur the hatred and reſentment of all about us: as on the contrary, whoever can regulate his actions according to the rules of virtue and honour, will not only have the inward teſtimony of his own heart, but will gain the love and eſteem, the approbation and praiſe of all mankind, or at leaſt of all whoſe opinion is worth regarding.

Which leads to the main concluſion we have endeavoured to eſtabliſh: for we do preſume to affirm, how contrary ſoever it may be to the prevailing opinion, that VIRTUE is ſomething more than an empty ſound, being, in truth, the beſt and chiefeſt good; that it is not only the ſupport and ornament of ſociety, and beneficial to mankind in general, but the trueſt and moſt ſubſtantial happineſs to every particular perſon, as it yields the greateſt pleaſure, both in its immediate exerciſe, and in its conſequences and effects. It is this which gives a reliſh to all other pleaſures; and where it is wholly wanting, there can be no true nor laſting pleaſure, but all will be bitterneſs, horror and remorſe, without the leaſt mixture of any thing gentle and agreeable.

Therefore, whoever is deſirous to obtain the greateſt pleaſure he is capable of receiving, after

having firſt ſettled right notions of what is worthy and valuable in life, ſhould endeavour by the patient uſe of forbearance, to wean his fancy from inferior enjoyments; as by due conſideration he may raiſe his deſire, and by habitual practice increaſe his reliſh of thoſe that are his higheſt good; and by working upon his own mind, he may bring all his diſpoſitions and affections to that juſt harmony ſo eſſential to virtue and happineſs, which are found to be one and the ſame.

He will principally ſtrive to cultivate a virtuous diſpoſition, and form his temper to kindneſs and humanity: whatever elſe he may have, he will be ſure to preſerve his conſcience clear, and his honour inviolate; ſuppreſſing every baſe and ſelfiſh inclination, and cheriſhing as much as poſſible a generous and benevolent ſpirit. This he will make the ruling paſſion of his life; and his chief ambition will be to do good to all, ſo far as his abilities will extend. All his other pleaſures will then be brought to correſpond and be friends with this, and no affection will be indulged that is in the leaſt inconſiſtent with it; and that for this plain reaſon, becauſe the nearer we approach the ſtandard of moral excellence, the more we ſhall advance our own true happineſs, which every man of reaſon and reflection will propoſe to himſelf, as the ultimate end of all his actions.

Yet after all, with our utmoſt efforts, we ſhall not be able to attain to perfect virtue, or complete happineſs; but virtue and vice, wiſdom and folly, happineſs and miſery, will be differently ſhared, and variouſly mixed and compounded in the ſeve-

ral characters of mankind: and ſo it muſt of neceſſity be, unleſs we could be omniſcient and infallible, endowed with other faculties than our CREATOR has been pleaſed to give us. The SUPREME WISDOM beſt knows how to compoſe the diſorders of the intelligent world, to reconcile the jarring motions, and make all the ſeeming diſorders contribute to a moſt perfect harmony. But that is perhaps above the reach of our underſtandings: we can diſtinguiſh what is apparently good or evil with relation to ourſelves and to thoſe of our own kind; and have the natural ſenſe of right and wrong to direct us in our conduct, and to which we ſhould always pay the greateſt regard; but of what is abſolutely good or evil we can form no judgment, becauſe we cannot ſee the whole, nor any part of it fully: and we are loſt in mazes, whenever we preſume to reaſon about things that are placed beyond our view, and of what we can form no ideas, but what are very inadequate and imperfect.

But as we know, that in the univerſe all things are governed and regulated for the beſt by a being infinitely wiſe and good; we have reaſon to believe, that not only thoſe motions that we now perceive to be regular and juſt, but thoſe alſo which appear to be moſt irregular, all the various errors and imperfections of the ſeveral parts, are guided by a ſuperior hand, ſo as to conſpire to the beauty, order, and perfection of the whole.

THE END.